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ABSTRACT

SELF-RELIANCE OR DEPENDENCY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
May 1988
THOMAS R. NEILSON, B.A., SUNY CORTLAND
M.Ed. NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY

Ed.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by: Professor Robert J. Miltz

This dissertation is about refugees in Somalia, how

they got there, where they came from, and why they stay.
It discusses the community development program, the

notion of self-reliance and the manipulation of these
concepts to create a circumstance of regional dependency.
The research puts refugee circumstances in Somalia
into a global context of economic and military oppression.

Dispelling the myths of poor farm management,

drought, overpopulation, and backwardness, war is named
as the primary cause of refugee origins worldwide.

A major theme of the research is that we live in

a

corporate warfare/welfare world in which development aid
pursues hearts and minds, as well as markets.

Within

this system, development workers must understand local

political/social structures and put them into the context
of global political/economic realities.
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

Background
This dissertation is rooted in my work with the

United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in
Somalia in 1983 and 84.

It also incorporates my

experiences from work and travel since leaving the United
States 18 years ago during the Vietnam war.
During the sixties,

I

was part of the anti-war

movement and a supporter of civil rights, but
in connecting the two.

I

was slow

It wasn't until Martin Luther

King returned from Vietnam and connected the war, racism,
poverty, labor exploitation, and global domination that

many of us began making these relationships.
King became dangerous to the government and was

assassinated.

The FBI and CIA could deal with the Civil

Rights Movement as long as it was "Love Thy Neighbor" and

sitting at lunch counters, but demanding economic justice
was another issue.

I

took my activism, my idealism, my

anger, and my boredom to Colombia, South America with the

Peace Corps, where

I

became an extension agent for

agribusiness, soon to realize that the Peace Corps was
just another instrument of US foreign policy.
I

left the States with the notion that

to teach Colombians about farming.

I

was going

Two decades later,

look back and say that my good intentions were racist.
1

I

2

My concept of social change was developed from a position
of cultural and racial superiority.

it was a "white

liberal" attitude of "helping minorities", a process in

which the reality of oppressed people is named by the
privileged in power.
Leaving Colombia in 1974,

swore

I

I

would never work

for Peace Corps again, but two years later the

organization said they would send me to Senegal.
never been to Africa and

I

knew

I

I

had

had much to learn about

the continent and its people.
I

worked for an organization called Promotion

Humaine, francophone for community development.

Like my

previous Peace Corps work, it was another welfare program
for selected villages that had contacts with the

government.

It was a "Hearts and Minds" program to win

friends for the United States.

In Senegal,

I

was the

anti-neo-colonialist wanting to organize Senegalese

villagers against corporate control of their land and the
food they ate.

This was racist as well because

Senegalese villagers did not need a white guy to organize
them for anything.
Senegal had the greatest impact on me.

Daily

I

observed the violence of cash cropping, indiscriminate

pesticide use, infant mortality, and debt.

One big

difference, however, between the villagers and me was

that

I

could walk away from it anytime

I

chose.

I

have
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been aware of class inequalities since childhood, but it
was in Senegal that

I

really began struggling with a

class analysis of oppression.
I

went to Kenya with Peace Corps because

I

was

^ job in program evaluation and later as training

director.

This was an opportunity,

I

thought, to impact

on the system from a position of power within the system
^J3d

therefore have influence on policy.

I

was wrong.

Six months of work on program evaluation was covered up
by Peace Corps/Kenya, never leaving Nairobi.
of all this was that

I

was then asked if

I

The irony

was interested

in an Associate Director's position in Kenya.

refused.

I

Working with HCR/Somalia was more of the same.
was increasingly frustrated and angry because

I

I

could see

no place in the system to do anything other than collude

with the oppression.

During the last two decades

I

have

known many development workers who carry around their
activism, idealism, frustration, and anger looking to do

good deeds.

Obstacles that impede these good deeds

include naivete, cynicism, racism, classism, sexism,

nationalistic chavinism, and little awareness of
political economy.

This research will discuss these

obstacles by examining the concept of self-reliance.
The dissertation is about self-reliance because
"helping" refugees to self-reliance was a main part of my
job description with the HCR.

Self-reliance was in
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nearly everyone else's job description, as well.

A

serious problem in Somalia was getting people to agree
on

what self-reliance was.

Chapter One discusses some

theoretical views concerning self-reliance.
The refugee program in Somalia is a case study of a

global issue.

In Somalia many development workers saw

circumstances as isolated from any greater global
context.

Chapter Two addresses political and economic

considerations that relate to refugee origins worldwide.
It focuses on US foreign policy, the global dimensions of

which must be understood before working in another
country.

Two key concepts are power and privilege.

Chapter Three presents an analysis concerning selfreliance as a feasible objective in Somali camps.

It

addresses the systemic realities of development work in
Somalia by including the opinions of several development

workers and some suggestions for "durable solutions".
Chapter Four draws on the systemic power and

privilege from the preceding chapters and focuses on the
geo-political realities specific to the Horn of Africa,

particularly their relationship to development work and
foreign policy in the Horn, especially with people in
Somali refugee camps.

In this chapter, self-reliance is

looked at in terms of self-determination.

Liberation

struggles are more easily understood when the dynamics of

self-determination are contrasted with the dominant

5

Characteristics of colonialism and imperialism.
Community development was also part of my job
description. Community development was to be a

key

component to the durable solutions exercise for
refugees.
Chapter Five discusses why community development
wasn't
successful, primarily because of the systemic issues

raised in the first four chapters.

Community development in Somalia had a training

component to train its workers.

Chapter Six offers a

^^se study of a training for which
responsible.

I

was largely

The power relationships within the

hierarchy of a small, local training program resemble the
relationships

I

see at the national and global level.

The last chapter presents my analysis and

conclusions.

An exciting part of this research has been

the number of past colleagues who participated by filling
out a questionnaire, as well as the several interviews

with US government representatives in Washington. Twentyfive out of 50 questionnaires were returned, a very high

rate of 50%.

Eleven of these 50 were sent to people

currently working with the National Refugee Commission
(NRC)

in Somalia or HCR/Somalia.

None of them replied.

Excluding the 11 current employees of NRC and HCR,
the return on the questionnaire was 64% which indicates
the interest and concern these colleagues have with their

work in the Horn.

I

am writing largely from personal experience.

Truth is a function of experience.
time.

It is a function of

This dissertation is truth as

years of experience.

I

I

know it from 39 +

do not consider myself an

authority on the Horn or on refugees.

I

offer that in

this document may exist a bit of wisdom for anyone on his
or her way to work with refugees, to work in the Horn, or

anywhere in the world.

It may help you decide what to

take and what baggage to leave behind.

Purpose of the Study
The primary question to be answered in light of the

preceding issues is:
What are the issues and problems related to
self-reliance, what are the preconditions necessary for

self-reliance, and do these preconditions allow for self-

reliance as

a

feasible objective in Somali refugee camps?

Significance of the Study
The significance of this research is that it

addresses the creation and continuation of

a

situation among people in the Horn of Africa.

dependency
It

discusses how foreign aid can perpetuate dependency
(intentionally or not) rather than facilitate
self-reliance, and raises some critical ethical and

political considerations for people working in this area.

7

Economic and political power is at the root of
refugee origins.

Understanding the global, regional, and

local power structures and its imposed limits is

essential before attempting legitimate development
e.g. education for self-reliance.

The research has provided an opportunity for people

who have worked with refugees in Somalia to share ideas
and discuss alternatives.

The results of the research

offer information to an audience which includes the
UNHCR, the US State Department, the Somali Government
(SDR)

,

voluntary agencies, all donors of aid,

politicians, and the United States public.

Clarifications

Assumptions
1.

Overpopulation, poor farm management by small

farmers, and drought are not the causes of refugee

populations.
2.

War is the primary reason.

When discussing community development for

self-reliance there are two major concepts that have been
researched in considerable depth by others:

(1)

phenomenon that is legislated.

a.

Self-reliance is not

b.

Broad based community development and growth are not

a

realized merely through skill acquisition; i.e. education
and training alone cannot foster self-reliance.

Other

larger factors such as security and sel f-management must

8

be acknowledged if effective development is to
take place

and be sustained.
3.

As instruments of change, education and training are

necessary components for community development programs.
However

,

they must be linked to community-based and

•^oritrolled participation since only in this manner can

communities focus on the heart of their problems.
Definitions

(

2

The key terms for this research will be defined in
the following way:
1*

Self-reliance

-

Viewed as central to empowering

the disenfranchised by developing skills in awareness,

problem solving, and decision making.

The key to self-

reliance as a development alternative is to include and
give power to target people in the decision making process at all levels of project development and management.
2

.

Self -management

-

As a concept it means a direct

comprehensive democracy in the economic, political, and
cultural unit which affords democratic representation to
all participants in the production process.
3.

Participation

-

Seen as both

a

motivating force

in learning and as an empowering force through addressing

the needs of people/learners

self-reliance in

a

.

As it relates to

developmental context, it reguires

that these people are included in and have access to

power in the decision making process at all stages of

project development and management.
Community development

-

Based on the belief that

the abilities and energies of people in a community
can
be used to improve their lives through the use of

democratic processes and voluntary efforts; A process of
social action in which people of a community organize

themselves for planning and action, define their common
individual needs and problems, make and execute plans

with

a

maximum of reliance on community resources.

Design of Study

This study is a descriptive and analytical treatment
of the community development program in Somali refugee

camps set in a regional and global context.
In that my methodology is essentially qualitative,

the following steps were taken to insure validity of the

study while answering the following implementing

questions
1.

What is the existing literature pertaining to

theoretical issues of self-reliance?
The initial step was a critical literature review of
the primary and secondary source material available in

this area.

Many of the contributors have

analysis referred to as dependency theory.

a

developmental
For purposes

of this study, dependency theory is viewed as a system

actively exploiting people in oppressed countries for
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their labor, resources, and markets to increase the

wealth of people from oppressor countries.
2.

Where do refugees come from worldwide?
Contributors include environmentalists, political

econo- mists, academicians, news reporters, and accounts
from UN, US State Department, and voluntary agency
(volag) personnel.

Personal experience provides primary source
irif oi^s^tion

through conversations, meetings, interviews,

and observations.
3.

What is the feasibility of self-reliance in Somali
refugee camps?
This chapter is a political economic review of the

issue through four lenses at four levels; local,
national, regional, and global.

Key themes in this

chapter are "Food as a Weapon" and "The Myth of
Neutrality."

My information is from personal experience

and from the literature.
4.

What are the geo-political concerns in the Horn of

Africa?
There is a lack (if not a poverty) of good,

comprehensive writing concerning the Horn.

To a degree

this derth of literature is from a lack of access to the

primary sources of production and dissemination of
information in Ethiopia.

Habte suggests that this is

complicated with misinformation "from the absence of

11

systematic accountability from a community of scholars

who specialize in the area."

(3)

As a consequence, anyone purporting to be an expert
in the region can get his/her manuscripts published with

the consequence of having considerable influence on

public opinion.
If not an expert,

I

am at least knowledgeable of my

sphere of the Horn, and from that knowledge comes a power
to affect people's thinking.

I

know this experience has

given me a perspective that is important to share.

I

am

also aware that the people who participated in this

research do not represent all sides of the argument.
This was a matter of inaccessability and unwillingness on

behalf of some people to cooperate with the research.
For others, non-participation was a matter of safety.
I

have reviewed publications that are pro-Soviet,

pro-US, and pro-Mengistu.

have met with the National

I

Union of Eritrean Women (NUEW) and been in contact with
people connected to the Eritrean People's Liberation
Front (EPLF)

,

The Eritrean Medical Association (EMA)

Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)

,

,

The

and the Western Somalia

Liberation Front (WSLF)
5.

How does non formal education facilitate

self-reliance in Somali refugee camps?
The core of this chapter is my personal experience

working in Northwest Somalia.

My primary responsibili-

12

ties were protection and assistance issues both of
which

were part of the community development program.

Sources

include daily interaction through conversations,
meetings, memos, letters, reports, and observations.

The

interactions listed above are with Ethiopian refugees and

people who have worked with refugees including voluntary
agencies, the UN, the US State Department, the Somali

government and Somali residents.
6.

What are the practical considerations behind

implementing a community development training program?
This chapter is a product of my work and includes

conversations, memos, meetings, and reports in Somalia.
7

.

What are the analysis and conclusions from this

research?
In Somalia, analysis of the notes and observations

began immediately.

Obtaining data through work

experience was the action part of the research.
to Freire's praxis,

co-workers, as

I

I

Similar

reflected on the interactions with

continued my work in the field.

This

process continued in a cyclical pattern of action and

reflection throughout the research.
The information is important.

Most questionnaire

and interview respondents want to see the finished

product.

People were eager to discuss their work which

is illustrated by the percentage return of

questionnaires.

The research has provided an opportunity

13

for me to think critically about my work over
the last

two decades and has influenced my choices for the
future.

Collection of data from

a

year's work in Somalia

provides an accurate day to day account of events.

These

records are added to multiple sources of data collection
from diverse organizations and individuals.

documentation is accurate.

All

Anonymous sources of

information and questionnaires have always been available
to be shared with the Chair of my committee.

For

reasons of safety, all refugee names are fictitious.

All

cases where only one name is used represents a fictitious
name except in the case of writers.

A full name such as

Clare Rolfe or Representative Blavo are real names.

Questionnaire and Interview
Data from one questionnaire is included.

I

was

assisted at different times in questionnaire development
and testing by colleagues who were from my committee, co-

workers, Ethiopian, Somali, and the University of

Massachusetts School of Education Research and
Development Office.

It was sent to volag, US State

Department, HCR, and SDR employees who worked and still
are working with refugees in Somalia.

Interviews were conducted in Washington with

13 US

State Department, United States Aid in International

Development (USAID)

,

and Food For Peace (FFP)

14

representatives
Data from the questionnaire and interviews was

referenced in chapters two through seven.

The

questionnaire data was codified with a Likert scale to
reveal any patterns present in the research.

A strength

of the research lies with the participants who have

cooperated in providing data and analysis.

FOOTNOTES
1.

See dissertations of S. Gajanayake, 1985, and
Graybill, in process, CIE, U/Mass, Amherst.

2.

These definitions draw largely from the work of H.
Reed and B. Loughran, Beyond Schools CITP, CERC,
U/Mass, Amherst, Ma, 1984; The definitions for
community development and self-reliance are
compatible with SDR documents and are the
definitions that I shall use for purposes of this
research.
They are the theoretical bases for the
HCR sponsored community development program, the
goal of which is self-reliance.
I expect that the
process of this dissertation will reveal other
definitions of these terms, which may lead to a
better understanding of any contradictions that
exist in the practical application of this work in
Somalia

D.

.

3.

Habte, "Books on the Ethiopian Revolution: A
Review Essay," in Socialism and Democracy,
Fall/Winter 1986.

A.

CHAPTER

2

THEORETICAL ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE;
A LITERATURE REVIEW

"Remove the chains of oppression and the yoke of
injustice, and let the oppressed go free." Isaiah

58 6
:

In order to analyse the self-reliance initiative in

Somalia and through it the issues and problems of

community development in Somali refugee camps, it is
necessary to examine the various existing theories of

self-reliance and how these relate in practice to
community development.
Of these self-reliance theorists, people such as

Nyerere, Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh, and Rousseau stressed

agrarian reform as the basis on which to build an

egalitarian self-reliant society.

Cohen and Uphoff from

Cornell University, and Galjart and Buijs from Leiden,
and Galtung have written extensively about participation
as a necessary part of the developmental process.

Rogers

and Maslow write about self-actualization, and Freire

stresses critical conciousness and self-confidence to

describe self-reliant individuals and groups, both of
these concepts being important qualities in Gandhian
nonviolence.

Shadid, Prins, and Nas emphasize the

realities of access, the right to inclusion.
Participation, self-reliance, self-help, and community
15

development are abstract concepts and easily

misunderstood when loosely defined or not
defined at
all.
Self-reliance can be "implemented" by a
centralized
authority in a condescending, altruistic, and
harmful
way.

It can be utilized to manipulate people
for

amusement, power, and financial gain.

In these cases,

P^^^i^ip^tory movements are co-opted into autocracy or
poorly organized to the point of ineffectiveness.
Ideology stressing control of production, access
to
land, or a right to participate in making local
decisions
is a process to empower.

This is usually threatening to

elites in controlling positions, be they heads of state,

corporate directors, or representatives of international

organizations such as the UNHCR.

Self-reliance and self-

determination require committment and struggle.

They are

not romantic notions of rags to riches.
As a development strategy, it is wrong to think of

self-reliance as a new concept, a creation from a think
tank in Geneva, Beijing, Dar es Salaam, or Amherst.

On

the contrary, it has probably existed from the beginnings
of human development as a natural and essential form of

social behavior.
Five years after William Walker's invasion of

Nicaragua, Smiles (1859) wrote about the destruction of

colonizers who exploited overseas sources of raw
materials.

He wrote:

17

"There is a fundamental ideological and
practical
incompatibility between nineteenth century
liberal
capitalism and self-reliance." (i)

Smiles considered capitalism to be
individualistic
and competitive.

He considered collective self-reliance

as the only compatible approach favoring
community and

group interests.

Julius Nyerere and Uiamaa
The notion of collective self-reliance was

fundamental to
development.

u~i

amaa

,

Nyerere 's program for internal

Rooted in agrarian reform, a major

objective of u^ amaa was an increase in agricultural crops
local consumption as opposed to cash crops for

European markets.

Availability and access to food is

unquestionably an essential component of self-reliance,
but agriculture was a means to a greater goal for Nyerere
and this was human dignity in a Tanzania built on

traditional democratic, non-capitalist structures.

Writing in 1963 he stated:
"We in Africa have no more need of being converted
to socialism than we have of being taught
democracy.
Both are rooted in our past in the
traditional society which produced us." (2)

The strategy was inclusive rural participation in

decision making implemented through communal village
organization
In 1967, Nyerere stated in the Arusha Declaration

that his political party (TANU) was:

18

"...involved in a war against poverty and
oppression. .. it is our weakness that has lead to
being oppressed, exploited, and disregarded." 3 our
(

)

He called for a revolution that would put an end
to

weakness, oppression, humiliation, and exploitation.

He

suggested that one way for Tanzanians to liberate themselves was to avoid external finance through gifts, loans
and private investment.

Gifts of food claimed Nyerere,

could undercut the Tanzanian marketing of local food.
have high interest rates and often political and

economic stipulations attached to them.

Private invest—

ment is in the donor's interest as it allows for repatriated profits at the expense of the Tanzanian economy.
"The prosperous nations," Nyerere wrote, "have not

accepted a responsibility to fight world poverty."

(4)

The worst crime of colonialism to Nyerere was
t>slittling indigenous cultures as backward,

Europe, or non-existent.

inferior to

He wanted to instill confidence

among Tanzanians to dismantle these oppressive structures
on their own.

He emphasized that wealthy nations will

not readily give up privilege to help the poor:
"On the surface they look very strong - they have
the police, they have the army and they have the
economy which can keep them in power for a long,
long time. They appear determined to stay in power.
So if you look at it purely from the outside, you
see that these people can stay for a long time. The
African opposition inside can organize the masses,
but they have no fire power. The government has the
monopoly on fire power. These young men and women
who defy the state have nothing except their courage
and when you see that kind of confrontation you say,
how can they do anything? These people can go on

19

for a long time."

(5)

Nyerere emphasized the importance of education
as an
integral element of ujamaa, stressing that
classrooms
existed everywhere, at markets, at offices, in
fields, on
buses, that everyone was an ujamaa teacher, and
that this

way of life would free from dependency and lead
Africa's
struggle for self-determination.

dependent," he once said,

"

"We are so import

we import even our management

ability," to tell us what to do.

(6)

writes that the ujamaa model was a promising

alternative in its organization of rural people into
decentralized, self-managed communities which by their

nature change political and economic power relationships.

He suggests that this type of organization

strengthens the:
"political conciousness of the rural population in
reference to its own cultural, technical, and social
being." (7)
The alternative Buntzel describes is attractive, but
it is important not to regard ujamaa or any model as a

formula within itself that changes power relationships.
Further, decentralization of political and economic

structures does not automatically change power

relationships and strengthen political conciousness.
Shiviji cautions that collectives like those in

Tanzania may come under the control of bureaucratic

bourgeoisie and become susceptible to foreign political
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and economic intervention and cutural
intrusion.

Buntzel

concurs that this is an "invariable result
of organizing
the rural population from above."
(8)

Organizing from above, the oppressor need not
be
foreign, rather can easily be internal and
local. Nyerere
admitted that even though TANU tried to facilitate
participation, leadership was unorganized and imposing:
'We're better organized now than we were in 1967.
So the problem is not socialism.
The problem is the
process of implementing socialism." 9
(
)

Van Vroonhoven argues that the problem was

convincing people it was in their interest to farm
communally when many had decided that they preferred to
remain on their own plots of land.
In Freedom and Socialism (1968) Nyerere referred to

village people as sovereign and encouraged leadership to
identify with the masses by living with them and

experiencing their lives:
"iri the course of building socialism, and especially
in a poor, underdeveloped country, naturally you are
groping in the dark. You make some decisions that
are right and others that are not." (10)

Van Vroonhoven writes sixteen years later that it
was an imposition for many people:

"Peasants were persuaded by arguments, lured by
substantial subsidies, but frequently also forced
and sometimes under threat of violence moved to new
settlements." (11)
not always prudently chosen, according to Van Vroonhoven,

by the government.

In F reedom

^
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^yelopment, Nyerere clearly states;

"Unless the purpose and socialist ideology
of an
understood by the membeL from the
ginning, at least to some extent, the
village
will not survive the early difficulties."
(12)

This applies not only to the village,
but to the
national government as well, similarly,
it applies to
villagers as well as to officials at all
levels of the
bureaucracy, technicians and managers in
business and
industry, TANU, and foreign interest groups
who either
intentionally oppose and resist ujamaa or who
may not
understand what it is. Parker (1979) and Shivji

(1976)

support this argument by pointing out that the
manipulation and pressure of multinational corporations
(MNC)

and

foreign capital groups was always present and strong.
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has

^^iticized agro— businesses that have penetrated rural

agriculture systems with capital and technology:

—

"
with their foreign capital investments they tend
to P^oinote concentration of the ownership or control
of land, to displace labor and cultivators on fam
lands and thus to contribute to the perpetuation of
rural poverty." (13)

U1 Haq reasons that the only alternative to this

social and economic oppression is:
"...a genuinely socialist system based on a
different ideology and a different pattern of
society.
It means a major change in the political
balance of power within these societies and drastic
economic and social reform." (14)

With control of production and decision making power
in the hands of a national or local elite, the infra-
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structure for self-reliance will not exist
and the formation of self-reliant groups will be neither
seriously
promoted nor tolerated by controlling interests,
be they
local or foreign; feudal or capitalist.

Developmentally

,

control through a centralized, top

down infrastructure at the global, regional, and
natonal
levels has been responsible for an increase in
poverty

as

measured in the actual numbers of poor and increasingly
poor people throughout the world.

it is

reflected in

disease, unemployment, and most of all hunger.

(14a)

Gandhi and Self-Sufficiency

Similar to Nyerere's agrarian reform, Gandhi

envisioned

a

network of self-governing, self-reliant

villages trading with other self-managing villages.
Small cooperative units organized at

a

grass-roots level

with an ever-increasing control of production would allow
less advantage for dictatorship from above and afar.

This was his recipe for democracy (Fischer 1954)

Gandhi's democracy was in terms of community

education in sanitation and hygiene, cattle breeding, and
fertilization of fields, spinning and weaving cloth, and

cooperative arrangements to market produce and purchase
necessary items.
At Tolstoy farm, Gandhi was "insistent on sanitation

and environmental preventive medicine, or the need to
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turn waste into wealth." (15)

Above all, it was to allow

people to "discover that in themselves and
in their
cooperative efforts lay their salvation."
Working
(16)
cooperatively was a critical first step towards
a self-

determinating society, one in which people could
liberate
themselves from cultural dependence. Cultural
dependence
was the worst form of dependence to Gandhi and
the worst
crime perpetrated by colonial powers.

Rabindranath Tagore believed that India had made its
own shackles.

in a letter to Gandhi, Tagore wrote:

"Prisoner, tell me who was it that brought this
unbreakable chain? It was I, said the prisoner, who
forged this chain very carefully." 17
(

)

Standing in the face of powerful governments,

exploitative economic structures, and oppressive
majorities, the result is a shrinking human being who has

seemingly lost control of his/her peace and security with
an inability to change the situation.

When this

submission happens, explained Gandhi, the road is open to

dictatorship and totalitarianism.
The danger in a poor country, Gandhi cautioned was
to have a virtue made of necessity, be it in the form of

money, clothing, food, or external control in a political

and/or economic sense.

When this occurs, consumption can

be imposed on the poor whereby they can be easily

manipulated by the rich.
For Gandhi, the village was the locus of struggle and
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the organizational center for democracy.

Solidarity

through partici-pation would provide people
with the
potential to successfully confront the exploitation
foreigners and local elites.

His

of

circles of intercon-

nected villages paralleled Nyerere's ujamaa
in its
insistence on local self-sufficiency, mainly in

food.

Gandhi's development ethics blended social,
cultural, and economic factors.

Unlike colonial powers,

he drew no distinctions between ethics and economics;

"Economics that hurt the moral well-being of an
individual or a nation are immoral and therefore
sinful
Thus the economics that permit one country
to prey on another are immoral." (18)
.

isnce for Gandhi started with the individual

and found its greatest application at the village level.

Individual self-help and self-sufficiency (counting on
one's own resources) were integrated with "solidarity and

interdependence among equals."

(19)

The individual was

like the village, both being independent for basic needs

and yet "interdependent for many other needs in which

dependency is a necessity."

(20)

Gandhi was influenced by the writings of many,

including Thoreau, Rousseau, Ruskin, Emerson, Tolstoy,

utopian socialists (not Marx)
Christianity.

,

and by the fundamentals of

From these teachings, intertwined with his

own strong roots in Hinduism, evolved his high regard for

human labor as unquestionably possessing more value than
the machine.

Also were formed the moral and political
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sh iins3. (non~viol©nc©)

.

Truth and Non-Viol©nc©

N©hru was oft©n impati©nt with Gandhi's id©alism of
th© villag© ©mbodi©d in truth and non-viol©nc©.

N©hru

r©gard©d villag©s and th©ir inhabitants as backward both

culturally and intellectually and as such, on© could make
little progress with them in these areas.

He often

viewed the poor as dishonest and prone to violence which
in his mind made Gandhi s ahimsa not practical in a
'

developmental context (Collins and LaPierre 1984)
For Gandhi, however, any dishonesty and violence had
its roots in hunger which was all the more incentive for

him to proceed with his Panchavat (direct democracy at
the village level)

.

To him any "marginal democratic"

changes were merely a perpetuation of a violent status
quo.

The best attempts at land reform legislation to him

were a sham because the political influences of the

landlords were in no functional way altered.

In

situations such as these there was no overt killing,

therefore they were not conceived of as violent
situations.

Yet this:

"...stalemate and inaction lead to hunger and
deprivation of millions ... even though nobody pulls
the trigger of a machine gun, such an environment of
utter degradation, filth, and hopelessness is just
as violent ... one cannot deny that it is in such
environments that crime and violence flourish and
undermine the stability of a society." (21)

For the hungry, Gandhi told Nehru, "Liberty,
God,
and all such words are merely letters put together

without the slightest meaning."

(22)

Truth and Civil Disobedience

Emerson and Thoreau both read and borrowed from the

Bhagavad Gita and some of the Hindu Upanishads.
D isobedience

set free.

,

In civil

Thoreau spoke of the prisoner's soul being

Gandhi was impressed by this work for a number

of reasons, but one concept stood out and this was the

emphasis on truth as a basis for his actions.
Gandhi was God.

Truth to

To Gandhi, the truth would make you not

only free, but provide you with sound mental health as
well.

Truth Gandhi set himself free to go to jail.
Some of Gandhi's major teachings were in the area of

self-assertion which was exemplified in the Indian
resistance movement using civil disobedience as
tactic.

a

Nehru once said that Gandhi had "straightened

our backs and stiffened our spines ... Power cannot ride on
an upright back."

(23)

Gandhi was corresponding with Leo Tolstoy just prior
to his death in 1910.

Truth to Tolstoy was:

"...standing up for your rights... as a rational and
free man, and defending them, not. .with concessions
and promises ... but with moral and human dignity."
.

(24)

Tolstoy's comment on self-reliance is perhaps best
expressed in The Kingdom of God is Within You (1894)
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where he states that through non-violence,
people can
resist evil and set themselves and the world
free,

whether the government likes it or not.

Operating from a

similar moral premise, Thoreau wrote in Civil Disobedi-

—

(1849)

what

I

that he had an obligation "to do at any time

think right."

(25)

At the time of this writing,

Thoreau was protesting slavery and the US invasion of
Mexico.

In W hich Way to Peace (1936), Bertrand Russell

advocated direct action through civil disobedience:
"...all great advances have involved illegality.
The early Christians broke the law? Galileo broke
the law; the French revolutionaries broke the law;
early trade unionists broke the law. The instances
are so numerous and so important that no one can
maintain as an absolute principle obedience to
constituted authority." (26)

Writing against the barbarity and legitimacy of
World War

I,

he wrote from prison,

"As a lover of truth,

the national propaganda of all the belligerent nations

sickens me." (27)

For Gandhi, Tolstoy, Thoreau, and

Russell, non-violence through civil disobedience was

a

mechanism to express truth, a truth that ultimately leads
to justice.

For Martin Luther King Jr.

the choice was

"clearly between non-violence and non-existence."

(28)

Economic Justice
King's justice was economic without which, there

would never be political justice.
Thomas Paine

(

Agrarian Justice

^

Two centuries earlier.

put forth an indictment
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Of poverty based on the economic
injustice he had

experienced in Europe and the US.

He argued not for

charity, but rights; not bounty but justice.

In the

R ights of Man (1791) he referred to
the chains of

political superstition and how they must be
broken
(Tagore's shackles) that degraded people must
rise to
their proper rank. The French Revolution was
influenced
by Paine and his contemporary, Jean Jacques
Rousseau.

Like Paine, Rousseau was concerned with the
inequalities
from political and economic dependency.

Rousseau viewed

justice in terms of agrarian reform:
''...the only means of maintaining the external

independence of the state. With all the wealth in
the world, if you lack food, you will be dependent
on others.
if you wish to be a free nation...
nation that is self-sufficient unto itself and
happy. .employ the masses of your population in
agriculture " (29)
.

.

Rousseau's self-reliant individual in a self-reliant

society is associated with equality derived from:
1)

Control of production of basic needs and

2)

Direct participation in political life.

Rousseau's conception of an egalitarian community was
"bands of peasants regulating the affairs of state under
an oak tree."

(30)

In his mind, poverty was caused by an

oppressive monarchy and malicious power relationships
forming around new technology and economic arrangements
of the industrial revolution.

Tickner uses a definition of self-reliance by
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Galtung (1980) which she feels is appropriate
for
Rousseau's peasant. As such, s/he is viewed in
terms of:
or a faith in one's own values,

culture, and civilization;
2)

The ability to be self-sufficient to produce basic

needs; and

3)

Fearle ssness/Invulnerabil ity

^

a structure

of defense to withstand external coersive power.

(31)

Political Economy Rousseau described an ideal

society that was static and non-progressive.

He was:

"against social mobility. Progress brings a division
of labor which leads to ineguality and dependence:
social complexity, usually associated with urban
life, erodes the ties of equality that bind men
together and break down self-reliance." (32)

Gandhi and Mao echoed Rousseau's ideals of national
self- reliance and agricultural self-sufficiency, but Mao

did not envision a China in Rousseau's likeness that was

static and non-progressive.

The Chinese communists were

forced into a system of agricultural self-reliance out of

necessity during the struggle against the Kuomintang.
Then and later, Mao talked about "building up our country

through diligence and frugality."

(33)

Many austere

years contributed to Mao's belief in a self-reliant

society with a strong agricultural base.

Mao considered

self-reliance in food production essential for China to
build a strong industrial state, although:
"one in which industry would ideally be decentralized to avoid large urban concentrations." (34)

Unlike Rousseau, Mao recognized the importance of
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scientific education and the practical utility
of work.
Ch'en writes of Mao's reference to university
students
"who do not see how workers work, how
peasants
plough,

and how business is done."

(35)

"Man's knowledge depends

mainly on his activity in material production."
(35a)
In his Hunan Report of 1927, Mao articulated
the

role of the peasantry as "the vanguard in
overthrowing

the feudal forces" in Chinese society."

Cumings writes:

Mao's belief in the creativity and spontaneity of
the Chinese peasantry and his cooresponding distrust
of the pretensions of any elite (including the
Communist party) figures in his widespread adoption
of the practices of hsia-hsiang (to the villages)

Many would ascribe the entire Cultural Revolution
(1966-1968) to Mao's determination to prevent the
development of new elite values and to eradicate
persistent old ones in Chinese society." (36)

Education and Freedom
Like Mao, Gandhi was searching for an Indian

national identity to offset imperialism.

A major

however, was Gandhi's educational framework
for doing this.

Gandhi wanted adult education centers to

be consumer and producer co-ops, as well as to provide

training in village industries.

He did not profess

educational notions such as "all powerful".

Unlike Mao,

Gandhi's education for social change was rooted in nonviolence.

He recognized human weakness in himself and

others and had no standards of perfection for anyone.

Freedom for Gandhi was

a

freedom to make mistakes:

reedom IS not worth having if it does not
connote
freedom to err and even to sin.
If God has given
the humblest of His creatures the freedom
to
passes my comprehension how human beings, be err, it
they
ever so experienced and able, can delight
in
depriving other human beings of that precious
right." (37)
The right to err presupposes the right to

participate in legitimate ways.

Before one can

legitimately participate, one must have right to access

Agriculturally speaking this means access and tenure to
arable land.

In a political sense this means access to a

legitimate power to make decisions.

In the economic

arena it is access to the labor force and to markets.

Effective participation means having access to legitimate
power.

The Center for Self-Directed Learning sees

information as a critical source of power: "Information
gives you power

.

"

(38)

Access
Buijs defines access as:

"...the possibility of people to dispose of services
and goods intended for them which are not
distributed via the market system, but through
administrative institutions." (39)

Depending on the goods and services, this definition may

presuppose income or
terms of labor.

a

method of payment, perhaps in

Similarly, Schaffer sees access as

a set

of relationships "between the administrative allocation

of goods and services and the people who need them, and
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for whom they are intended,"

(40)

in a distribution

system which is not based on purchasing
power.
In addition to goods and services,
access is

considered by Shadid, Prins, and Nas as:

To Palmer, access is "including the excluded,"
(42)
but Colebatch affirms that access encompasses
much more

than mere inclusion, rather it is:
"the whole range of interactions, both of people and
of institutions, that govern the administrative
allocation of goods and services." (43)

All of these definitions/descriptions of access are
valid, but

I

am reluctant to exclude factors of income as

Schaffer suggests.

Disposable income is generally, but

not always, a consequence of factual access to the labor
market.

This income in turn provides access to the

consumer market which includes among other commodities,
nutritional, medical, legal, and educational services.
In a system based on maximization of profit and

simultaneous unemployment, we begin with an unequal
access to income which creates an unequal power structure
and inequitable distribution of resources which in turn

can generate and perpetuates problems with pragmatic

access to the system.
Buijs identifies two important dimensions which he

lables formal and factual access whereby one could have

a
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legal right to entrance (formal) but
be hindered by the
realities of social, economic, and political
structures
(factual)
Civil rights legislation is one example
from
the Civil War amendments to the Voting
Rights Act of 1964
to Reagan's attempts to rescind it;
Women's Rights from
the Suffrage Amendment of 1920 to the
defeat of the ERA;
Or an Ethiopian refugee's right to
protection from the
Somali army, as well as food and water without
a bribe.
These cases have long histories of circumstances
which
.

illustrate that having formal access has the potential
of
even greater risk than no formal access, when this
right
to access is pursued.
Buijs refers to this conflict of interests as the

"access tension field," a result of incongruencies or

contradictions in practicing one's formal right to
access.

This lack of harmony is created by different

methods of denial and exclusion not the least of which is
intimidation and co-optation by the system.

Buijs

includes one other dimension to formal access, the abuse
of which leads to corruption.

This occurs when an

individual or organization has no formal right to access,
yet assumes such out of self-interest.

United States

military intervention in Central America comes to mind,
as well as the inscription of Ethiopian refugees into the

Somali army.

This is power abuse.
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Access and Participation

Access does not mean participation.

considered by Buijs as
two levels:

1)

a

it is

prerequisite to participation at

Self- organization of the target
or

subordinate group and

2)

Action for the ultimate goal.

Dealing with two abstract concepts,
it is difficult and
unnecessary to put them in a time sequence.

What is necessary is to regard access
and

participation as educational processes.

Education and

rebellion are related processes in human
development
against oppressive conditions which restrict

the self-

determination of people.
Paulo Freire's conciousness raising is a mechanism
for liberation within a social, economic, and
political

context. He refers to oppression as dehumanizing,

stressing that the dehumanization affects "both the

oppressors and those whom they oppress."

(44)

It is the

responsibility of the oppressed to;
"wage for both the struggle for a fuller humanity.
The oppressor is himself dehumanized because he
dehumanizes others, and is therefore unable to lead
this struggle." (45)

Education and Liberation

Education to Freire is the practice of liberation
because it frees both the oppressor and the oppresed; the

teacher and the student from the;
"twin thraldom of silence and monologue as they
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learn of each other as beings of
worth." (46)
To understand this silence, one
must understand
dependence and its structural relationships.
a letter
to Freire, Jose Luis Fiori wrote:

m

not the
and imposes it on
the result of the
dominated and the

dominator who constructs a culture
the dominated. This culture is
structural relations between the
dominators." 47 ).
(

Hence the relational phenomenon of
dependence gives:
"rise to different forms of being, of
thinkina of
those of the culture of silence 'and
those of the culture that has a voice."
(48)
For Freire, the way to liberate oneself
from this
silence, to "have a voice", is through
political

literacy.

Through new generative words, learners:

"expand both their vocabulary and their capacity
for
expression by the development of their creative
imagination." (49)

Chomsky writes that creatively, the linguistic and
mental processes are virtually identical with:
"...language providing the primary means for free
expansion of thought and feeling, as well as for the
functioning of creative imagination." (50)
This creative imagination Freire suggests, is lost
in an illiterate society where an educated elite does all

the thinking.

In The Politics of Education

,

he states:

"As illiterate learners go on to organize a more
precise form of thinking through a problematical
vision of their world and a critical analysis of
their experience, they will be increasingly able to
act with more security in the world." (51)

This task of self-introspection, of inter-relationships

among people and the world based on social experiences.
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contributes to the ability of the
oppressed to think in
terms of control as regards their own
life functions.
This process of transformation Freire
calls prawis
Through praxis, one becomes the subject
of his/her
life and uses the power of thought
to work towards
.

social

change.

The praxis of political literacy allows
the
learner to "understand the word". The
word takes on new
power, and facilitates a process of
self-discovery

through which the oppressed can "say their
own word, to
name the world.” (52)
By naming their world, people can
create as they become more confident, and
simultaneously
overcome dehumanization. Carlos Fonseca once
said to an
showing a recruit how to clean a rifle, "When

you're done with the rifle, teach him to read."
As dehumanization dissipates, dignity develops.

As

subjects, the oppressed are makers of culture, makers of

history. Through praxis they have "a new instrument of

conduct" with which they can "overcome traditional

structures and enter the modern world." (53).

In

conversation, Freire once said, "The knowledge already
exists.

I'm there to help them order it." (54)

This "self-knowledge", writes Kubie, leads to

greater creativity, a less distorted perception of
reality, and a greater freedom." (55)

Homey concurs

that self-knowledge facilitates the loosening of inner

bonds and thus allows a person to be "free for the

development of his best potentialities."

(56)

Through cpncientizacao (conciousness raising)
Freire teaches that people can codify their:
"...total reality into symbols which can
generate
conciousness and empower them to alter
their relations with nature and social
forces." (57)

Critical conciousness is the key to cultural
emancipation.
In Education as t he Practice of Freedom
Freire
argues that the oppressed must continually focus
on the
slave conciousness which has been imposed on them
^

by

elites.

Freedom (and the foundation for self- reliance)

is the power to reject and throw off this imposed

unconciousness of inferiority.

in U.S. culture, as well

as elsewhere, the great excess of power which exists
has

^^^ipulsted and intimidated many people to submit to that
power, as well as encouraged others to be all powerful.

Schaull considers the impact of Freire 's methods of
teaching, as well as his impact on educators, to be

extraordinary in that it has made each group aware of
traditional lethargy and stagnancy in the educational
process.

Its reality, Freire says is to put "the

educator as a knowing subject face to face with learners
who are knowing subjects." (58)

The reality is also

prison and exile, both of which Freire has experienced.
"It is indispensable to be curious, critical, not to
be afraid of presenting feelings, not afraid of
being touched by fantasy, by intuition. .. Knowing is
not from guessing, but knowing allows you to guess.

This culture (U.S.) has a fear of freedom, a fear of
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controls which are
ed.
An inability to
power." (59)
By overcoming fear, by arriving at
a new awareness
of self and:

"...by looking critically at their social
situations, people take the initiative
in acting to

Transforming society is another way of saying
social
change.

As an organized educational activity,
this

transformation meets primary needs of local people
and is
instrumental in facilitating the struggle of community
development (Vella 1979)

Community Development

Gajanayake believes that as

a

developmental

approach, community development was introduced to

exploited countries by European and United Statesian

organizations in the fifties and sixties.

He suggests:

"This approach stressed the importance of people's
participation, but was only another version of the
old diffusionist strategy." (61)

Defined by the U.S. International Cooperation Admin-

istration (USICA)

,

community development is

a process:

"of social action in which people of a community
organize themselves for planning and action; define
their common and individual needs and problems; make
group and individual plans to meet their needs and
solve their problems, execute these plans with a
maximum of reliance upon community resources; and
supplement these resources when necessary with
service and material from governmental and non
governmental agencies outside the community." (62)
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Theoretically, this definition is
rooted in respect
for the human worth and dignity
of individuals.
However,
in Its practical application,
community development has
often been used to promote western
ideas and values or in
Uphoff s opinion, to encourage
programs in countries

which "had some strategic importance
to the west."

(63)

Das argues that in India:

benefitted the most from communiand a growing
inequality became visible in the rural disparity and
areas." (64)
f

° ^

He suggests that the:

"...dominant land owners benefitted from
sion work and other projects, rather than the extenthe majority of the poor peasants in the community."
(65)
Personal experiences in South America and Africa
lead me to concur with Das that village level
extension

workers were more often than not, representatives
of the

government and agroindustry rather than agents for social
change.

(66)

These extension workers are, in Todaro's

viewpoint, hooked into:
"... institutional and structural economic rigidities
and caught up in a dependence/dominance relationship
to rich countries." (67)

It is a consequence of the uneven design of capitalism:
"... in which the world consists of center and
periphery nations, and each nation in turn has its
center and periphery." (68)

The "New International Economic Order" (NIEO)

introduced in 1974 by the Group of Seventy Seven,
stresses narrowing:
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"...the gap between developed and
developina

-dressing
The implication of this is a rearranging
of

socio-political structures and an overhauling
of power
relationships as concerns political leadership
and
economic control. The logical path for
exploited

countries to follow is one of self-reliance
emphasizing
human and material resources at the local
level.
Goulet advocates a human needs based approach
within
the community development model. A human
needs approach
utilizing the energies of people is supported
by Abdalla
as a method to:

"undo the ties of dependency ... correct the
distortions and achieve internal integration of
national development." (70)

This for him is self-reliance with naturally motivated

people believing "the fruits of their endeavors belong to
them." (71)
For community development to be sustaining, there

must be participation.

Chambers believes that

participation increases communication and knowledge,
generates ideas, and facilitates problem solving, while
it encourages confidence and skill development through

cooperative working relationships.

Uphoff and Easmon concur;
"Participation in the decision making process can
reveal and tap previously unrecognized managerial
and leadership talents. .enhance the legitimacy of
the institutions and also national government.
.
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prcpvides a ready outlet for the
expression of

generate local cooperation and
elf help activities for development."
(72)

Participation

Participation is defined by Gajanayake as:
...the capacity to influence or to play
a vital
role in the development of various economic
and
social processes." (73)

As defined by Shadid, Prins, and Nas
it is:

"...taking part in the decision making and
implementation process of an organization."

(74)

French refers to participation as:
...a process where two or more parties influence
each other in making plans, policies, and decisions
that effect those making the decisions and on those
they represent." (75)

To Arnstein participation:
... is the strategy by which the have nots
co-decide
how information is spread, how ends and policies are
formulated." (76)
"

In its simplest, Meister concludes that participa-

tion means "to have a part of something." (77)
Lammas,

"an attempt to exert upward influence."

To
(78)

Reed and Associates view participation as an empowering process, reguiring that people are included in and
have access to power in decision making at all stages of

project development and management.

It is seen as both:

"...a motivating force in learning and as an
empowering force through addressing the needs of
learners." (79)

Cohen and Uphoff see participation as on-going,
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including the "decision making,
implementation, benefits,
and evaluation" (80) of development
projects. To Vella,
this process:
"

i^^volves time .

comprehensive respect ... a
listen.
Participation involves first
Of all an awareness of class distinctions...
comprehensive participation involves... a
hard
pragmatic comprehension of reality, admitting
everyone s perspective and respecting it."
(81)
:

: :

.

.

On the lowest rung of the participation
ladder
manipulation, persuation, and therapy which do are
permit real participation in decision making." not
(82)
In reality, this is non-participation and
deserves

no rung on any participation ladder,

with the refugee

business in Somalia, participation is often expressed
in
terms of coersion, and intimidation as well.
All of these descriptions of participation have a

common denominator in that they address a redistribution
of power and therefore a redistribution of control, or in

the abscence of this, an ensuing conflict.

As Freire has

discussed education as political, the process of

participation is similarly not neutral.

As an empowering

process, it addresses the roots of "human rights to

constructively change and improve one's quality of life"
(82a)

and with it are included accompanying risks.

The

alternative is as Gandhi has expressed, a continued

vulnerability to the violence of the status quo.
In a national development plan with a focus on

community development, participation means decentralization.

Writing in 1964, ten years before the coup in
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Ethiopia, Gabre Mariam (Haile
Selassie Law School) concluded that Ethiopia was at a stage
of development that
was socially and economically
hampered by a centralized
administrative system. He believed that
harmonious growth
could only be expected and in people's
interests through:

central
dministration and the participation government's
of the people
in such decentralized activities
... that the decisive
administration of local
a?fairr^h''''?H^r^''-°''
f fairs should be given to
the people of that area
that means the establishment of an
independent,
local, self-governing system." 83
(

)

Self-Governing Systems and the Workplace
Humanization, dignity, and economic viability are
as
important in the democratization of industry as
they are
to Nyerere's principles of agrarian reform.

A basic

premise of Drucker's (1954) is that job performance
in
industry is tied to internal motivation and self-

satisfaction stemming from responsibility,

a

belief that

decisions should be made at all levels of the workplace
by those closest to the problem.

Simmons and Mares concur that workplace democracy

giving workers more control over their jobs boosts
production, and the democratic restructuring is the key
to economic recovery.

The ultimate goal of workplace

democracy Hunnius believes, is self-management and social
change.

He postulates:

"The right to control and manage a joint effort
rests with all the members of that group,"
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stressing that:

capita??»^^84r^

labor management is in conflict
control and management by

What Hunnius considers a person's
moral and natural right
to individual self -management and
self-determination
is

countered by the perceived right of capital
to possession
and maximization of profits. This
"capitalist property
system", writes Hunnius, "legalizes theft
and tyranny in
the workplace." (85)
Wilson is concerned with worker alienation due
to
fragmentation of their lives into little bits of
activity.

The real objective, he argues is "direct
by workers, not indirect participation

resulting only in a temporary expedient."

(86)

Further,

he cautions of token participation where management,

often in collaboration with unions, manipulates workers
to decrease labor strength.

Aronowitz supports this argument by suggesting that

although unions are:
"...an elementary organ of struggle, they are also a
force for integrating workers into the corporate,
capitalist system." (87)
He argues that unions are often an appendage of the

corporations and in actuality serve corporate interests;
that although many unions in the U.S. have retained forms
of democracy, the content is no longer there.

This is

another example of what was mentioned earlier concerning
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and factual acc©ss

Ken Blaylock, president of the
American Federation
of Government Employees,
strongly promotes the rights of
international trade unions. At the
April 25th Mobilization (1987) in Washington DC, he
spoke forcefully against
Reagan's foreign policy in Central
America and Southern
Africa and the violence that is
perpetrated against
unions in those regions. At the
1985 AFL-CIO convention
in Anaheim, Blaylock criticized
AFL-CIO collusion with
the Reagan administration and its
CIA sponsored American
Institute for Free Labor Development
(AIFLD)

When I look at Iran, I look at Vietnam,
l look at
Nicaragua, I look at El Salvador and
Guatemala I
government to be on
the side of the people, not on the side
of rich
dictators living behind high walls. i think
has to stand for the principles of democracy, labor
human
rights and trade union rights. We should reject
policies of terror against the people of Central
America." (88)
At the NAACP's 78th annual convention. Rev. Jesse

Jackson attacked transnational corporations for runaway
shops that remove jobs from the US and put US labor into

exploitative competition with South Korean and Taiwanese
workers.

Jackson appealed for:

"...enforceable international laws against global
union busting, racism, sexism, and sweatshops.
multinational labor exportation and exploitation
must end... After the South Korean and Taiwanese
workers start watching the television sets, in
addition to building them, they will start marching.
Then they will be called Communists and we'll be
asked to take up guns and shoot them and they'll die
and we'll die... We've been down that road before, we
must go another way." (89)
.
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In the Summer of 1987, South
Koreans were in the
street.
As of 1983, only 57% of Korean
workers received
a salary above the poverty
level. Among working women,
only 37% earn wages above the

standard minimum

established by the government
authorized federation of
Korean unions. A Boston Globe
editorial asserts:
for democracy and spontaneous
strikes have demonstrated that
neither the militarv
^
officers who monopolize political
power nor the
corporate barons who wield economic
power Ln
P°Pular yearnings for freedom or
ror
a share in
fo^Tshare
in^^K^®
Korea's new prosperity.

who are now askina
independent unions and to
shfre in the nation's export-based
Share
prosperity, are
seeking the most basic form of social
justice." (90)
People concerned with workplace democracy
address
issues of dignity and humanization;
self-management and
self-determination; participation and access.
None use
the term self-reliance, but their rhetoric
incorporates
ideas of empowerment and in this they resemble
Freire.

Know your word, know your world, know your
workplace.

Genuine participation in the workplace, as in other
segments of society, requires a radical shift in power
and control among the privileged.

In industry as well as

educational institutions, it depends upon a radical
change in management philosophy.
Simmons and Mares draw

a

distinction between

political democracy which is indirect and

representational and workplace democracy which:
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"...usually means direct involvement in
ecisions through problem solving groups daily
and
consensus decision making. .. choosing
fellow
employees to sit on committees or the
board o f
directors, or selecting one's own manager...
people
see the results of their efforts,
while they often
do not in political democracy."
(91)

Mondragon
Perhaps the West's best example of a
self-reliant
and self-sustaining system in both human
and economic
terms, involving both self-management and
worker

ownership are the Northern Spain cooperatives of
Mondragon.

Mondragon has its physical and psychological

roots in the wretched devastation of the Basque
country
by Franco during the Spanish Civil War.

Father Jose Maria Arizmendi arrived in Mondragon in
1941 equipped with his Bible and Mao's Little Red Book

and initiated an apprentice school for technical

education.

Arizmendi

's

committment to freedom and the

importance to him of work and technical skill were
parallel to Mao, but he was against Mao's belief in

compulsory productive work.

Arizmendi described how:

"...students at the professional and polytechnical
school were able to cover their required contribu- tion
to school fees by taking part in productive work for the
market, but he insisted that they must be free not to do
that if they so desired." (92)
Simmons and Mares discuss two vital elements in

Mondragon's success.

One is the:

"...sophisticated management and ownership structure
of the individual firms, which balances managerial

effectiveness and employee participation.
The
combination of profit sharing for
the
ennl’nv
reinvestment needs^of thf

Mondragon has solved one of the
most acute problems of
cooperatives, the "reliable access to
adequate capital,"
(94) by beginning a Cooperative
Savings Bank called the
Caja Laboral Popular (The Bank of
People's
Labor).

The bank's assets are internal, its
funds coming
from over 300,000 depositors in the
cooperatives. This
IS consistent with the important
Mondragon rule of no

outside ownership of any Mondragon enterprise.

Ten

percent of all profits are invested in
community

organizations and institutions such as schools
and civic
associations. Twenty percent is reinvested in
the

cooperatives and 70% in individual worker accounts
which
is also money available to reinvest in the
cooperatives.

When workers leave the company, they must take their

4)

assets with them to ensure no outside ownership.
system, referred to by Simmons and Mares as

"pragmatic genius", balances individual needs with

company goals and is buttressed by four basic principles:
1)

Insure democratic from—the—bottom— up self-government;

2)

Contribution of capital by all working members;

3)

Protection of job security and work behavior and

discipline that promotes inter-cooperative solidarity and
coordination;

Open-door policies of maximum job creation and
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acceptance of new members.

(95)

Women and Self-Reliance
Karla Jackson-Brewer

Against Rape (NYWAR)

,

,

a

member of the New York Women

feels strongly that:

against women and children takes
many
exile, forced sterilization,
apartheid, sexual terror and assault."
(96)
Nina S.L. Martin, Volunteer
Coordinator/Supervisor
at Necessities/Necessidades, an
organization for battered
women and their children, asserts;

There are many similarities between US
foreign
policy and battering. Both are manipulative,
they
victim, and they undermine self-esteem
and
"determination
Both use physical and
psychological violence as a means of control,
a
control which is perpetuated through manipulated
economic relationships.
Because of this violence
and dependency, a nation or a woman knows
that
they attempt to pursue independence, they risk if
being
respectively destroyed or killed.
Both US foreign
policy and battering are carried out by insecure
individuals who have extreme needs for power and
control over others." (97)
.

In June 1987,

Yanira Corea, an El Salvadoran woman

working with the Committee in Solidarity with the People
of El Salvador (CISPES)

,

was raped and tortured by three

men identifying themselves with the Death Squads in El
Salvador.

Death threats were sent to 19 people in the

*^^9^^ization and several women were singled out with

warnings.

Two weeks later, another woman was kidnapped

and terrorized.

The FBI saw these incidents as isolated

and not requiring Federal investigation.

If there are

degrees of rape, political rape to
me is the most horrid.

Eritrean Women and Self-Determination
"Eritrean women are liberating themselves
and their
country at the same time
These words, spoken by keynote speaker
Dr. Helen
Rodriguez, were the theme of "Women to
Women: Towards
Self-Reliance," a conference sponsored by
the NUEW in
October 1986.
The NUEW writes that Eritrean women have

historically been "blunted by ossified
patriarchal
oppression and norms," structurally similar to
what women
experience in any oppressive culture:
"The social status of Eritrean women, as in
all
exploitative systems, is merely that of subservience
and they are confined to domestic work, deprived
of
access to other socially productive work.
Indeed,
Eritrean women were victims of class exploitation,
Patriarchal domination and feudalist myth and
reactionary scpcial norms in addition to the barbaric
crimes and injustices perpetrated on them by the
colonial enemy." (98)

One of the biggest challenges for the EPLF has been
to mobilize and incorporate women into the revolution.

Samuela Zerai,

a

nurse and member of the Eritrean Medical

Association sees Eritrean society in

process where

a

women and men are changing roles from

a

very traditional

patriarchal society to an egalitarian one,

which women are exploring

a

a

society in

new status, "a woman's bid

for freedom from traditional bondage."

This exploration, however, must be viewed within the
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reality that -one out of four women
die within six months
of childbirth.- Although
disease and malnutrition are
evident in these deaths, the root
cause, asserted Ms.
Zerai is a war that -that subverts
the economy."
(99)

Before the revolution, women could
not own property,
participate in legal transactions, or
discuss political
and religious issues. The founding
of the EPLF made
gender issues an important component
of the revolution:
"Without the conscious participation of
constitute half of the population, the women, who
revolution cannot triumph and likewise social
women's
emancipation depends on the victory of this
revolution." (100)

Literacy and health education are priority
issues in
this liberation process. According to Luul
Ghebreab,

Chairwoman of the NUEW in Italy;
"We work with women on different levels,
according
to their level of conciousness. We raise issues
very slowly. As time goes by, the women from the
village take up new concepts themselves, and then
they become those who are working for change."
(101)

The EPLF outlawed arranged marriages as well as

child brides.

Under EPLF law there is equal ownership of

property between husband and wife.

In the words of one

Eritrean woman, social responsibilities:
"are shared, whether cooking supper or sharing the
danger of military attack." (102)

One must be careful not to romanticize the

revolution and the role of women within it.

Eritrean

countryside has been ravaged by US and USSR bombing and
strafing for 27 years reeking a devastating horror and
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terror throughout the country.

To protect themselves and

avoid fleeing to the Sudan, much of
Eritrean society has
literally gone underground. Underground
there are
hospitals and clinics with women doctors
and nurses;
there are businesses and factories with
women workers and
managers; schools with women teachers.
(103)

Above ground at night, women till the
soil.
Negisti
Hintsa, Geologist/Economist, and member
of the EMA in
Canada explains:
"When the EPLF did land reform, the first
action was
landless and this meant women."
(104)

Above and below ground is the EPLF's army,
1/3 of whom
are women.
"When women engage in armed struggle,

they

learn their rights," professed Hintsa.

(105)

Saba Issayas, Chairwoman of the NUEWNA in New York,

suggests that it is because of these austere conditions,
in which the EPLF has no superpower assistance,

that has

made men and women realize they must work together for

everyone's liberation.

She asserts:

"The liberation of Eritrea will not take place
without the liberation of Eritrean women. And the
liberation of Eritrean women will not take place
without the liberation of Eritrea." (106)

Babu and Social Economy

Abdul Rahman M. Babu, a noted Tanzanian

Journalist/Economist refers to the Eritrean struggle as
"the hope for Africa:"
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Eritrea, my
wSh
wish we had our people so first impression was I
well-rounded like this
because we could have utilized
our resources in a
way that could have revolutionized
our
greatest achievement that
tniriK Eritrea has made."
think"'Eritraa*'i®
a*'®
(107)

'

Babu asserts that to achieve
economic independence
and self-reliance, neo-colonies
must pursue a socialist
approach to devel-opment. These
strategies must deal with
contradictions between industry and
agriculture, heavy
and light industry, large and small
scale, urban and
rural, capital or labor intensive.
To Babu, capitalist
controlled development, regardless of
good intentions,
results in punishing the poor because they
become:
"...a heavy burden on society. The contrast
to the
captalist and socialist approaches to this
problem
IS dramatically illustrated by the
development
experience of China and India.
in the one case the
peasantry IS a source of rapid development, in
other it IS a heavy burden on the economy; in the
one it
IS an asset, in the other a liability."
(108)

Babu stresses that economic planning is

fundamentally, political action:

A Socialist planner plans for freedom; he makes a
concious effort to liberate the economy from the
realm of necessity to the realm of freedom.
Political leaders must have no illusions about the
political nature of these objectives; and they must
articulate them to the masses." (109)
To serve people in transition to a self-reliant and

democratic society, Babu's economic planner must be a
social economist who is a politically motivated
technician.

The social economist:

"...begins from a premise which is fundamentally
political-freedom. The objective of a planned
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economy is freedom; to facilitate
move from the realm of necessity and hasten the
to the realm of
freedom." (110)

The Political Economy of Chuch

'

When George Wold was in Amherst
in April 1985 he
spoke briefly of self-reliance.
event of nuclear war,
he thought the two countries
surviving the longest would
be the United States and North
Korea. (Ill)

m

The US, he argued, has the largest
accumulation of
resources of any country in the world,
however these
resources are derived by oppressing other
countries.
it
is for this reason that Reagan
requests $300 Billion war
budgets.
As such, the US becomes a society
economically

dependent on military intervention to exploit
the
resources (human and natural) of other countries.
North Korea, he argued, is the best example of

a

country's accountability for its people and resources
in
terms of distribution of goods and services. Viewing
Chuch

'e as

an ideological concept, he added that North

Korea has manifested a high degree of political

organization that is both nationalistic and self-reliant.
Chuch e
'

'

s

nationalism and centralization are

contrary to many of the principles of self-reliance and
village level participation discussed in this chapter.
Ideas were certainly generated at the village level for

Chuch

'e,

but it is uncertain to what extent these ideas

were incorporated or co-opted
with government
implementation of the economic development

program.

Rooted in anti-imperialist thought,
Chuch'e draws
from Kim Il-song's struggle in
the thirties against the
Japanese, as well as present defense
precautions against
the unreliabilty of the USSR as
an ally and aid giver.
Politically this meant revolution, "an
act of

destruction willed against a whole ruling
class."
Cumings writes:
"North Korea's Communists turned to a
highly
coercive, ideological approach in its
revolutionary assault on the power of landed
privilege. Tight organization was the key
implementing the land reform and success in to
endeavor doubtless reinforced Kim Il-song's this
emphasis
on 'fostering the core.' (112)

Fostering the core was Kim's concept of the 'mass
line', a theory of developing the potential
of the masses
in agriculture and industry.

Kim stated in 1948:

We must acquire the work method of explaining matters to the masses, not commanding them, of going
deep into the midst of the masses and knowing their
feelings, teaching them and learning from them."
As relations deteriorated in the sixties with the
USSR, the economic implications of Chuch'e were expanded

to include economic self-sufficiency, particularly in

defense policy.

An editorial in "Nodong Sinmun" (1963)

compared the USSR to the US:
"Economic enslavement, exploitation and plundering
of the backward agricultural countries by the
industrially developed countries and, on this basis,
political domination of the former by the latter -
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mutual relations between countries
world... it is
such phenomena to exist between impermissible for
socialist
countries
.

The editorial criticized the USSR
for:

about independence, equality and noninternal affairs, while
independent national construction and disapprovinq
denying the
sovereignty and equality of other countries."
(114)

Similar to the language of Mao, Nyerere,
and Ghandi,
Kim stresses the necessity of economic
independence

before one can obtain political independence.

In a

cultural context, Kim echoes Freire, Rodney,
Fanon, and
Memmi when he speaks of psychological decolonization:
...an attempt to rid the conciousness of the
Korean
people of the stunting influences of the Japanese
period... as it (Chuch'e) strengthens the cultural
identity of the North... it strengthens common bonds
with the South and thus eases the transition towards
eventual reunification." 115
(

)

Summary
The contributors to this chapter view self-reliance
as a process for emancipation from political,

economic,

and social oppression in feudal, capitalist, colonial,
and imperial forms.

This oppression includes cultural

and psychological dependency, racism, classism, and

violence against women.
Chapter One discusses self-reliance as

a

collective

process in which oppressed groups obtain legitimate
economic, political and social power to control their
lives.

Viewing self-reliance as a socially integrated
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and interdependent process does
not minimize the emphasis
on personal dignity and self-esteem
and the importance of
personal power in this process.

Self-determination may be facilitated through
voting
or mandate, but the struggle is
strongest when people
internalize and are committed to personal
and collective
notions of worth and power. And
regardless of
interdependence, it may be necessary for an
oppressed
group to work among themselves. Women
working with women
at a battered woman's shelter is one
example of this.

Acountry closing its borders is another.
People, organizations, and governments work
at many

different levels of self-reliance and assuredly
there are
many different definitions of community development.
A

question to consider throughout this dissertation is
what
community control means. What are its implications?
Does it conflict or create a tension with national

control when strong centralization is viewed as
necessary, as in the case with North Korea?

A village's or country's concept of self-reliance

most likely has everything to do with political and

economic circumstances.
the economy?

Are they at war?

Who controls

And perhaps most importantly, who is

generating the notion of self-reliance.

Is it from

within or being imposed by outsiders?
As an educational concept, self-reliance is viewed

a liberating force.

This concept will now be
examined
discussing self-determinant
movements and the response
dominant forces in society to
them.
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3

POWER AND THE ORIGINS OF REFUGEES
"The outstanding lesson of the
Vietnam war is that
Vietnam-type L^uaU^n
arise°aaair"L'""
We were too late in recognizing
the
extent of the subversive threat. We
appreciate
now
that every young emerging country
must-be constantly
those symptoms which,
allowL
develop unrestrained, may eventually if
grow
situation such as that in South
Vie?nL
w have learned the need
Vietnam.
We
for a strong
police force and a strong police
intelligence
organization to assist in identifying early
the
symptoms of an incipient subversive
situation."
General Maxwell Taylor (1)

National Security
Subversion, according to General Taylor,
threatens
stability.
Subversion, viewed in these terms, also

threatens US security.

With reference to Vietnam, the

Pentagon Papers cite security as:
"...unthreatened control by the US client regime in
Saigon.
If Saigon controlled by sheer force and
violence, the people and hamlet were 'secure'
if
the NLF (National Liberation Forces) controlled
without force, the hamlet and its people were
insecure " (2
;

.

'

'

Black (1977) defines security in the US context as being:
".

.all-encompassing, involving economic and
political hegemony, as well as strictly military
considerations." (3)
.

That which must be secured is determined by:

"...what a nation, class, institution, or other
social entity has or thinks it should have." (4)
The great irony, she continues, is:

"...that the nations, groups, and individuals whose
wealth and power would appear to make them the most

secure, are in fact, the most
paranoid."

(

5)

James Gregor of Berkeley, considered
by NBC's
"Crossfire" as an expert foreign
affairs analyst, argues
that security is a function of
stability.
a stable
country is one "with continued
economic growth," and if a
military government is necessary
to achieve this growth,
then a military government must
be supported."
(6)

A Natural Right to Power

What the US defines as "strategic
interests", for
"national security," is invariably in
conflict with what
was discussed as self-reliance and
self-determination

in

the preceding chapter.

Recognizing and fearing movements

of self-determination, the US passed
the National

Security Act of 1947 creating the Department
of Defense
(War)
the CIA, and the National Security Council
,

(NSC)

The language in this act:

"...officially introduced the catchall abstraction
national security' that has since served to justify
everything from the procurement of questionable
weapons to the invasion of Grenada." (7)
The predisposed assumption to a natural right to

power "legitimizes" US military intervention at

a

global

level to keep subordinates within the US empire in line.

This attitude was clearly evident in Ollie North's

testimony at the Iran-Contra Hearings, a built-in selfjustification that fascism in the name of capitalism is
necessary and honorable:
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"...Where domination is so taken for
granted that
he hegemonic power intervenes
by inevitable and
unquestioned authority." (8)

North insisted he was acting under
the authorization
of the President, that he was merely
following orders to
execute Reagan's publicly stated foreign
policy against
Central America, which I believe is
true.
To quote
Reagan:
"When the Commander-in-Chief of a nation
finds it
necessary to order employees of the government
or
agencies of the government to do things that
would
technically break the law, he has to be able
to
declare it legal for them to do that." 9
(

)

From 1960 to 1979 there was an average of
one US
sponsored military takeover per year in Latin
America.

During the 35 year period from 1898 to 1934 there
were
US military interventions in the region.

effect",

if you will,

(lO)

33

A "domino

these invasions have resulted in

the death and displacement of millions of people, many

seeking asylum as refugees in foreign countries.

Who is a Refugee?
The UNHCR is quick to point out that not everyone on
the move is a refugee.

This may appear to be trite, but

definitions not withstanding, the HCR and countries that
are recipients of people displaced from their homes are

discerning as to who deserves international protection
and who does not.

This is evident when comparing US and Canadaian

policy towards Central
Americans. Canada grants
asylum
to all Guatemalans and El
Salvadorans fleeing political
persecution in their countries.
The United States
recognizes both governments as
models of democratic reform while it arms and trains
their death squads. Therefore the Reagan administration
refers to these asylum
seekers as economic migrants and
thus delegitimizes
refugee status for them. To do
otherwise would contra
diet US military aid and
intervention in the region.
Further, the international order
of people
regulation distinguishes between the
terms "refugee" and
"displaced person". The two major
documents defining
these terms are the 1951 Convention
Relating to the
Status of Refugees and the 1967
Protocol.
Their

definitions will be used in this study.
Refugees, in a classical sense, are
people fleeing
persecution and seeking asylum abroad. The
Organization
of African Unity (OAU) Convention in
1969 defined

refugees as people who are:
...compelled to leave their homeland because of
human— created disasters, i.e. armed conflict, or
other political and social upheavals." (11)

Persecuted people are further defined by the Convention
as persons who leave their country of origin because:

"...their life, security or liberty is threatened
due to generalized violence, foreign aggression,
i^t®i^nal conflict, massive violation of human rights
or other events which seriously disturb the public
order." (12)
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This definition has been
periodically supported by
numerous UN General Assembly
resolutions. Most recently,
these resolutions have been
endorsed by the Cartagena
Declaration (November 1984) for the
specific protection
of Central American refugees.
The concept of asylum, as well as
the word, originates in Greece. Orestes was a
refugee.
in the 13th
century B.C., a treaty between the
Egyptians and the
Hittites sought the return of refugees
to Egypt.
The
Hugenots were refugees, as were people
fleeing the Spanish Inquisition, Hitler, Stalin, Franco,
and the terrorism of US proxy governments.
it would be easy to fill a
chapter with a synopsis of people fleeing
persecution.
The UN distinguishes displaced people from
refugees
as

...persons fleeing natural disasters such as
drought or flood, if this is the only or principle
reason for their flight." (13)

An example of this are the Colombians displaced from

their homes after the eruption of the Nevada de Ruiz.
the UN identifies displaced people as being

internally displaced if they do not leave their country
of origin.

An example of this are the El Salvadorans and

Guatemalans who have been removed from their homes and
relocated in camps or strategic hamlets by their
governments; also Native Americans and Japanese Americans
in the United States.
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Power Relationships
The concept of power must
be understood when
discussing refugee populations.
Refugees have left their
homes because they have lost
the power to ensure their
security and survival. A
prerequisite to working with
refugees is understanding these
power dynamics at the
local, regional, and global
levels.
It is critical to examine
the belief systems,

behaviors, and attitudes that US
citizens have learned,
how these beliefs assist the
formulation of US foreign
policy, and the impact of this
policy around the world.
Understanding this context, it will
facilitate

comprehending that refugee populations,
particularly
since World War II, have not happened
in
isolation.

They

are the result of a consistent pattern,
a planned design
resulting from political, economic, and
military

intervention at a global level.

Power Abuse
In 1948, George Kennan in his position as advisor
to

the US State Department Planning Commission,
observed:
"We^ have about 50% of the world's wealth, but only
6.3% of its population ... In this situation, we
cannot fail to be the object of envy and
resentment.
Our real task in the coming period is
to devise a pattern of relationships which will
permit us to maintain this position of disparity
without positive detriment to our national
security ... We should cease to talk about vague and
unreal obj ectives such as human rights, the raising
living standards, and democratization. The day
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9 oing to have to deal in
”
power concepts. The less
hampered by ideological slogans,
the better."
{

14 )

Power IS the deciding factor
in society.
it is the
ultimate determinant fundamental
to relationships among
people.
Refugees are people who have lost
power.
The notion of power was not
invented by Kennan, nor
by the us Government. His words,
however, clearly
Illustrate the importance of political
and economic
control, a control realized by
either directly taking
over a government, setting up a
proxy government, or more
indirectly by controlling the laws
under which the

government operates.
Kennan 's contributions resulted in the
Grand Area
Scheme, an action plan whereby the US
would be able to
protect "its" sources of raw materials
worldwide.
in
essence, it was "protecting" these natural
resources from
the very people who had a right to them.
This economic
control necessitates political control. To
manipulate

both of these successfully is a full time job,
it right)

(if you do

and more often than not, requires military

intervention (McMahan, 1985, Herman 1984, Sunshine 1985).
The Center for Defense Information (GDI) writes that
the Grand Area Scheme divided the world:

"...into military regions for purposes of military
planning, putting a four star general or admiral in
charge of each. No other country has divided the
world up in quite this way." (15)
To legtimize these interventions, a common enemy was

72

needed. This was and still

is

communism:

system whereby the government
has direct
welfare^^f its

Communism and Refugees
Close examination is not required
to realize that
the US government, and therefore
usually the media, draws
a close link between
communism and refugee populations
(also a parallel between communism
and terrorism which
allegedly causes refugees)
US foreign policy needs an
ominous Communist terror to act as a
diversion to draw
attention away from its own terror network.
.

This anti-communist fixation is evident
with
Reagan's support of South Africa; that and
racism.

In an

off the record interview, one of Reagan's
top African

advisors commented:
"The problem with Reagan is that all he knows
about
is he's on the side of the whites."
^17^^^^^^

Reagan is convinced that "the African problem is

Russian weapon aimed at us."

(18)

a

In a Wall Street

Journal interview he stated:
"The Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is
going on.
If they weren't engaged in this game of
dominos there wouldn't be any hotspots in the
world." (19)

This simple-minded viewpoint is a naive reductionism
into good guys and bad guys.

It names the problem as

Soviet communist expansion at

a

global level.

It
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lently disregards any
regional or root cause analysis
of
refugee origins, So defined,
it is communism that is
causal to famine and fighting
and this leads to refugees.
A good example of ideological
subterfuge is ex-US
Ambassador to the UN Jeane
Kirpatrick's distinction be
tween authoritarian and
totalitarian states. She

contends
(i.e., authoritarians) leave
allocations of wealth, power.
Status,
statis and
and^n^h"^
other resources which in most
traditional societies favor an affluent
few and mLntain
poverty.
But they do not disturb the
leisure, habitual
Dlaces^if^^^^^S^
patterns of family and
persSal
Because the miseries of
they are bearable
ordina^''oLnt5®
people, who growing up in the society, to
learn to cope... Such societies create
no refugees.

Precisely the opposite is true of
Communist regimes (i.e., total i tar revolutionary
ians
They^
create refugees by the millions because
they claim
whole life of the
make demands for change that so violate society and
intern^ized
and habits that inhabitants flee by the
tens
of thousands.” (20)
)

.

This totalitarian/authoritarian paradigm was
used by
Kirpatrick and ex-Secretary of State Alexander Haig
when
defending allies with horrid human rights records.
During
the last century, these apologetics have served
to protect "free market" interests.

In 1935, General

Smedley

Butler described his work with the US Marine Corps:
"I spent 33 years and four months in active service
as a member of our country's most agile military
force-the Marine Corps. .And during that period I
spent most of my time being a high-class muscle man
for Big Business, for Wall Street, and for the
bankers.
In short, I was a racketeer for
.
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capitalism.

.Thus

helped make Mexico and
American oil interests
make Haiti and Cuba a decent
National City Bank to collect revenues
in
T bin
H purify Nicaragua
helped
for the international
banking house of Brown Brothers in
1909-1912
I
Dominican Republic for American
1916I helped make Honduras
right for American fruit companies
in 1903." (21)
.

I

.

Butler's account is an excellent example
of the
intentional exploitation of people for profit.

As an

imperial power, the US imposes this commercial
domination
at a global level.

i

often feel this exploitation is

most abusive in its control of food.

Agribusiness
One form of exploitation is the plantation economy

supported by multinational corporations'
agribusiness.

(MNC)

Through political arrangements and sheer

economic power, agribusiness generally has access to

country's best land.

a

Within this capital intensive

system, profit maximization is incompatible with the

local human needs for food, shelter, and health care.

This policy results in landlessness, hunger, and

displacment
BUD Senegal is a good example of agribusiness.

During the famine of 73-74 when it was trendy to have

starving babies in the newspaper and on television, BUD
was sending
Europe.

(22)

DC-lOs a week filled with produce to

3

I

was told it was common for BUD to destroy
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crop surplus to keep the
market price up.
23
BUD'S case is not isolated.
its policies are
similar to Del Monte, Unilever,
Heinz, Nestle, Shell, BP,
and other food corporations
operating plantation
economies in exploited countries.
(

)

The transition to colonialism
realized that forced
labor in Africa was more profitable
than slavery in
the

western hemisphere. Accompanying
this revelation was the
raping of the continent's resources.
Cliff
e writes:

"Opportunities for increased production
and
often prompted
the buying up of land and the hiring
of labor
and thus trends in the direction
of landless-'
ness and proletarianization of
others." ( 24
)

For agribusiness to profit, it must
have a reliable
source of cheap labor.
in countries like Kenya, colonial
policy was to replace traditional land
tenure with

capitalist property relationships by providing
for
private ownership of land. The purpose for
private
ownership (Sorrenson 1967) was to create a market
for
land and in the process concentrate land
ownership among
an elite gentry utilizing the labor of a landless
class.

Labor is obtained by separating farmers from their
land through a system of laws, taxation, and force.

Colonel Grogan, a Kenyan white settler, said of the
Kikuyu:
"We have stolen his land.
Now we must steal his
limbs.
Compulsory labor is the corollary of our
occupation of the country." (25)
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Changing societal relationships
to land greatly
decreased food security.
Traditional land tenure, writes
Cliffe:
cultivation, and
tSif^om'^of^sSciarseLr^ty^h^^
security has disappeared.”
(26)
It IS replaced with a
moneyed property class dominated
by
large-scale capital intensive
agriculture.

"This policy bias is encouraged,"
writes Cliffe by:
Ints '^confr:,??'^
Manuf acturers °and
,

if**®-®

P^taphernalia of consult-

BerSants^nSr^^^lic”?^'?^^,^

severe ecological problems in
their wake?*'thf
corporate
partners,
rather
rather^than
than to
to^th^^^+^
the state or the peasants.”
(

27 )

As male labor was drawn to work
on plantations and
mining concessions, women increasingly
absorbed the
responsibility for growing food and
caring for the
family.
of the many socio-economic pressures
stemming
from these conditions, one was the
increasing difficulty
to grow food.
An official report from Nyasaland in
1935

describes the consequences of migrant labor:
"The whole fabric of the old order of
society is
undermined, when 30-60 per cent of the able-bodied
men are absent at one time. .Emigration
(i.e. labour
migption) which destroys the old, offers nothing
o take its place, and the family community
is
threatened with complete dissolution.” 28
.

,

(

)

Farmers who are not disenfranchised are usually

coerced into growing cash crops for export.

In many

cases, the monetary incentives are not enough to
induce

farmers to grow cash crops. It is readily apparant to
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them that it is one more step
in critically reducing
their control over their food
supply.

Along with the strategies
of persuasion, the
government introduces high yield
variety seeds (HYVs) to
encourage farmers to pursue a
line favorable to corporate
investment. The consequence
of these seeds is often
disastrous.

(

29

)

The immediate impact of
plantation economy on rural
farmers is displacement from the
best land. They are
forced to farm less fertile areas,
and forced to compete
with agribusinesses that ignore
local economic pressures
by reacting to international
needs first. (30)
These
arrangements place farmers in conflict
with each other
and with pastoralists, for the same
area of land.
Land
tenure which was previously cooperative
among farmers and
herders now becomes a competitive struggle
for survival.

Berry describes this type of progress as
community
killing.
The high technology and "modernization"

of the

Green Revolution; the miracle poisons of
science, have:
"...involved the forcible displacement of millions
of people... It is the work of the institutions
of
agriculture:
the university experts, the bureaucrats, and the 'agribusinessmen,' who have promoted
so-called efficiency at the expense of community
(and of real efficiency)
and quantity at the
expense of quality." (31)
,

In Senegal, a family with four hectares of millet

was "encouraged" by the government to sow two hectares in

millet and two hectares in cotton or groundnuts.

Farmers
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are not stupid.

They know it is not in their
interest to
cut their food supply in
half, but many see themselves
as
too weak to resist a
government's and corporation's
economic and military control.
HYVs can, under controlled
conditions, produce
greater yields than traditional
seeds.
Controlled
conditions mean fertilizers,
pesticides (to wit. the
petro-chemical control of seed
processing)
and
,

reliable source of water.

a

Farmers are given a loan to

buy the chemicals, the assumption
being that the loan
will be repaid with the selling
of the harvest.
The
problem is rainfall. The Sine-Saloum
region of Senegal
receives 20-25 inches a year, but it
may fall in an

unpredictable manner.

The rain can come early, in the

middle, or late in the season, and this
is too sporadic
for HYVs.

Farmers begin in debt by taking the loan.

With

poorly spaced rainfall, high yield seeds
become low yield
seeds and farmers fall back on food reserves,
which after
a couple bad harvests, are depleted.
In the 1930s,
Grogan commented on the sophisticated storage
facilities
of African villagers which kept harvests stockpiled
for
as many as three years (Rodney,

1982).

This appropriate

technology has disappeared because there is nothing left
to stockpile which results, during lean years, in a

shortage of food.

The traditional seeds have also
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disappeared which has created a
dependency on government
controlled HYVs.
Connell writes:
Crops, African states can onlv
respond by increasing acreage
despite the fact
Pa^-trio^^SLf
the^ Trll rortlLtr
available for local food prodSctioA
and^drive°small‘*

destruction of the fragile environment."
(32)
Previous to these conditions, farm
families in
Africa may have been poor, but
were generally selfsufficient. At the end of WWII,
Africa was able

to feed

itself. Now it services those who
control and exploit the
land to feed others.
During the 80 s, food exports have

increased yearly from Africa to Europe
and the US while
food availability within Africa has
decreased. (33)
Fanon writes:
The relations of man with matter, with
the world
outside, and with history are in the
colonial period
simply relations with food." (34)
"Colonial exploitation, poverty, and endemic
famine
drive the native more and more to open, organized
revolt." ( 35
)

^o^ty thousand Kenyans were killed during the

Mau-Mau resistance, but only one hundred whites.

Fanon

writes that armed resistance is a natural and necessary
response to violence:
"Colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body
endowed with reasoning faculties.
It is violence in
its natural state, and it will only yield when
confronted with greater violence." 36
(

)
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Violent Responses
In 1967, Packard and
Packard wrote:
In fifteen years, famines
will
revolutions and social turmoil be catastrophic and
upheavals will sweep areas of and economic
Asia Africa, and
-Latin America." (37)

us militarily intervention
to maintain elite and
corporate control of land is
violent. These systemic

relationships between rich and poor
are violent.
Terrorism becomes both a strategy
and a consequence of
the status quo and is causal
to the greatest number of
refugees in the world today. A
logical response
of

exploited people is to liberate
themselves from this
control.
This was the case with Nicaragua
and Grenada,
as well as the struggles in El
Salvador
and Guatemala,

Eritrea and Ethiopia, South Korea, The
Philippines, and
many countries in between.
The Reagan administration legitimizes
war in
Central America as self-defense against
the Soviet
Union.

The real issue is that local people want to

control their own resources.

going to control the land?

This is the point.

Who is

who is going to control

production and the benefits of developing local
resources?

For this reason, local people are the major

enemy of US corporations in Central America and around
the world.

People are the enemy in Eritrea's liberation

struggle and with the resistance movements among

81

Ethiopians against the army of
Mengistu Haile Mariam.
This is why they are relocated
by force, their crops
burned and their homes destroyed.
This situation will be
discussed more specifically in
Chapter Four.
Kibreab concurs that to understand
the refugee
problem, one must understand
political
economy.

He cites

that up to the mid 1970s the highest
number of refugees
in Africa emanated from the
Portuguese colonies of Guinea
Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique where
fierce struggles for
liberation were taking place:
"Colonial exploitation in the forms of
taxation, labour service, monopoly
pricing, and
oppression manifested in the denial
of the right to self-determination
forced the
Africans into organized resistance.”
(38)

O'Brien attributes the success of these
revolutions to
the work of leaders like Amilcar Cabral and
Samora
Machel
At the 1986 Non-Aligned Summit, Machel stated:
"The roots of violence in southern Africa are to be
found in foreign occupation.
.

Imperialism would have it believed that violence
stems from the struggle of peoples for their freedom
and that imperialist shellings, invasions and
massacres are peaceful acts. When we look for the
causes of violence, we find domination over peoples.
Domination, colonialism, racial discrimination, and
dictatorship are imposed with brutality and nurtured
on violence, encouraging war... The People's Republic
of Mozambique as a frontline state is viewed by
South Africa as a model that must be smashed." (39)
The US Committee for Refugees estimates that 400,000

Angolans have fled their country due to the military
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intervention of the US, South
Africa, the Soviet Union,
and Cuba

footpLhs"tLf
C?ipp!af soSe li?SoolJ;g:?Ls
The economy of Angola has been
decimated ^he
population devastated, and peace
country remain well beyond reach."and unity in the
(40)
Presidents Nixon and Ford were alarmed
by the
independence of these colonies and
precipitated a sharp
increase in anti-communist remarks
condemning Soviet
intervention in the area. However,
the CIA was the first
to intervene in 1975 with financing
and weapons for the
armies of the FNLA and UNITA.
In terms of class
(41)
struggle, the objectives of the liberation
fronts against
Portugal were a political and economic
response to
colonization, a desire to control their
respective

countries from foreign domination, no different
from the
Vietnamese struggle.
Two decades after independence, the mercenary
armies
of UNITA and the MLA (RENAMO) are supported
by South

^f^ica and the United States to terrorize Angola and
Mozambique, two countries rich in human and natural
resources.

Refugees from these countries are not caused

by drought as is often advertised, but from the fighting
and intentional destabilization of their societies.

Their famine is caused by war.

South Africa is an
extraordinary condition of
displaced people, but the
official line does not call
them refugees. South
Africans are displaced by
state
sponsored racism. They are
exploited by
institutionalized, capital
intensive slavery.
The interest of us
corporations in cooperating
with
south Africa and in so doing
supporting Apartheid, has
always been to go with the
profit margin, even though the
amount of investment in South
Africa is relatively
small.

War contractors are concerned
with access to the
strategic minerals (chromium,
manganese, platinum,
vanadium, cobalt) that are
prevalent in South Africa.
(42)
Only since November of 1986
have corporations like
GM and IBM begun to pull out
because the quality of life
index for investment was not
stable (and therefore not
profitable) enough to warrant staying.
John Stockwell, CIA agent in charge
of Angolan
operations in 1975, suggests that Kissinger
was obsessed
with the notion of Soviet competition.
His obsession

was

fueled by the humiliation of Vietnam and
the independence
of Portuguese colonies.
The ensuing Angola conflict was
an opportunity for him "to challenge the
Soviets"
(

43 )

putting it into a global perspective of anti-communism.

Kissinger authorized CIA operations in cooperation
with
South Africa and Zaire to prevent the MPLA from taking
power.

In so doing he sponsored terrorism against the

by
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people Of Angola by financing
what was to beoone the
mercenary army of Jonas
Savimbi.

in an interview with
"Africa Report," Dr. Julius

Nyerere strongly criticized
Reagan -s policy in South
Africa:
the idea that racist
sonrh°zf
® defender of Western
tion.
tion’ *And°th^^
And the nonsense that they are oivilizaficrhi-ir.rT

f
51

oom„unistI
African states, how many
communist? This blessed idea
that^
^^^ts to protect Africa
aaain^f^o
communists
in
^
mention Angola. .but refuse to
i
Angola in the
first olLe^^
place and why now they must remain
accept the implementation“of J®=°l“tion 435... The
Cubans went there
in 1975 because South
Africa invaded Angola,
because the U.S. panicked, they
thought\he
party of Portugal was taking
itll t
linked that communist party
Wii-h
with the MPLA, they thought they'd
jump in^
^ickly and prevent communism from taking
over
joined
the
South
Africans.
A
And
that s how the Cubans got there."

irA?rLa?"“Se"r'
We have
,

.

(

44 )

For such a racist, anti-communist
policy to proceed
in a "democratic" society, us citizenry
must be

appropriately conditioned.

Conditioning in the US is a

primary responsibility of the media and presupposes
the
use of fear.
Refugees are a primary consequence of this fear, a
condi- tioning that condones US privilege.
In East
Timor, Indonesia, and Burundi, refugees were a by-product
of a brutal genocide, a systematic and selected US

sponsored murder of what were labled opposition groups in
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countries.

in the us media, they
were classic cases of
misinformation and no information.

East Timor
In East Timor,

20 to 25 % of the population
was

killed so that the US could
maintain the unquestioned
privilege of using East Timor
sealanes for US nuclear
submarines, as well as oil
exploration.
The newly
independent government of East
Timor had never restricted
US access, but Fretelin was
a reformist government with
a
focus on education, health, ecology,
and food selfreliance.
Ford and Kissinger planned the
final details
of invasion with Indonesian
President Suharto
on the

morning of

7

December 1975

.

Before leaving Jakarta,

Kissinger commented:
The United States will not recognize
the
independent petelin government of East
the United States understands Indonesia'sTimor and
position
on the question." (45)
^

Indonesia's annexation of East Timor followed

a

precedent well-established by the US and was
similar to
military intervention in Eritrea in 1961 (see
Chapter
Four)

.

There was virtually no coverage in the US media

of a genocide that displaced over half of
the East Timor

population.

East Timor refugees arriving in Portugal

gave repeated accounts of Timorese refugees in Indonesia
as prisoners of war, many of them dying in
Indonesian

camps, but the US press was silent on the issue.
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While the Australian press was
describing a 20th
century carnage sponsored by the
Pentagon,
the US

reported only Indonesian government
statements naming a
communist conspiracy attempting to
overthrow

Suharto.
Five Australian journalists
were murdered by the Indonesian army for being communists.
Impatient with the fuss
over five dead commie correspondents,
Indonesian Foreign
Minister Malick told an Australian
press crew, "Let's
forget them and we will erect a
monument to them." (46)
Congressman J. Herbert Burke, ranking
minority
member of the US House Subcommittee on
Asian and Pacific
Affairs, shared Malick 's sentiments
that the untidiness
of murder should be covered up.
Burke argued in Congress
that the East Timor problem was "virulent
Marxism".
in a

letter dealing with the East Timor Hearings,
he wrote:
"I have my own suspicions respecting
what might
behind the testimony of Dunn's, and I agree with be
you
that It IS in all of our interests to bury the
Timor
issue quickly and completely." 47
(

)

Congress buried the truth of East Timor in a common
grave
with 100,000 to 200,000 dead Timorese and five dead

Australian journalists.

In 1987 "African Confidential"

listed the population of East Timor at 167,000, down from
600.000 in 1975.

(48)

Indonesia was experienced with mass extermination.

Between 1965-1969 an anti-communist pogrom killed from
750.000 to over 1,000,000 people.

thousands of whom died in prison.

750,000 were arrested,
(49)

The US establish-

ment approved of this
consolidation of authority,
the
press generally regarded
the politioal ramifications
as
positive, and this combined
well with the enthusiasm
of
US political leaders.
(50)

Duj.

una.

Burundi had no sealanes,

"communists.”

nc

oil deposits, and no

it had Hutus and coffee
which combined

with US lies and deception
for

2

50,000-350,000 dead Hutus

during the Spring and Summer
of 1972. (51)
The state Department began
to use the word genocide
in June 1982.
Senators Kennedy and Tunney briefly
mentioned the killing in Congress,
but the general mood
was that the minority Tutsi
government was stabilizing a
violent uprising by Hutus and
discussion ceased.

Stability meant continued US control
of 80% of the
Burundi coffee crop.
During this same month, the Senate
Foreign Relations
Committee confirmed Ambassador Robert Yost
to Burundi
with no discussion of the massacre of
Hutus.
A year
later, articles such as Charles Mohr's
in the New York
Times (52) implicated Hutu exiles for
inciting violence
against the Tutsi government, maintaining
media support
for the Tutsi.
The Carnegie Endowment for World Peace study of
the

Burundi massacre was appalled that:
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uttered a single

public word^to describe^the^i^^
against humanity in Burundi

LnLsnIl ?f

fore?grpoUc“?r„Sch lhe®os?ens?b^fhf
disaster had
relationship with Pakistan
diplomacy with Peking.

5u

”®®hington's
tangled secret

pSli^ic^if'^a^civil^war'^ bSt'^Il "°h

“""^ood
re?aSSnfw??h'?L"'""'"^
^®^®tal Nigeria. Yet
there appeared to be^no^c
interests in
Burundi tr^llg^aglinst
j-gn against the
?h^^H®‘’^®
human factor." 53
us policy was not to
intervene in what was
considered to be an internal
Burundi affair. The
conviction of the African Bureau
was that this policy
would avoid any:
(

)

legal issues in Burundi."
(54)
us Ambassador to Burundi
Thomas Melady praised the
US for not intervening,
a New York Times interview
he

m

stated that the role of the us
as a world enforcer "had
faded," that it was inappropriate
for the us "to

interfere in the affairs of small
states ... wrong to
boycott trade." (55) He praised the
US for promptly
sending food assistance during the
first two weeks of the
crisis without acknowledging that the
food was being
adminis-tered by the same people who were
doing the
killing. Melady's capacity for ignorance
or selfdeception or both is alarming.
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Blaming the Victim

People who are most victimized
by state sponsored
violence are often blamed for
being violent. A popular
explanation of underdevelopment
blames the victim as
well, for living in poverty,
famine, or as refugees due
to the inferiority of
their cultures."

Harrison writes:
Obstacle to Latin American progress
is
not Yankee imperialism, but
Latin culture". (56)
He purports that the Latin
mind is responsible for
poverty, chaos and tyranny among
Caribbean, Central, and

South American people.

Harrison asserts that "mistrust
permeates Latin
society", that "the absence of trust
and identification"
lead to a "fragility and impermanence
of many community
organizations and cooperatives" reflecting
"this cultural
impediment"; that "corruption is so deeply
ingrained in
the society that acts of justice and
honesty are often
viewed with incredulity." (57)
Tanner and Kidwell (1987) blame the violence

directed at Black people in South Africa on Black
people:
"When the nature and causes of unrest-related
deaths
are examined, it becomes clear that violence among
conflicting individual groups is the primary
underlying factor." (58)

Using figures from the South African State of

Emergency during August and September of 1986, Tanner and
Kidwell illustrate that 82% of Black deaths were caused
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by other Blacks.

The remaining 18% of the
killings were
deaths due to security force
intervention against 'Black
Marxists'.
59
(

)

Blaming the victim is Reagan's
refusal to recognize
apartheid as causal to the violence
in South Africa.
Nyerere says that Reagan is
incapable of naming apartheid
as the problem, rather he
insists on "seeing it purely in
terms of the East-West conflict."
60
(

)

Myths and Stereotypes

Victim blaming is supported by the
creation of
myths.
Myths suggest that poor farm management,

drought,

and overpopulation are primary causes
to famine and
refugee populations.
One popular tactic for blaming the
victims is to
rationalize that there are too many of "them",
that a
lack of self-control and birth control
is causal to

famines and refugees.

Thomas Malthus was one of the first economists to

summarize the relationship between population and

agriculture whereby population increases in

a

geometric

progression (1,2,4,8,16) and food availability increases

arithmetically (1,2,

3, 4, 5).

This mind set has been used,

misused, and overused to explain hunger in the world.

During Lyndon Johnson's "War on Hunger", Paddock and

Paddock presented

a

triage approach to dealing with the
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hungry in oppressed countries.

The first of three groups

of countries were those whose
population growth had
already passed their assumed
agricultural potential and
were labled -can't be saved."
"To send food to them is
to throw sand in the ocean."
(61)

Similar to this attitude is
Garrett Hardin's
"Lifeboat Ethics". His premise is
that a lifeboat can
only hold so many people. To
let more people in to
"lifeboat earth" is to ultimately
drown
everyone.

Hardin transposes this theory to
Africa arguing that an
excessive birth rate is responsible
for hunger.

As such.

It is better to let people die
rather than provide them

with food and by so doing, exacerbate
the situation.
In the Spring 1985 issue of The
Amicus Journal, Hardin
blames pastoral society for environmental
devastation.
Herders, he argues, increase their herds,
reaping:

...almost all the benefit, but paying very
little of the costs of overgrazing, which
spread among all users
The pasture
deteriorates, and everyone's cows starve. Each
man is locked into a system that compels him to
increase his herd without limit in a world that
IS limited." (62)

Hardin fails to recognize that the real overgrazers are
not pastoral ists, but rather corporations and the global
arms supermarket.

His "quid pro quo mutualism" (63)

among countries for purposes of trade and foreign aid is

monopoly capitalism.
Hardin's notion of sanctity of life is

a

reduction

of fertility "to let the
population fall by attrition."
Eritrea and Guatemala have each
had over 100,000 people
murdered in the last 2 1/2 decades
as well as
1/3 of

their populations displaced by
war.
Salvador's population is displaced
deaths since 1979 .

Over 20% of El

including 65,000

include Burundi, East Timor,

Southeast Asia and rapidly one may
conclude that Hardin'
use of the words 'sanctity of
life' under these
ciiTcuinstancGs is indscent.

Lester Brown is another who recognizes

overpopulation as the essential factor
leading to
environmental destruction and hunger. He
writes;

"One consequence of the continuous
growth
population is the spread of agriculture to in
land
with thin mantles of topsoil that will
not
sustain continuous and intensive cultivation "
(64)

Brown (1985) stresses the ecological devastation
in
Ethiopia emphasizing the annual loss of over one
billion
tons of top soil without ever mentioning the war,
the

longest running current war in Africa.

Deforestation in

Ethiopia is the result of low intensity conflict; of

white phosphorous used as part of an agrarian reform
®^^®ssing high tech slash and burn of the environment.
Brown raises three questions which reflect

a

upper class mentality:
1. "Why is the world no longer able to sustain the
economic and social gains of the century's third
quarter?"

white,
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the world back on

track?"^’'

It is necessary to consider
who the recipients were
of those gains,
it certainly was not the
farmers in
Africa nor the farmers in the
us who now make up only
three percent of the US
population.
It was not single
mothers, the poor, and people
of color who still have to
for the right to vote.
It was not the dead and displaced
in Southeast

Asia.

It was not US workers left
unemployed when

management ran away to non-union shops
and cheap labor in
Taiwan and South Korea.
It was not Salvador Allende and
the disappeared in

Chile and elsewhere in Central and South
America.
it was
not the victims of apartheid in South
Africa.
And it
was not 1 1/2 million Eritreans and Ethiopians
displaced
from their homes.
it is a long list of who it
is not.

At no place do these writers and policy makers

mention land tenure, control of seeds, and control of
production.

Neither is there reference to war.

Their

argument is essentially that lowering the birth rate is
the key to having enough to eat.

Lloyd disagrees with

this analysis, arguing that regardless of the amount of

population decrease, a slower growth rate;
"...would not alter the structure of society in the
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industrialized West?"^^66p^^^ ^relationship with the
Lappe and Collins feel
strongly that:

world is a hopeless

SSributiLf°°t67r'^“'"^^°"

®'3Uitabir

Thomas (1984, 1986) stresses
that:
"The root cause of
population
environmental destruction is growth and
poverty."

sustainable economic and social
progress as r-an?dV,^
possible... jobs and better
Saols
^
nutrition, better
edScfiior emancipation of women
education,
acce<?4
conditlSns^^rehich
faSii^
S tes^?Iil“:rharh“"
"" the developed
oountrfesS' (^8?
i

Lloyd, Lappe, and Collins do
not reject population
growth as a concern. Unlike
Hardin and Brown, they
recognize the reasons for having
large families. In labor

intensive agrarian societies, children
are considered an
asset to farm maintenance and
production. A child can
produce more than s/he consumes.
(69)
Poor people with inadequate nutrition
and
sanitation, and little or no health care
have high death
rates.
These conditions are not rooted in ignorance,
rather are a result of exploitation. The
poor protect
themselves by investing in children.
The less control people have over their basic
needs.
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the more -risk- is involved
in their survival,
these
terms, as Individual
control over survival decreases,
the
power to reproduce becomes
increasingly vital. Further,
the power of reproduction
is one power the poor can
control, unless taken away
from them through forced

m

sterilization.
Lapps and Collins assert that
shifting resources to
the poor is a much better
assurance of a lowered birth
rate, rather than a direct
birth control program.
In

short, ignorance does not breed
babies, but powerlessness
often does.

Victim blaming in Africa does not
acknowledge that
African countries were stripped of
human resources
through four centuries of slavery.
a very real sense,
this represents the root of African
underdevelopment. A
conservative estimate is a loss of 20
million people.
More realistic estimates cite 100-200
million political
leaders, skilled artisans, teachers, and
farmers on whom
was built the infrastructure of African
society.

m

(70)

The class in power controls the dissemination
of
information.

I

have experienced this in my work on the

Ethiopian border with the UNHCR, as well as elsewhere
in
Africa, South America, and the United States.
Misinformation, distortion, and omission of facts

perpetuate the violence of hunger and legitimize the

^^^tality of military intervention against oppressed
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people.

Depriving people of the benefits
from their
labor while oppressing them
socially, politically,

and

economically, continues the haves
and the have-nots on a
collision course. The consequences
of this injustice are
lions of dead, dying, and
displaced people, as well as
the continuation of oppressive
social policies,
exploitative laws, and military
interventions, all of
Which are on the increase in the
1980s.

Summary
It IS always alarming how quickly
United Statesians

accept the myths and US definitions of
international
issues, particularly the concept of
terrorism.

Reagan administration defines as terrorism

is,

What the
for the

most part, resistance of people in other
countries to US
economic and political violence. To understand
this
oppression, one must understand the power relationships
that institutionalize it.
This chapter has documented several examples of

abusive power relationships and their connections to
refugees.

The behaviors and attitudes of these

oppressive relationships are perpetuated by the racist,
classist, and sexist structures of our society.

They are

manifested in violence against women, people of color,
the poor, and other oppressed groups.

The importance of Chapter Two is understanding the
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global connections between refugee populations and US

economic and military hegemony.

The refugee program in

Somalia is a case study of a global issue.

In Somalia

many development workers see refugee circumstances as

isolated from any greater global or even regional
context.

Chapter Two addresses political and economic

considerations that relate to refugee origins worldwide.
The global dimensions of US foreign policy, its assumed

power and privilege, must be understood before working in
another country.

Chapter Four will discuss this hegemony

as it specifically relates to the Horn of Africa,
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4

THE FEASIBILTY OF
SELF-RELIANCE AS A DEVELOPMENTAL
OBJECTIVE IN SOMALI REFUGEE
CAMPS
Food Aid
In January 1984, Senator
John Danforth (R Missouri),
came to the Northwest to get
pictures of starving refugee

children.

There was no food shortage.

starving children.

There were no

Neither was there a serious

malnutrition problem.

But the Senator came for
photos

and attempts were made to
please him.

was the only US citizen working
with the HCR in
the Northwest, yet I was not
allowed to meet with a US
Senate delegation visiting camps
for which I was
responsible.
Confidential accounts from UN and State
Department sources state that US Ambassador
Robert Oakley
contacted a high-ranking UN official in
the Northwest
region (not from HCR) and asked him to
fabricate a
I

starving refugee setting in Saba 'ad camp.

The UN

official refused to cooperate with the scheme.

Working in conjunction with the HCR and RRC,
scenario of 6 or 8 sick children were gathered

a

for the

Senator to witness.
what

I

He is quoted as saying,

"This is

came to see," took his pictures and left,

(l)

One AID colleague told me he was sure Danforth knew
he had been "duped" by the time he left Somalia.

returning to the US

,

But

Danforth showed pictures of starving
104
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refugees from Mozambique and
Somalia to the President
and
to members of Congress.
(2)

Discussion of the "starving in
Africa crisis" was
brought to the Senate floor
by Senators Boschwitz
(R
Minnesota) and Boren (D Oklahoma)
who introduced the
"Food Aid and Export Market
Promotion Act" in February
1984 which authorized another
1/2 billion dollars of food
under Title II Public Law (PL)
480 to be sent
to Africa.

Similar to previous food assistance
bills, this one
outlined the importance of food
aid in establishing
international markets for US agricultural
products:

"S. 2304.
A bill to enhance US food aid,
restore
competitive position of the United
States in
agricultural export markets, and for
other
purposes
.

.

The purpose of this legislation is
twofold: First
exports through existing
credit and food aid programs; and second,
provide
Agriculture with additional export
redit tools aimed at developing markets
for US
agricultural exports in economies that are
strong
enough so that they can start phasing out
of PL-480
yet not strong enough to move completely
to GSM- 102

!

Our ability to effectively compete in
agricultural
decade ahead will greatly depend on our
ability to provide more creative financing
for
customers.
The export credit initiatives included
in this bill will provide the Secretary of
Agriculture with the tools necessary to expand US
agricul^^^sl exports in a number of key markets."
3
(

In March 1985

I

)

wrote Senator Danforth and requested

information from his tournee in Africa, particularly his
impressions from Somali camps.

information on the Somali visit.

l

received everything but
Several months later.

While in Washington,
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called his office and
requested
his report on Somalia
which I received. Although
I

it

included an overview of his
Somali visit, there was no
mention of his experience
in Saba -ad camp.
Neither was
there mention of hunger and
starvation in the camps, yet
according to his news release
of 19 January 1984, he
Showed President Reagan and
Congress slides giving the
impression that there were
starving refugees in
Somalia.

am not passing judgement
on Danforth's ability to
tell the truth, but there are
gross errors in his report
dated 30 January 1984. He
refers to 1983 as "a year of
exceptionally dry weather."
I was there.
(4)
In
I

Hargeisa, it was so wet, there was
hardly a dry period
between the two rainy seasons. His
analyses of other
Sahelian countries defines hunger
as either a result of
communism or technological backwardness.

Danforth reports that he was told a
decade ago there
were lions in northern Senegal. His
belief system is
accommodating.
I was there, the lions weren't.
Perhaps
they had us confused.
Danforth was correct in his report when stating,
"The focus of my trip was food, not refugees,
yet the two
problems are related." (5) His newsletters to
his

constituents are filled with self-rightous imagery
of
Missouri farmers saving the world with the food they
grow.

(

6)

He also spells it out in clear, albeit
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misrepresented, economic terms:

providing nore d;nand!"
ll^u^taneSSsiy! VotTkr'
huge commodity inventories
that
act as"^a damner*'^

deficiency payment^ to
Pood For Peace, viewed by
Danforth as a moral
imperative, serves to push US
agricultural exports with
the ultimate purpose of controlling
what people eat in
other countries. Coming from a
grain belt state, this is
politically expedient for him to
support.
Quoting from a
USDA Food For Peace document:

hereby declares it to be the policy of
expand international trade; to
develop and expand export markets for
US
agricultural commodities...
It (FFP) paved the way for the
transition
developing countries into important dollar of many
customers
for all sorts of US products...

Big increases in yields (grain) and the
abscence of
acreage restrictions produced a succession of
huge
grain crops, far in excess of US needs.

these grains was costly. The obvious
solution was in exports. However, many of the
countries that could use US grains lacked the
foreign exchange to buy them.
PL 480 was proposed as a way out of this dilemma.
Basically, it permitted the United States to sell
its surplus agricultural commodities to friendly
nations abroad and accept those nations' local
currency in payment.
^

.

Under the sub-heading What the United States Gains
the USDA document includes these benefits:

.
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market demand for US farm

prodSIts^^'f

established trade relationships
developing countries, setting the with a number of
stage for growth
of commercial markets over
time
enjoyed balance of payments benefits
from PL 480

-re'than^S
^r^m^Se'bbeginning of the program
to the
present.
^
chiefly from principal and
^
^
interest payments
on PL 480 loans and from foreian
currencies used by US agencies abroad.

government was allowed to sell
currencies to US businessmen and
abroad, improving the US
u°
by cutting down on the outflow of payment position
US dollars
overseas."
(8)

Food as a Weapon
"No country is free that imports food."

Mao

"Grain is the currency of currencies."

Lenin

"If we can get everyone in China to eat a
donut a
day, we'll have a market for our wheat

surplus." Ex-

Agriculture Secretary, John Block (1985)

In Somalia, the food aid is considered by many
as

just part of the military aid package in exchange
for US

military access.

Food aid becomes a vital cog in

creating and perpetuating the dependency relationship of
Somalia on the US.

Unlike Somalia, throughout the 80s there has been
critical incidence of hunger in Ethiopia.

Haile Selassie

covered up the hunger in 73-74 which was one of the
reasons he was overthrown.

a

Contrary to Selassie,
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Mengistu has been very public
about the hunger even
though it is his violence
that is responsible for
it.
He
has requested food aid
from the US since 1978, but
US
policy was not to send food
to what was identified as
a
"Communist" or "Marxist-Leninist"
country,
March
1984, two AID Officials
reported that there was evidence
Of the Ethiopians selling
food aid to the Soviets

m

and

therefore no food should be sent,
one official stated
that "In the area controlled
by the government, there is
no food shortage right now."
The implication, of
(9)
course, is that the hunger and
killing in Tigray,
Eritrea, and other areas of fighting
didn't matter.
Dr.

Charles Elliot, former Director of
Christian Aid
in Great Britain, accused his
country and the
US of

intentionally withholding food from
Ethiopia in order to
weaken the regime and see it toppled.
In October 1984,
he told "The Observer"
"They took the view that if there was
another
serve the Ethiopian government
rignt, that they had it coming to them."
(lo)

Jack Shepherd concurs that a Government Accounting
Office (GAO) investigation revealed:
initial US response to Ethiopia had been
delayed because of strained relations between the
two governments' and that the Reagan Administration
had in 1983-84 expressed 'major concerns' about
supplying food aid to a Marxist nation with close
Soviet ties. There was a feeling that if Ethiopians
were in trouble, the Soviets should get them out.
But that feeling, which persisted through the first
ten months of 1984, fell before the preelection
outpouring of public concern for Africa, and
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Ethiopia in particular." (ii)
The US alleged wide-spread
misuse of food assistance
in Ethiopia until us
policy changed and then it was
viewed as "politically
appropriate" to send food. My
interviews with State, AID, and
FFP suggest that all the
US food was monitored
sucoesfully to its destination.
"It was other countries- food
that was diverted, not
our's," said AID officials:

Ethiopia was controlled by volaas
saved millions of^lives^and
in
people will remember the US.
i
thiS
think we can be proud of what we
did." (12)

Reagan still views food aid as an
area ripe for
budget cuts.
Politically, in 1984, it was rationalized
this way:
not form a noticeable segment
constituency, and conservative
(and sometimes anti-Afrioan) white
Who would notice cuts in this area? Americans did.
Or,
point. Who would complain, and who would more to the
listen'’
Ethiopia, like Mozambique, could be
ignored safely.
^
Where were the voices among the President's
constituency or staff, who would speak out
loudly
and publicly in favor of foreign aid to
a Marxist
nation? The budget could quietly and safely
be
back for all of sub-Saharan Africa, and cut to cut
zero
for Ethiopia." (13)

of^tS President's

,

This policy, strongly formulated by Haig and
Kirpatrick, is fervently maintained by Senators Helms,
Stennis, and Hatch.

It is opposed by grainbelt senators

like Boren, Boschwitz, and Danforth because their

constituents grow the grain.

It is also opposed by the

USDA, the government representatives of agribusiness, who

desire foreign markets
for their agricultural
products.
sending food to Ethiopia
is supported by that
faction in the administration
that views food
as a

strategy to wean Mengistu
from the USSR.
Five of the
State, AID, and FPP people
interviewed denied knowledge
of this policy or adamantly
said it wasn't
the case.

One

employee commented that maybe
there was a policy. One
person said the policy had
failed.
Two people said it
was too early to tell what
the outcome would be.
Everyone else declined to
comment on this
policy.

The other faction in Washington
who approves of food
assistance is the group who views
the matter as one of
siaply feeding people to keep
them alive. Many are very
genuine and sincere in their concern.
Many are selfrightous. Most are not able or
willing to put the social
and political issues of the Horn
into an historical

context to recognize and understand
the valid grievances
of people fighting against
oppressive
regimes.

interviews, the roles were switched to
where

I

In two

became

recipient to questions about the Horn,
mostly Somali
specific.
One official confided that he didn't know
who
or what to believe, "even in this
building."
Two people with significantly high US
government

positions in Ethiopia and Somalia respectively,
had
alarming analyses for solutions in the Horn. The

US

official in Ethiopia told me:

Ill
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°verpopulation.

drough^Sro^rpeople^ve^toe
agriSiturarpofLy^fls'b^d^f^^^f"--

are no incentives for
farmers ll gro^^ood;
practices,
™hiopS^haf?he®Last°‘’^°"®^?
scientific based agriculture
in the world
^

ther» lo

s»

modern seeds, fertilizers

'

There was no mention of forced
relocation or war. Her
attitude was essentially that
the Ethiopian people and
Communism were causal to the famine,
that there was no
intentional starvation.
The AID official from Somalia
compared the Somali
situation to the "American west
120 years ago," when
there was conflict between ranchers
and nestors.
He told
me that the Somali situation could
be understood by
watching the western movies "Pale Rider"
and "Shane." He
quoted Shane, "We tamed this range," as
an example of
Somali landowners not wanting to offer
land for refugee
settlement. He suggested that in ten years,
the

situation would sort itself out by itself, and
again
quoted one of the westerns, "Thems Sioux lands
out

there," meaning that thems Somali lands and the
Somalis
will take care of them.

Not being a fan of Clint Eastwood westerns,

I

have

yet to see these movies, even
knowing that within their
scripts may be the answer to
durable solutions for
refugees in Somalia.

The UN

UN policy must change.

The Cairo Resolution of 1964

was a deliberate move by
leaders in newly independent
African countries to protect their
colonial boundaries.
Selassie was the primary mover in
formulating this policy
and it is no coincidence that
the headquarters for the
OAU was based in Addis Ababa.
The evolution of international law
has provided

a

legal framework through which people
can pursue the right
to self-determination.
The struggles of Eritrea and the

Ogaden can both be settled within this
framework.
B.H.
Selassie argues that few countries in the
UN question the
"justice of their (EPLF) cause on moral or
legal grounds.

And justice, like peace, is indivisible."

(

15 )

But the

OAU does not recognize liberation struggles
in the Horn
as having any connection to the continent's
liberation

movements.

Writing in defense of Eritrea, Harnet argues:

The underlying reason is that many African states
are so fearful of their own precarious make-up that
they prefer to ignore the issue... The OAU respects
the boundaries of African states inherited from
colonialism.
Be that as it may, many of those who
advocate respect for colonial boundaries fail to
take into consideration the fact that Eritrea has
well-defined territorial boundaries inherited from
colonialism.
.
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and Its'oSn^SL?er
resolutions
^ advocates for the
Namibian peonle's
5
is unbecoming of
its^raison^d^ft‘^®’^^""-"®^^°'’'
ignore the
outrageous crimes being
pernetuatL’^»
^
against
the
Eritrean people for no

The US and USSR have
considerable influence in the
UN and both are responsible
for the UN's avoidance
of
liberation issues in the Horn.
Postponing legitimate
claims to self-determination
and independence seriously
questions the integrity of the
UN.
In "Africa Now" Dr. Julius
Nyerere is quoted:

"There is an exaggerated respect
for soveriontv and

other point is - and again we
are
first
stone?
We
look 55
7
at ourselves and, to be honest,
we
sav
't
am
not going to be the first one
to cast the first
°"® to caS
Stone
stonl'at
at Sr
the upcoming OAU meeting." (i?) the first
In terms of food aid and refugee
assistance the UN
is slow, and usually unwilling,
to

publicly criticize

either Ethiopia or Somalia.

As one UN official put it:

®°™®.P’^i''3te agencies are
rSticTLSh
criticize the Addis government openly,

reluctant to
for
jeopardizing existing relief shipments and fear of
programs." (18)
In a similar vein,

I

was nonchalantly told by a

colleague my first week in Somalia:
You have to watch what you say.
Everybody
the same boat and it is better not to stick is in
your
neck out. There is no sense shouting about
what
everyone already knows. Once you learn the system.
It s not so bad, and you can still do your
job."
The Boston Globe (26 November 1984) wrote:

"Agencies, mandated to work onlv
^
neither act independently
they make any public
staLments
government descriptions of the tS contr;dict°"'
crisis

L

^

they wish to avoid
govLnment side?"

The following week

(2

..

Plaining
°P®tations on thi

^

December 1984), The Globe

Similarly reported on Ethiopia:
•maintain that
secrecy is necessary because
if the central
*^heir involvement in
??b?l"c?Sr???er
•

"he

country alt?ge?^e?^'
on two occasions,

I

heard CARE officials confront
UN

officials in Somalia with the comment,
"The HCR has no
backbone.
The CARE argument was that the
HCR would
neither take the initiative in
confronting inappropriate
Somali government practices nor in
supporting
the

community development initiatives of
voluntary agencies.
The HCR reply in each instance was
a standard response in
these circumstances:
We are an apolitical organization.
We
he invitation of the Somali government are here at
to help them
as they feel it is necessary.
To do this in all the
which we work we must remain neutral."

The Myth of Neutrality

Neutral is
If

I

a

gear in my truck, also my motorcycle.

turn on the engine and the truck is in neutral,

nowhere.
coast,

I

If

i

I

go

am on a hill and the truck begins to

am in less control of it than if

l

were in gear.

The faster the truck rolls
in neutral the less I am
in
control and the n.ore dangerous
is the cirounstance to
me
and those along my path.

A basic educational
supposition of Paulo Freire is
that nothing is neutral.
The non-neutrality of the
refugee business is quite
evident in the Horn, it is
Clearly illustrated in the
extent to which Ethiopia and
Somalia have manipulated
displaced people to their own
political and economic advantage.
It is evident
in the

design and implementation of
projects, as well as the
types of programming that are not
allowed.

The self-serving nature of both
the Ethiopian and
Somali governments is understandable
considering their
exploited positions in the international
economic

order,
as well as when considering how
they have each been

manipulated in other ways by the US, Europe,
and the
Soviet Union. These self-serving
behaviors,

however,

have resulted in short-sighted policies
with intended
immediate gratification which in the long
run have only
compounded economic and political problems.

Volags and the UNHCR are "guests" of the country
in
which they work. The volags are not neutral
because they
operate under the coordinating umbrella of the
HCR and
the HCR adheres to government policy.
one RRC official,

in the words of

"The HCR does what it is told and

everything is all right."
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One AID official in Washington
told me:
"Somalia makes very oolitioai
where to
put refugees and wLL^not to-^whi
^ refugee and
who is not. The hcr
^he HCR
is high?/politic?zed^ ?
glad when (Representative) Blavo left
Heahonin^
considering htf^prevtous^eipern^L’^^lif^Sn"*'"""
i

the"poii?i^s

of ?hrs;:

The editors of "Horn of
Afrioa" take the myth of
neutrality seriously. The
origins of the refugee crisis,
they assert:

sharply and honestly traced.
The past
Political organizations ^nf
aginlies havr^rf ";i
analyzed, and the
j-iiueresrs
inlerisis of
ofai?
all involved parties must be cleai-w
understood.
short, the mask

m

of

-neutraUtyf^

participants in thil
crisis
of sis has
hL^?o\*'^f
to be torn off to reveal the
actual
noff
iitical
refugee crisis must be exploded
J 5 truth
examined in full and clLr
ebate. refugees are the products
of politics
often designed wi?h political
ends and genuine, lasting humanitarian
come hand in hand with political solutions
solutions to
the underlying conflicts in the
region." (23)

Sfefof

am always suspicious of voluntary
agencies and
individuals who profess independence in
their work with
refugees.
If these agencies are truly independent,
why
are they not working where the need is
greatest,
I

in

Tigray and Eritrea?

it is ironic that the two most

successful refugee-based agencies in the Horn,
REST
(Relief Society of Tigray) and ERA (Eritrea
Relief
Association) receive the least amount of international

assistance when they have clearly demonstrated the
ability and committment to provide for the welfare of

their people.

Resource for resource, there
is evidence
that these agencies have
made significant achievements
in
promoting self-reliant initiatives.
The choice of agencies not
to work with the ERA,
REST and ORA (Oromo Relief
Association) is political.
One FFP officer in Washington
commented in a seemingly
regretful and frustrated way:

assistance

operation with these organizations,and indirect
cLperation^wi?h°th
it's too
sensitive an
issue."

(24)

It says that working under
the jurisdiction of oppressive

govern-ments has more benefits than
working with
grassroots movements fighting for
liberation.

In Ethiopia, the continuation
of "relief" operations
that use food assistance to
depopulate opposition groups

and destroy their liberation movements
is a disaster.
Many writers assert that Western aid
is used to fill the

financial vacuum created by Ethiopia's
inflated military
budget to support armies on as many as
four fronts.
This
economic assistance also serves to pay off
arms debts to
the USSR. (25)
Food assistance and other relief

commodities are similarly used in Somalia.

(26)

The Feasibility of Self-Reliance
For self-reliance to be a feasible strategy, people

must become empowered to exercise democratic control over

their human and material resources.

For this development
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to occur, there must first
be a conciousness towards
personal and societal liberation.
Slaves do not become
self-reliant on the plantation.
If the system allows for
change to occur through legitimate
access to power, the
process may be relatively peaceful
or perhaps better put,
non-violent. When this access is
not provided, the
liberating process of self-reliance
may take on the
proportions of armed struggle. The
Barre government has
offered no such power access to
his people much less to
refugees

Self-reliance implies a democratic
structure that
gives people a voice allowing actual
access to both
political and economic opportunities.
A first

step for

Barre is to allow other political
parties to exist, a
S omali colleague laughs that
this is tantamount to Barre

tending his resignation.

Mohamoud writes:

"A democratic multi-party system is
compatible with
political tradition of organizing rival
f

coalitions.
Direct presidential elections
will help stabilize political parties and encourage
prospective presidential candidates to seek broad
national constituencies." (27)

Consistent with this notion of pluralism would be a

decentralization of the government bureaucracy.
Theoretically, the organization of the Somali

Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) calls for
decentralized and shared power within the body politic.
Disregarding the rhetoric, Samatar

(

1986

)

writes;

"It is no secret that, despite the appearance.

- s-r

for the Central Committee notion?
(Somali Revolutionarv Commi+-?^

secretary General of

Si

have all SRC

^y^the

thf

iyS"E£L€iri3'-

i-taL^rsLi?r

leadership choices?®budgeSrr^'’
l??ocat-°^
allocations,
and programmatic dire^tionT"
28
(

)

The state Department
concurs that claims of power
decen- tralization are
unsubstantiated. US Country
R eports of Human Rights
p rartjror annually repeat that
economic and political power
are concentrated in the
Somali elite, resulting in a
growing gap between classes
and ethnic groups while adding
to the growing list of
human rights violations. The
1986 report states:

Section

1

c.

that Somali police authorities
ro„2h^r®"‘'r
rough
treatment in order to obtain confessions
suspects.
Living conditiSn^Jn
oSon^’'"''^i
prisons
can be harsh.

Solv
pply

Section

1 d.

frequently

makes arrests without
3arr?nn’"’”r!
arrants and detains indefinitely
persons whom it
views

as a threat to national security.
In
prisoners are held incommunicado
access to lawyers prior to being formally

sLf

charged

350-500 political
being held without charge, including 6 prisoners are
high
government officials arrested in June 1982.

Section 1 f.
The National Security Service (NSS) has the

private citizens anH
and detain subjects without on
charge.
Section 2 a.
by the governnen;.

S^oEer^o^"''

and"EE?E!En"?hat is
docepraoie to the government.
acEEp?^E?E'EE

Section

2

b.

organizations and public

^“''^^^nt^onEEol
KpeEEiEiEn^’'%a??^®°^
Rallies or meetings of a direct or

r^oi?r^

organized only by the
government, usually to promote
its^owE pEEgrams.
Section 3 a.
g°vernment,
-°
PUWXJ.C
pEElic'^EriEicilf
criticism of its policies
is forbidden.

and

Section 4 a.
The Somali Government has
refused requests bv
rights organizations to
viEit^Eo?ft^‘'''?^®
Somali
^
®
actively address human rights
SEEs

tonesty International, in its 1985
report expressed
°''®’^.P'^is°ners of conscience, some Ef
whom
hEd°beEE
had
been detained without trial for more
than 6
detention without trial of
other
prisoners or their conviction after
House rated Somalia "Not
Free " ^29^^^*
'

Refugees must adhere to the Somali political
and
legal structure.
Survival considerations for refugees
are increased because they have no power
base

and the HCR

has no policy that confronts Somali
authority.

Refugees

are not interested in imposed "self-reliance"
initiatives
when political action is subject to reprisal
and there is

no form of protection,

when refugees are
conscripted by
the army, they prefer to
pay their way out rather
than go
through HCR. As one refugee
put it:
^hey will help
us? bSt"do not!^
us, HCR says ok and dr.o=^™^ says they do not have

Protection Officer (HCR)
makes promised but
^
“= identification
cards.
-Lt
I? IS
i? safer
4afe^ on our own."
(30)

Somali recruitment is not
done in a discriminating
way.
in May 1984 a colleague
of mine at HCR/Mogadisho
was conscripted, had his
head shaved and was in the
army
for about a week.
The Nigerian Counsel and a
US citizen
working with a voluntary agency
have also been

conscripted and released.
To promote self-reliance, it
would behoove relief
workers in Somalia to come up with
a working definition
of what is meant by self-reliance.
The only time I was
present for a discussion about
self-reliance and

participation was the community development
meeting
described in Chapter Four when Suleiman
Gulaid told us
participation was telling people what to do.
Self-reliance to many at the State Department
means
Somalia has enough foreign exchange to
purchase US
products:

Somalia is our best example of success because
Somalia no longer picks up farmers products at
lowest price... Our policy reform there is one of the
the
most successful. Changing the Market Board is
a
result of US inf luence. .. Devaluing the currency was
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facLriirarr^rby^'loLirelLes!®

business and

The time is not riqht vet fn-r
investment,
Somalia must be clear ac? i-o
agribusiness corporations bni-^ I’nles. .There are no
corporations bu^^a^f sen looai
vegetables, particularly
lei?®'
®®l?'teliance
macro concept in terms of melons
is a
hi? e' survive
^
through
trading.
Selflrei??^
.

'

political motives for having
rellglll lle?l??®(3i)
self-reliance means different
things to people and
great harm can come to
refugees who are encouraged
to
become politioal-ly active
in planning and decision
making in a system that
prohibits this activity. Great
misunderstanding and frustration
can come to relief
workers who lable refugees
lazy because (aware of the
risks) they refuse to
participate in such
programs.

At the level of planning and
implementation,
refugees are notably excluded
in Somalia.
When in
attendance at meetings, their
comments, if heard at all,
are often disregarded. The
AFSC and MCC were the
organizations most committed to
small-scaled, refugeecontrolled projects.
Yet HCR so Head Langschwert
continually discredited both agencies
as doing nothing.
The world has entered a period of
severe political
and economic crisis.
Somalia, being one of the poorer
countries, is most critically affected by
its links to
the global market system and to the
militarization that
protects this system.
In conjunction with this

oppression are the
intensification of ethnic
and class
inequities. The unfulfilled
social, economic, and
political expectations of
Somali people have
translated
into militant protest,
as it has in Ethiopia
and Eritrea,
a protest that will
increase
ase as the oppression
becomes
more severe.
KO amount of refugee
assistance is going to
provide
for self-reliance.
An internationally
supervised cease
fire and cessation of
military aid to both
countries is a
ep in the right
direction. Somalia and
Ethiopia (with
the assistance of Italy
and the USSR) have been
negotiating a peace settlement
over the Ogaden. The
country that is blocking
these negotiations is the
US.
By not supporting the
peace initiatives in the
Horn, the
US becomes its greatest
obstacle.
At the world Food Conference
in 1981, the US was the
only country to oppose a
resolution condemning the
practice of using food as a
weapon.
Reagan was quite
clear as to what his food policy
would be. Through the
80s, he has supported three
military governments in the
Horn (Somalia, Sudan, and
Ethiopia) through the callous
use of food assistance to
manipulate dependent people for

self-serving political ends.
The UN and OAU are guilty of
obstructing peace by
refusing to assume the responsibility
of mediation in
internatonal conflicts. The UN and
OAU support the
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political boundaries of
neo-colonial Africa. Both
organizations fear a perceived
loss of power from
negotiations with legitimate
liberation movements.

Militarization
The rapid and on-going
militarization in the Horn
and the Indian Ocean by
the superpowers must be
opposed.
UN General Assembly
Resolution 28 32 (XXVI) declared
"the
Indian Ocean as a zone of
peace." 32
Co-sponsored by
Sri Lanka and Tanzania, the
resolution called:
(

)

installations, nuclearweaponf
aid
and weapons of mass destruction
and any manifesta">ilitary prescence conceived in
the context of great power
rivalry." (33)

This resolution specifically
refers to Soviet
facilities in Ethiopia and Eritrea,
US bases in Kenya,
Somalia, and the Sudan.
It calls for the return of the
island bases of Diego Garcia and Mayotte
to Mauritius and
the Comoros, as well as Glorieuses,
Juan de
Nova, Europe,

and Bassaa De India to Malagasy.

Unfortunately, as with

the World Court decision condemning the
US war against
Nicaragua, and resolutions against apartheid
in South

Africa, there is no enforcement of these
decisions.

The US and the USSR are requested to freeze
the arms

build up in the Horn.
aid,

After the cessation of military

they must then dismantle their bases.

US and USSR
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military advisors and Cuban
troops should go home.
34
The productive sectors
of Somali economy have
been
Slighted in favor of military
investment and what is
called -General Public
Services- - funds for the
secret
police and elite expense
accounts. (35)
Ahmed Samatar
refers to this police as a:
(

)

"...pervasive security network,
The National

afthfLnnnrsr"">

est;blilhS"^r?inction

unlimitL power to s2Lc™ dfta'^®
and kill sLpIcted dSs?d4nts?-^
(36r
The Pervasive Security Network

The culture of silence that
allows development
agencies in Somalia to collude with
oppression has been
briefly described. Somali author
Nuruddin Farah counters
this silence by articulately
opposing the debilitating
developments in his country.
Farah conceives that his
novels offer:
...an alternative to the propaganda
that
mediocracy in Somalia produces and puts on the state
the
shelves, an alternative and true record
of history."

Okonkwo concurs
One significant aspect of the General's
(Barre's)
regime is its censorship and monopoly of
information.
It practices selectiveness,
distortion, and, often, fabrication of information
which it feeds the public." (38)

This hardly comes as an aberration, however,
to people in
the United States who daily experience the same

manipulation.
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of Farah's characters

Soyaan believes that
Somalia needs:

sr:rKS‘“-,

pregnant letters such as
KGB^
alphabet of mysteries." (39^'

hiding behind
wicked

Coercing individuals into
conformity is a theme in
Legson Kayira-s
are bribed or intimidated
into complicity with
the
system. Where everyone
chooses words carefully
in an
atmosphere of fear and
suspicion:

reinterpreted according to
the <-000
code or
of clan,
clan class,
or grouD interfbc:-*light? ^otofnl e^capes
security system whosfplanLf
ears^Sfve",^
^
sprouted in
every homestead." (40)
i

Okonkwo describes Somalia
under Barre as "nothing
but a modern torture chamber,
a concentration camp,
a
Gulag." ( 41
)

With reference to Solzhenitsyn
-s Gulag, Farah draws
this
analogy:
the prisoners; the
SecSritv
curity the Green Guards, are
the iailers* anH
General, the Grand Warder of
them all."
,

-t-Hm

(42)

Farah 's Somalia of mystification
and misinformation
parallels US media manipulation. My
friend Jeanine was
watching the news one evening with
her eight year old
daughter Molly.
irate with the reporting, she yelled
at
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the newscaster:
"Liar, liar."

Molly thought

moment about the contradictions
and
asked, -Mommy, how am I
to know who to believe,
him
(pointing to the tv) or
you?"
a

Jeanine responded, -That,
Molly, is going to be a
struggle you will always have
to deal with, seeking out
the truth."
In a country run by Abrams,
Casey, Meese, and Deaver
It IS often hard to get
a handle on the truth.
Lies

become a norm in government,
not an aberration.
Africa" writes:

Se
T:ne

other.
other^

-Horn of

is suppressed or ignored at
one
withheld ol distorted at
And power over all our lives is

control of information and
center, leaving whole peoples
inked f
global merry-go-round while
vast sums'^of
g°°<iSr and arms are mysteriously
transferred
iittle actual mystel^ fr r
this.
The truth is right out^in
obscured by layers of misinformation fnd^mier"d^^
^
assumptions.
it remains for
US to dig for it.
And then to act upon it." (43)

resou?cef-'^a^

^

1

f ~Rsl iance

and Development

Babu suggests that self-reliant
development and
liberation are part of the same process. One
will not
occur without the other. The issue is justice.
Self-

reliance and liberation are connected to democratic

participation in development.

Where dialogue and

legitimate freedom of expression do not exist:
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of political violence

with those in power

orlLf eKf.in^ion.??'^^"^’^^"^

of nSionarSeve?opm4n^r^that''‘'''°“^r

regimes challengrrmaf i
desire for iustice anH a

f

^<==°onts

“n^ust,
5 woman's) repressive
inherent

Self-reliance as a feasible
objective for human
development is always appropriate
when viewed in terms of
liberation. Meeting the
self-reliant needs
of a

politically concious people in
Somalia will be pursued by
establishing a new government
in Mogadisho that shares
political and economic power with
its people.

This

government must struggle for
self-determination be it
autonomy within or liberation
from the US
empire.

Summary
The history of us foreign aid has
been to channel it
through private and governmental
elite structures. Steve
Hellinger of the Development Gap asserts:

working through elite channels that
well-being of the
enhance the well-being of the rich, your poor, but
aid is
surely going to be counterproductive."
(45)
^ ^
facilitate the

Counterproductive for the poor, that

is,

but US foreign

aid is generally concerned with the
well-being
(stability) of the rich.

Many development workers are

concerned with doing good deeds, but to many of
them,
doing good is associated with spending and giving
more

Development (aka selt-neliance
in many circles) is
not
something you buy with money.
Development happens when
people have access to
economic and political
power.
A simple solution to
this conflict is for the
us to
Side with the world's
poor.
This is a highly unconventional approach to foreign
aid, but it could be
a very
popular one.

self-reliance is not a feasible
development
objective in Somali refugee
camps because it is an
imposed policy on which
limits have already been
placed
restricting what refugees can
and cannot do.
Selfreliance is not viewed by the
power structure either in
terms of empowerment or
liberation.
As long as food aid is used
to create and perpetuate
refugees in Somalia, there will
be a harmful and
unnecessary dependency, quite
contrary to the SDR's HCR's
publicity advocating self-reliance.
One AID official in
Washington asserts:

HCR s self-reliance promos and
the Somali
government's promos are a wash. .Refugee
selfreliance IS a band-aid approach and
is ending
Forestry was
in
irth^ref
the refugees interest, but it was supposid to be
a
pro:ject and qualifies as self-reliance government
only by
name... Food For Work is another way
of givinq^peoole
what the government wants... Land tLure
IS not clear.
There will never be self-reliance
because the Somali government doesn't
want it." 46
.

(

)

Eleven of thirteen Washington interviewees
said that
self-reliance among refugees in Somalia was not
feasible.

Six people stressed there was no available
land suitable
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for fanning to support
this number of people.
Three
that Barre's political
manipulation did not allow
for self-reliant activities,
one blamed poor economic
policies. Another exclaimed:

no place l\ave^ever^seen^and'’^^‘
human habitation."
(47)

Place is like
conducive to

3^*’®

Six of these respondents
were adament that refugee
assistance was creating
dependency and that the food
Should be cut back. Two
people said the food wasn't
creating dependency, it was
creating markets. Three
people said the food was
wds necessary
nece«;«?ar-Tf to
support the hungry
and the Somali economy.
Two didn't know.

Expatriate development workers
in Somalia argue
there are too many camp and
local residents actively
colluding with the refugee
business power structure for
the accrued benefits and
rewards the system
offers.

Between the collusion and the
contrived population in the
camps, there is no sense of
a camp community with a
desire to work together. Rather,
there are special
interest groups. To quote one AID
official:
"Self-reliance is a grand idea, but it
doesn't work
well in most places due to self-interest."
48
(

)

Competition and independent operation
among refugee
agencies removes even a basic amount of
coordinated
support for self-reliance initiatives.
The HCR and NRC
offer no system for the self-reliance
process to
exist.

To quote from a censored report requested
by Geneva,
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covered up in Somalia:

)ut:

worri^loL"lia^:rtr^^ Sfref ?o^a°rf
^

intro&?“^"y

-cha^fsrto'^cMevfs^??!
development was to be

which -promotes the
participation of

®

Phenomenon

th

entit?erto^fac?ular‘^ successful
it in the field

t

two

incorporation of

^tea of development was
Aeitter
nnHe^ i"
^y HCR and
RRC in lhe'No??hwes??"^'( 49

r

Footnotes
I

was the only United Statesian
working with the hcr

greet\"SI"s:L%"' fact-finding allowed^rHCR^to
team wanting
infn^Tii^^y

information on the camps for which
I was
fources for information concerning
include refugees, Somalis, volags^
TTM
H^TTC
^
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US State Department people.
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CHAPTER

5

SELF-RELIANCE AND SELF-DETERMINATION
IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
From the point of view
of iustir-o +-v.«
cinsider^^ion?
Ne^ertoellss
cnat:
(1)

Basin
^‘c'-tissary
the country
linVoH wi'-f-u
^ be iinxed
with our ally Ethiopia."
-i

-,

Strategic Interests

Elliott Abrams has stated that
Somalia satisfies US
interests by cooperating "closely
with the US in several
ways," primarily by providing
the States with military
access to Somali ports and
airfields.
Early in
his

testimony to a US Joint Hearing
on Human Rights and
African Affairs (1984), he stressed
that US interests are
served if the Horn is "...stable,
peaceful, and
prosperous."

He accused Ethiopia of attempting
to

destabilize Sudan and Somalia by arming
guerillas from
these respective countries. He
disparaged the military
buildup of Ethiopia without mentioning
that the largest

per capita recipients of US military
aid in Africa are
those countries surrounding Ethiopia.
(2)

As suggested in Chapter Two, the
perceived strategic

interests of the US have legitimized US economic

manipulation and military intervention at

a

global level.

Events in the Horn since World War II have followed
this
same global pattern.

War and famine in the Horn of

Africa are rooted in this manipulation.
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The violence of

hunger and human displacement
is perpetuated by
superpower rivalry, as well

as inept, aggressive,
and

foolish decisions on behalf
of the leaders of all
governmsnts concerned. The
result has been millions
of
dead and displaced people.

'Strategically, the Horn is
not
primarily pursued for its raw

a region that is

materials, although there

are significant natural
resources available including
the
fertile highlands of Eritrea
and Ethiopia, potential
oil
wealth in the Ogaden, and
useful agricultural land in
the
river valleys of the Wabishabele
and Ganale, the

headwaters of both systems rising
in the Ogaden.
The Horn's major importance
in the geopolitical
scheme of world politics is
its geographical position.
Within Ethiopia are the headwaters
of the Nile.

The

Horn's juxtaposition borders the
Arab world and Black
Africa.
To the east (Eritrea) lies the
oil lanes of the
Red Sea and the Indian Ocean
(Somalia, Kenya).
Deep
water ports in these countries offer
attractive military
bases for the US, the USSR, or anyone
desiring an attempt
at hegemony in the Indian Ocean.
At 15 degrees North
and

40 degrees East, Eritrea's low
magnetic atmosphere make
it an excellent location for a
listening post in an

international communications system.

Whatever prospects

there may have been for post WWII economic
development in
these countries were greatly impeded by
internal

conflicts centered in
nationalist issues, us and
USSR
intervention has virtually
extinguished this generation's
hopes for such development
by promoting and
manipulating
these conflicts into
devastating wars that have
reduced
standard of living to
relationships of dependency.
For millions, the quality
of life has been reduced
even
further to a matter of
survival for hungry and
homeless
people ravaged by warfare.

Within the US state Department
are two primary
policies to achieve the same
end.
Wolpe (1982) refers to
these perspectives as the
globalist and regionalist views
to control events in the
Horn.
The globalist stresses an
accelarated military presence
to attain a military
solution. The regionalist is
concerned with selfidentified development or
humanitarian aid, the purpose
of Which is to ultimately
create stability through
dependency.

My experience, as well as views
expressed in the
literature, suggest that both of
these approaches

minimize and usually ignore the
importance of local and
national social and political forces
in the region.

Both

views overemphasiz-e and fantasize
the power of external
factors (e.g. USSR intervention) as
being the moving
force behind social movements in these
countries.
To explore durable solutions of peace
and justice in
the region, the conflicts must be understood
within the
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context of indigenous social
and political forces. To
do
otherwise is to perpetuate the
same disastorous and selfserving behavior characteristic
of US policy in Vietnam
and in Central America.

Eritrea

Ethiopia and Italy colonized
Eritrea.
During WWII
the British made a deal with
Eritrea guarantying them
independence if they would fight
against the Italians.
The Eritreans consented to the
offer.

Eritrea, however,
has two deep water ports on
the Red Sea.
This maritime
access, combined with Ethiopia's
land and natural
resources, was too profitable a
package for the US to let
free-thinking issues of self-determination
confront US
power and privilege in the region.

The Atlantic Charter's Four Freedoms,
promoting
independence for countries like Vietnam,
were similarly
ignored in Eritrea as national sovereignty
was usurped.
The consequence was a US manipulated
federation of

Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952.

Ten years later, Eritrea

was annexed to Ethiopia with US military
backing.
1952,

in

Emperor Haile Selassie began an economic, social,

and political destabilization of Eritrea.

Eritrean armed

resistance against the Selassie government and its U.S.
sponsors commenced shortly after annexation in 1962.

Similar to other liberation movements around the

world, Eritreans desire
sovereignty for their country.
Similar to other independence
struggles, armed resistance
began only after Eritreans
were denied their voices,
a
loss Of dialogue to the
point where peaceful
resistlrs
were ignored or punished
for speaking out.
similar to
other liberation struggles,
brutal suppression by U.S.
end USSR trained and
sponsored armies has resulted
in
massive human and environmental
destruction in Eritrea
and throughout Ethiopia.

Unique to the Eritrean struggle
is that they have
fought against both the United
States support of Selassie
and the Dergue (1962-1977)
and the Soviet Union support
of the Dergue and Mengistu
(1974 to the present).
Fighting for 26 years, it is the
war of longest duration
on the continent.
Eritrea's right to independence is
easily defended
and well-argued in international
law. (3)
The legal
framework for the rights of people to
pursue selfdetermination is stipulated in Articles
1 and 55 of the
UN Charter, as well as in several
supportive documents
and resolutions.

Resolutions 1514 and 1541 in 1960, and 2526
in 1970
leave no room for doubt but that the
international
community (and its legal expression, the UN)
hold no
for even entertaining any denial to the
quest of peoples under colonial rule or alien
domination, for self-determination up to
independence " ( 4
.

)

Medhanie (1986) writes;
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Self-determination has been
of
^
international law ever sinc^^ a princinle
ok
United Nations camllntl
^’2"
efieo? on
^
24th of
October, 1945 ." 5
(

)

The 1960 Declaration on
the Granting of Independence
to colonial countries
and Peoples, General Assembly
Resolution 1514 (XV) states:

by^virtue^S that

®®lf-<ietermination:

social, and cultural development."

®t°nomio.
(

6)

Arguments against independence
are rooted in the
colonial and imperial desire
for foreign control in the
region:
"In hostile hands it (Eritrea)
may
communications through the Red Sea block our sea
to various parts
if >^sed as a

silppinr

mountains bastion, may
rirute a threat
ti?Ste
Sre^''to^?h^"
to the whole of Eastern Africa."Ions7
The British conclusion was
suppported in a letter
from US War Secretary James
Forrestal to US Secretary of
State Dean Acheson in 1948. Forrestal
(

;

wrote:

strategic and
onsiderations it would be of value to logistical
States to have refineries, capable of the United
supplying a
substantial portion of our aviation needs,
close to a crude supply and also close to located
areas
task forces would be operating and where
airfields would be located, yet far enough
to be reasonably safe from effective enemy removed
bombing.

With respect to the Middle East, refineries
located
in Italien Somaliland and Eritrea would
meet the
foregoing conditions. .. therefore, as a long range
P^oyision of potential military value, it is
believed that concessions on rights should be sought
for United States interests to construct and
operate
refineries in Italien Somaliland and Eritrea. These
rights should include necessary transportation and
port concessions, together with air and naval base
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rights and communication
facilities." (8)
In his correspondence
to the U.S., Haile
Selassie
was Clear that the U.s.
request for military
facilities
would be granted if Eritrea
were ceded to Ethiopia,

m

its most simple terms,
U.S. policy was based
on giving
Selassie what he wanted
(Eritrea, as well as the
assumed
military strength one accrues
from accommodating
U.S.

military bases), in exchange
for the U.S. desire for
military installations and a
listening post for the CIA.
in none of these
communications is there evidence
of any
consideration for the rights and
welfare of

the Eritrean,

Ethiopian, or Somali people.

The language suggests only

a

geo-political concern for U.S.
strategic interests in
the Horn, as well as an
acquiescence to Ethiopian
colonial aspirations.
With an election approaching,
Harry Truman was
prepared to return Eritrea to its
Italian colonizers on
the grounds that it would appeal
to voters of Italian
ancestry in the u.s. But in
1950, when Selassie agreed
to send Ethiopian soldiers to fight
for the US

in Korea,

Truman decided to firmly endorse
Ethiopian territorial
soverignty over Eritrea." 9
(

)

At the United Nations, the U.S. guided
Resolution
390 A V through the General Assembly,
but not without

strong disagreement from some delegates.

delegate argued that:

The Soviet
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people without its^conLnt^and\e^ the Eritrean
of the fundamental
princinle nf
right of selfdetermination of peop^e^ Th» r,
take a decision which
wiii‘Ltisfv'^tL'^?'^^°"®
longing of
the Eritrean people for
inden^ia

fedeLtion of iSrea wi^h^’^n^tr^
State adopted
without the partioipation*^o?
that is, without the

participatlorof Eritrea!" ai)

A local referendum with
Eritrean participation was
out Of the question for
the U.s.
a confidential
telegram of 19 August
1949, The U.s. Embassy in
Addis
Ababa stated that 75 % of
the Eritrean people
supported
the independence Bloc
Party." (ii)
Knowing this
information, u.s. policy was a
concious decision to deny
Eritrean people their right
(as stipulated in the
United
Nations Charter) to political
self-determination.

m

..

The Czechoslovakian delegate
addressed the General
Assembly with these words:
p*’® f“"'?®”>®"tal purposes of the UN
ChartS’^^t^e Resolution
would deny the people of
nn them a federation self-determination and impose
on
with Ethiopia which the areat
majority oppose. instead of
maintaining
that part of the world, the Resolution
loulT foster
civil war and discord.
Instead of assisting an
exploited people to achieve
and^^Tn^
and
independence, it would attempt to coverfreedom
up the
annexation of a small state by a larger
state!^-%)

peLHf

With a small change in vocabularly
(annexation,
federation) these words could be superimposed
in

Southeast Asia, Central America, Southern
Africa, and
elsewhere, as characteristic of U.S. foreign
policy
against self-determination in these regions
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Ethiopia
To George Shepherd
(1985) Ethiopia became:

=tate status
b;;iusfof its"stratLic"l
and its ruling CopUc
clasr^wh?rh°"

^"tiMuslim and non-Arab
Th! ?'
was pro-Western
and the Amharic ariii-nr->were trained in English
and European values
The'^^^
ePPeared stable and
willing lo provide the

S

deploy^ts f^rlef aS^oun^ef
gr:„?L""i?^
of Abdel Nasser south of
SueL" (13^

The U.S immediately
established its foreign policy
for Ethiopia with two
agreements effective 23 May
1953
The first was the Mutual
Military Assistance Agreement
Which provided for the equipping
and training
.

of

Ethiopian military forces.

From 1951 to 1976, Ethiopia

received more economic aid
($350 million) and military
aid ($279 million) from the
US than any other country in
Africa.
During this period, 3,552 Ethiopian
military
personnel were trained in the USA.
The second agreement pertained
to defense

installations, particularly the CIA
listening post at
Kagnew in Asmara, Eritrea.
Ideally situated, far from
the magnetic fields of the northern
and southern poles,
Kagnew became the communications center
for monitoring
nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean.
Kagnew
(14)
therefore became an integral part of the US
global

circuit running from Arlington, Va., through
US military
bases in Morroco, Eritrea, Australia, and the
Philippines

At senate Foreign
Relations Hearings in
1976, us
Aznbassador to Ethiopia,
Ed Korry, desoribed US
polioy as
Short-sighted:
The
GovlrnLnt*'defined"iras°the
use
Kagnew station'
of
The
then to be
•strategically vital? to
n
States, the only
such military installation
1/800 officeL men anrt ?? in Black Africa. We had
working there,
plus 800 dependents* a
well advanSrduSn;
plans
k
i

L

with the Ethiopians*^

cadSlac^
way!'"

(ll)

'

wasn't much we could do

•=

h®''® it

that

In 1960, the US and Ethiopia
signed a new military

agreement paving the way for US
military intervention in
the region. Although the US
left the main counterinsurgency work to the Israelis
(Ottoway, 1982), by 1966

there were over 100 US counter-insurgency
advisors in the
country operating under the code
name "Plan Delta." (16)
The CIA counter-insurgency people
were called 'civic
action teams
'

The other component of this agreement
was the
Emperor's insistence that the US refuse
to give any
military aid to the Somali government, despite
the fact
that Somalia had a generally pro-western
orientation. As
a consequence,

the Somali government received their arms
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primarily from the Soviets.

Military interests, of
course, followed the
historical precedent of
protecting the business
interests

S'-

Coffee - Ethiopian-American
Coffee Company
Timber - infl Industrial
Development Consultant Inc
Cotton - Mitchell Cotts
Cattle - International Packers

Sugar - HVA (Dutch)
Fruits and Vegetables - Del
Monte, American Can
Potash & Copper - Parsons & co.
Tea - Brooke Bond

This IS an abbreviated list.

Ethiopia is one of

those countries with the dual
World Bank lable of
"underdeveloped and minerally rich."
Although not
'prized' for its natural resources,
Ethiopia posseses
mineral wealth.
it is also a country totally capable
of
feeding itself (as is all of Africa)
but we have to
examine who controls the land and who
wields the guns
that support the landowners. Robert
Zwarthruis, Director
of American Food Shares Co. articulates
these
,

relationships well:
"Our greatest stake is in Ethiopia.

.

.We don't go to
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7

that we
sLu?fheirtSK‘'coSn 2 r
go to Ethi^pif
in"^?S:r"^o help
he^o those
poor thinas
<5
tt
Wo go to an underdeveloped
^his.
oountr^l
'

-i

•

strong°^?oduc^^\f
ITctly ttfsLe^^ooS°"" "
through a state
o^.pany"Inrse?rits"o™1rlc^I!"^
on

'‘°

^L''Iamrpr?cr"ond?tTins

continuous
supply and this we get if
‘we ^
go'’to'^o^
countries like
Ethiopia and Egypt ^

PiiiiW-

havrneverrIgarderirar‘'®'’''H°'’
an underdevel^pefco;nt^.""lfl^;;^?^"
frankly-you cannot trust them?

We take home our investments
every year
Whf^n +-ho
season is over, the money is
at
hLI???lhe
^nor^aL
has been enoraous. We double
every year in
^
product and the only
real nrnhi
problem is that the Eritrean
resistance qr^o

abo:nt^?r^Ll?S.?°"
We are now searching for the
ideal
Africa... The political risks imply country in
that once you
building up an organization^for
^ ^ay be nationalized.
There is no country
whS^f^'you can be safe today.”
^
''^bere
17
(

)

The response to this oppression has
been the
formation and organization of several
liberation groups,
first against Selassie and more overtly
against

Mengistu.

The liberation forces are local people who

want to control their resources.
the exercise.

This is the point of

Who is going to control the land?

Who is

going to control production and the benefits
thereof?

As stated in Chapter Two,
local people become the
enemy.
This is called resistance
in most vocabularies.
The

White House calls it
communism, also terrorism.

Revolution
The overthrow of the
monarchy by army officers
in
1975 did not Change
Ethiopia's foreign policy
towards
Eritrea.
For a brief period there
was a lessening in
hostilities as both countries
explored possibilities for
cooperation, but the self-proclaimed
socialist government
Of the Dergue (Committee)
continued a brutal war against
Eritrea which rapidly spread
to Tigray, Wollo, and other
areas.
The revolution had changed
governments, but not
the colonial policies of the
monarchy.

Neither did US policy change
significantly.
reason was Ethiopia was still
dependent

One

on the US for

weapons.

Secondly, the US State Department
assumed that

the Dergue

's

communists'

military officers were professed 'anti(anti-Soviet),

many of the officers having

been trained in the US, including
their emergent leader.
Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam. The Ford
administration
did not want an independent Eritrea
and neither did the
Dergue.
US military aid reached its peak during
the Ford
administration in 1976 to over $142 million.
(17a)

Farer (1976) writes:
"The US did not intervene to save the Lion
of Judah,
who had been such a close ally, because he
was
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tributary relations had
to the North
Sadat
While ^ initial phase
of the
'officer's revoV?.
anti-Western or a
threat to the feudal^svst'”

bSrworked our:i?f

a^atrund^r^h^Sfl^cror
mSlS?Ls?"”'al)^""

long oppressed

The US was uncomfortable,
however, with the
independent nature of the Dergue
that was formulating
social and political reforms
within the country while
simultaneously developing ties
with the USSR. Secretary
of State Kissinger was
concerned with these events, but
still encouraged aid to Ethiopia
as long as the country
retained some pro-western
orientation,
it was feared
that without continued US aid,
Ethiopia might join an
emerging African block of nations
that was critical

of US

foreign policy, thus reducing US
control on the
continent. Additionally, Kissinger
was afraid of

competition from Soviet aid to Ethiopia,
as well as
concerned about the well-trained and
well-equipped army
in Somalia aligned with the USSR.
(18a)
Consistent with previous decisions, US
policy was
guided not by an understanding of social
conditions
in

the Horn, rather by a fear and loathing
of the Soviet
Union cutting in on a piece of the US empire.
As

Ethiopian ties with the USSR grew, the US began
to menace
the Dergue with threats of cutting off aid.
(18b)

In February 1977, Mengistu Haile Mariam emerged
from

the "Palace Shootout" as the Dergue 's leader.

He

proceeded to eliminate those
in opposition to hi.
to the
point Of massacring select
groups who protested his
policies.
President Carter saw this
as an opportune time
to intimidate Mengistu
by announcing the
cancellation of
all US aid to Ethiopia
due to massive violations
of human
rights. Human rights,
however, were not the central
issue as much as the growing
pressure within Carter’s
administration (from Brzezinski)
to confront the Soviet
presence. To Carter's surprise,
Mengistu responded in
April by closing all US
installations, except for the
embassy and AID office.
While this "diplomacy" was
playing out in Ethiopia,
Somalia was becoming alarmed
at the growing contact
between the Dergue and the
Soviets. Aware of this
concern, the us tried weaning
Somalia from the Soviets by
announcing that the US would consider
selling weapons to
the Somalis. At this point,
US interests converged with
the Saudi interests of luring
Somalia away from the USSR
and in the Saudi case, into its
Islamic fold. Mengistu 's
policies hastened the organization
of liberation fronts
in Ethiopia among the Tigray, Oromo,
and Afar.

Ethiopia's army was poorly trained and
short of weapons
due to US cancellation of arms shipments.
in Eritrea,

the EPLF had Ethiopian forces under siege.

To the US and

Somali president Siad Barre, it seemed
opportune to start
a war on another front, the Ogaden,
referred to and
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claimed by the Somalis as
Western Somalia.

Somalia

After World War II, the Somali
territories
(including the Ogaden) were
placed under a UN trusteeship
with independence as an eventual
goal.
Britain favored
this arrangement, but the
US sided with Haile Selassie's
wishes to annex the Ogaden,
control of which was turned
over to Ethiopia in 1948.
Quoting
Lewis:

aggression, Ethiopia had
natura?!
rally every right to the most
considerate and
generous treatment.
But it was unfor?unatf?hat in
the process of satisfying her
claims t^reparation
protesting Somalis
sacrificed and the collective Somali
e®
5°^^ national self-determination be
cast aside
most as soon as it had achieved an
articulate
^xi^uiace
expression." (18c)

Somalia received independence in
1960, refusing to
acknowledge the borders it had been
relegated by the UN,

insisting that the Ogaden, the Northern
Frontier District
(NFD)

of Kenya, and Djibouti were all
legitimate

components of a greater Somalia.
Somalia's post independence government was

democratically elected and filled with corruption
and
disorganization.

It was overthrown in 1969 by a military

coup under the leadership of Colonel Siad Barre.

There were two Ethiopian policies with which the US
had historically cooperated fully and these concerned

Eritrea and Somalia.

Ethiopia feared Somali claims to
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the ogaden.

As such, the us denied
any Somali requests
for arms after the country
achieved independence in
i960.
Furthermore, us support of
the 1964 Cairo Resolution
to
the OAU accepted the
inviolability of colonial

boundaries, reinforcing
Ethiopian territorial claims.
US Ambassador Donald
Petterson acknowledged in
his
notes that the US:
"

seek to minimize the disruDtivf^
preserve the detente in
th^Hor?; orA?rio™"^^^
the view being that:

dlfficultle^Lf
East Afrlc^'.

(Lr

significant

" ""terests in the Horn and

For the US, priority was
always on the more "lucrativeinterests in Ethiopia. The
Soviets would agree that

Ethiopia with a colonized Eritrea
is a greater prize than
Somalia.
Following this self-serving policy,
on 27 April
1977, the State Department submitted
a report to Congress
Identifying Somalia, together with
Libya, Iraq, and South
Yemen, as countries actively supporting
international
terrorism.

An infuriated response from Mogadisho
claimed

that:

"The rightous struggle of movements
fighting
against oppression and colonialism was justified
and
could not be described as terrorism."
(20)

During this same month. President Carter, alarmed
at
the violent excesses of Mengistu, told his
aides to
"do

everything possible to
get the Somalis to be
our
friends." ( 21
one of the first steps
was a state
Department announcement to
the Somalis saying:
"„e think
It is desirable that
Somalia knows it does not
have to
depend on the Soviet Union."
(22)
)

Many of my Somali and
Ethiopian colleagues assert
that the US not only
promised to replace the USSR
as

Somalia's arms dealer, but
implied as well that the
US
would not stand in the way
of Somalia pursuing its
irredentist claims in the Ogaden.
There is good
indication that support for
this initiative came from
the
Brzezinski faction at the White
House.
The US openly contacted several
allies around the
world (England, France, Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan,
Iran, and others) to discuss
the desirability of
supplying weapons to Somalia.
Ethiopia reasonably
alleged that this consortium was
a network for channeling
US weapons through conservative
Islamic states to arm
Somalia (Legum and Lee 1980)

While these discussions were circulating
among
embassy missions and arms dealers,
Somalia acted

on its

initial cues from the US and attacked
the Ogaden.

Officially, the White House stated that the
US would
only sell defensive weapons to the Somalis
to protect
them from foreign attack. As early as July,
however, the
British withdrew their offer as arms supplier.
On 1 and
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September the US announced
that they were withdrawing
their Offer as well.
Receiving US weapons now
became
contingent on a cease fire
and the return of Somali
military forces to Somalia.
2

President Daniel Arap Moi
of Kenya was probably the
most influential person
in determining this policy.
He
was uneasy with the success
of the Somalis in the
Ogaden
and frightened at the notion
that they would attack Kenya
to reclaim the Northern
Frontier District (NFD) upon
successful completion of the
Ogaden war. Neither the
British nor the US wanted to
strain relationships with
Kenya so both countries complied
with Moi's demands and
cancelled their official arms
agreements with Somalia
until the latter withdrew from
the Ogaden.
The US had no vested interest in
Somalia winning the
Ogaden war.
it was a ploy to weaken the
Mengistu regime,
as well as create and institutionalize
Somali dependency
on the US.
When Somali weapons were exhausted,
the
Somali army was easily driven from
Ethiopia in Spring
1978 by a combined effort of well-trained
and well-armed
Ethiopian, Cuban, and Soviet military forces.
An estimated 1/4 of the Somali army was killed
(Legum and Lee)
The US never expected or desired that Somalia

reclaim the Ogaden as this would have confronted
the
colonial demarcations sponsored by the Cairo Resolution
to the OAU.

It would further encourage other legitimate
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attempts towards self-determination
and independent
economic development, and in
so doing confront
colonial
and imperial power structures
world wide.
"For a fleeting moment,"
writes ex-US Ambassador
Petterson,
"the plight of the refugees
caught the
attention of a fairly large
segment of the American
public.
(23)
But for the Carter
administration there
was greater urgency in securing
military access.
For
Siad Barre, it was pushing to
the extreme the amount of
US economic and military
assistance he desired in
exchange for US access to Somali
ports and airfields.
Barre knew that US military and
economic aid would
facilitate the WSLF's presence in
the Ogaden while
warding off political dissent at
home.
The deep water
port in Berbera helped satisfy US
notions of "missle
envy" (Caldicott) in the region.
In 1985, Somalia, Sudan, and Kenya
were the three

largest per capita recipients of US
military aid in
Africa, receiving respectively,
76, 38, and 24 dollars
per person.
Somewhere, cash registers
ring.

The Politics of Refugees in Somalia

Siad Barre, defeated in

a

costly war that may or may

not have been of his own making, now faced internal

political turmoil at home.

The 1969 military coup which

brought him to power had as

a

central focus the
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reunification of Sonali homelands
in Kenya, Ethiopia, and
Djibouti.
It was also rooted in the
theoretical tenants
of self-reliant development
through scientific

socialism.
Not only had he failed to
reunify the homelands, but the
war brought Djibouti and Kenya
closer to Ethiopia based
on their interdependent
economic and territorial
interests. This made Barre
unpopular among many factions
within his country.
in February 1978, his army was
decimated and he had

no superpower that he could rely
on for economic and

military aid.

Faced with growing civil insurrection
in
the North (the Somali National
Movement, SNM) and the
Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF)
in the
South,

the way was readied for the military
access agreement
with the US.

Nine of Somali's 15 regions share boundaries
with
Ethiopia and large segments of the Somali
population

supported these insurgent groups (Mohamoud 1983)

us

.

security and economic assistance escalated counterinsurgency, particularly the arrest of political

activists advocating reforms.

Mohamoud argues that it

was this suppression that:

"...effectively shifted the leadership of the
opposition from within the Somali government to
Ethiopian-backed insurgency movements." (24)
As a result of the war, there was a movement of

people from the Ogaden seeking refuge in Somalia.

Most
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Of these people were
loyal to Barre.

The President
realised that thousands
of loyal Ogadenis in
his oountry
would help him resist
opposition from rival clans,
discontented military groups,
and the Muslim clergy.
Barre also calculated
that sheltering --refugees"
would serve as a propaganda
tool to illustrate
Mengistu-s
brutality. He began
trucking food to the border
while
simultaneously publicizing
in the Ogaden that
there was
food and Shelter in
Somalia.
Some accounts attest that
the government used army
trucks to round up people
and
bring them to the feeding
centers. ( 25
)

News of shelter and free
food travels quickly in
^
society, particularly one
experiencing the
aftermath of war. while women
and children collected the
rations, men were freed up
to fight with the WSLF or
continued with their herds, as
they now no longer had the
responsibility of feeding their
families.

Unfortunately for Barre and the
refugees, while he
was calling around the world
about his refugee crisis,
one much listened.

no

The UN took six months to give
it the

Official stamp.

What began as a need among an
undetermined number of
refugees was soon exacerbated into an
emergency
situation. As the population of the
camps grew, the

circumstances of the refugees and of the
natural
environment became desperate
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The surrounding savannah
was stripped of vegetation
to provide for firewood
and building materials.
Camps
with inadequate water for
drinking and washing had poor
hygiene and sanitation contributing
to a rapid spread of
disease.

Mohamed Dahir, CHW Supervisor
of the Refugee Health
Unit (RHU) in Hargeisa told me
that due to the sparse

distribution of people in pastoral
society, when living
in close proximity to others,
resistance to disease and
infection is lowered. In overcrowded
Somali camps,
people began dying in alarming numbers.
In 1980, the UNHCR estimated the
cost of the refugee
program in Somalia to be $120 million,
in that year,

Somalia received 226 million pounds of
food from the US.
Included in the food package were corn,
bulgar, wheat
flour, sorghum, dried skim milk (DSM)
corn-soya
,

(CSM)

,

meal

vegetable oil, rice, sugar, meat, dried fruit
and

beans.

Tucker adds that:
"There were thousands of durable items as well, some
of them never before seen in Somalia: clothes,
cloth, blankets, tents, tarpaulins, radios,
refrigerators, generators, well-drilling rigs,
prefab houses, tractors, trucks, and dozens of new
cars, although primarily for the use of the

expatriates

.

"

(26)

Some of these items may not have been part of some
Somalis' experience, but it is chauvinistic for people to

read this quote and categorically assume backwardness or
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a people uncivilized.

The point Tucker makes
is that one of the
poorest
countries in the world was
suddenly recipient to over
$100 million in food aid
with no adequate infrastructure
to provide for its
appropriate distribution. Tucker,
a
CARE employee in Somalia,
asserts that "as much as
of
the relief aid was stolen
before it could reach the
refugees.
(27)
The "London Observor" had
a lower
estimate of 60 <; The Philadelphia
Enquirer quoted 50%.
During my work in Somalia, I
found it difficult to
estimate how much aid was being
diverted, and didn't
preoccupy myself with the task,
although I did keep
records of expenditures as
indicated in Chapter
Five.

Development workers in Somalia
often joked that the
refugee business was the best
business in town. World
Bank statistics support this with
figures showing that in
1980, dealing in food aid commodities
was the largest
industry in the country, increasing
the Gross National
Product (GNP) by 40%. My first reaction
to the
"corruption" was that it was stealing, and
had little
respect for those connected with it.
However, I argue
that the international community brought
this situation
on themselves by dumping $126 million
dollars worth of
food into a circumstance they did not
understand and into
a "food

Monitor)

moving operation," (according to one USAID Food
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even f iling^cabinlts°^\nvthin^
without
States would
^ nave
have oeen
been done with computers."
(28)
UNHCR Representative to
Somalia Otto Hagebuchle,
although exasperated with
the -headache- of Somalia,
admitted;

exploit this liLSlon'f"®

huLnitaSan puwoser

honest. If „e were
‘’® tempted to
"th°T

ere geared to national
political aiml';‘"^'( 29 ^
One Somali colleague,
Nuruddin explained it not in
national, political terms,
rather in terms of clan:

'Each Somali has a clan.
it ic; f
family is hungry, i must feed
it.
You wSuld^dS^th^
someone arrested me for feeding
mv clan
at IS called stealing) my
(
clan would kill hiiri
Foreigners do not underhand ou?
systel If yo^
“"'^®tstand our polices which are
tribar" Barrf feeds his clan with
refugee food or
hf loses respect
he
and power." (30)
,

.

Nuruddin added that foreigners do
not understand the
clan pressures that Somali officials
work under; that if
they took the time to understand,
they would know how the
power and hence the food moves among
the family.
Not all Somalis agree with this
opinion.

One

colleague said Nuruddin overstates the
issue by using the
clan as an excuse for profiteering.
"it is corrupt
individuals, not our clans who are responsible
for the

diversion." (30a)

Somalia was promoting a figure of 1,500,000 refugees
in their camps, with some figures as
high as two million.

The National Refugee Commission (NRC) cited that
most all

Of these refugees were
from the Ogaden.
The World Atlas
census for the Ogaden is
600,000.
The highest figure 1
have seen is 800,000 one million of whom the
authors
estimate 500,000 went to
Somalia. (31)
The Ogaden was by
no means depopulated and
one need not be a mathematician
to realize there was
considerable disparity between
the
figures of the NRC and the
Atlas Census figures.
By mid-1981, the emergency
situation was over.
Copious rains had returned
and development agencies
were
beginning to think in terms of
development rather than
basic issues of survival.
Donor countries, particularly
in Europe, were upset at
the inflated figures and gross
diversion of food. The blatant
deception, in the words
of one CARE employee, made a
mockery and a sham out of an
alleged crisis situation.
It is not an unreasonable
request for planning

purposes to have an accurate count of
the target
population, partioulary when the service
being offered is
reputedly to keep people breathing.
However, the Somali
government has to the present never permitted
a
legitimate census of camp populations to
happen.
The first UNHCR idea for census taking was
to do an
aerial photographic survey of the camps.
Expensive

photographic equipment was brought in, but the
government
refused to cooperate with an aerial survey for
reasons of
"national security".
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The plan that was pursued
was a national census in
the camps on ll November
1981.
Expatriates working in
the country were quick to
recognize that the immediate
goal of the government was
to keep the refugee figures
as
high as possible to ensure
a surplus of aid.
Somali
leadership was organized from
the national level down to
camp officials and the refugees
themselves to achieve
this end.
There was no way a count could
be taken that
would not be fraudulent. UNHCR
went ahead as planned.
ome agency people, like Caraher
with Community Aid
Abroad were openly threatened by
Somali officials and
police to "stay off the streets"
during the Census.
(32)

The strategy for counting was for
each camp resident
to dip their finger in a purple
dye.
The cleaning
antidote for the dye was a chlorine
solution.
Frank
Jantzen, Food Monitor with the HCR,
said that all the
bottles of the chlorine solution were
confiscated by the
Somali government well ahead of the census,
to be
distributed in the camps for the counting,
cleaning,
counting, cleaning, counting, cleaning etc.
On the day
of the census, expatriate observers estimated
that
some

people came back as many as 10 to 15 times.

When the

chlorine solution ran out, some people scraped the dye
off their fingernails to the point where their fingers

were bleeding, and returned to the census line.

Somali

were fully aware of what was happening reported

Chris Bentley,
I
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(SCF)

but none i:„peded the
fraud.
arrived in Somalia a year
and a half
,

later.
Many
development workers were
insulted and frustrated
with
What they described as
daily lies and deceit of
the NRC,
the incompetence of
the HCR, and the lack
of resource
accountability of both.
«,en I left in 1984 these
same
ill-feelings remained.

common knowledge among most
everyone I knew in the
refugee business in Somalia
was that inflated numbers
were an opportune measure
to attain greater amounts
of
refugee assistance as well
as greater sympathy and
wider
news coverage in the
international political arena.
No
one knows the exact number
of legitimate refugees in
the
camps, and during my time
in Somalia, no one took the
initiative to pursue it because
it would have resulted in
punishment. A negotiated figure
of 700,000 was agreed
to.
After all, writes Miller, "when
there is profit in
uncertainty, it is expedient to
remain vague." ( 33 )
A refugee friend, Omer once said
to me:

country has no friends.
uses other countries for its ownYour country only
interests. Th^ is
Somalia's friend. You want us to
fioht Ethiopia because the
fight
Russians are there,
do not matter.
We know this.”
The permanent interest for the US, he
explained, was to
keep Barre in power and have access to
the ports and
Omer commented matter-of-factly
"For us, it has always been this way, whether
at
home with Selassie and Mengistu or here in
Somalia.
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-n't.

It

„m

The state Department
was well-aware that
refugee
food was feeding
Barre's army, sustaining
the „SLF, sold
to Kenya for a
stronger ourrency, and
otherwise helping
to reduce the Somali
government. s Balance of
payments
dofecrt.
This conceivably made
Barre-s government
Stronger.
It is true as well
that the refugee business
had an
enormous impact on economic
activity in the country
by

providing employment for
thousands of people.
were in the camps as
logistics officers,

Many jobs

storekeepers,

interpreters, and porters.

UN, government, and
NGO-s

utilized drivers, office
personnel, assistants, interpreters, watchmen, and
housekeepers.
Port activities
require a number of logistical
and labor positions to
get
the ships Off-loaded and
the food headed to its
destination. Roads were built
and repaired. Several
others
Offered services to expatriates
in hotels,
restaurants,

clubs, communications, and
transportation.

Tucker

writes

2thin^he%"oma^res'L\uS:l^t^nL"°^
p^peuie'openf"

ntr"

My experiences in the Horn in
Kenya and Somalia lead
me to believe that US aid, be
it Peace Corps in the
former or food for refugees in
the latter, is tied to US
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"strategic considerations" in
the region.
From my
conversations with state Department
and AID officials
these motives seem to be:

Maintaining access to Somali's
military bases, which
in the summer of 1986
included access by South Africa
to
these facilities, as well;
1

)

Stabilizing" Somalia's economy
so that it
accommodates the west's market
oriented system and;
3)
Pushing US wheat surpluses with
the intention
2)

of

creating a Somali dependency on
US wheat.

(

35

)

Insurgency

Barre's survival strategies abetted
by US security
and economic assistance may not be
providing the
stability that either he or the US
desires.
Mohamoud
argues that massive military aid and the
dumping
of

economic assistance:
"...can be neither a basis for political stability
in Somalia nor an alternative to a
comprehensive US

policy for the region."

(

37

)

This policy did not have favorable results
for the US in
Ethiopia under Selassie or with the Shah in Iran.

Somalia's military based autocratic rule has no
place within its stucture for political dialogue or
an

opposition party.

Detention of anyone is arbitrary and

is solely designed to prevent political dissent.

Power

and authority in the system is derived from loyalty to

the leader,

having
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Ahmed Samatar (1986)
describes Somalia as

a:

ecSnlmir^ln!Seing1s'Ss"
g IS disastrously

neglected.”

(

38 )

samatar asserts that Barre
has lost legitimacy by
reinstituting historical
rivalries among clans:

new lease of life to centrifugal
ambitions.!.
for
tne bomaii
thi
lomaU state elite was, and is. theconnection
ea<?v
accessibility to more military
supplies to
strengthen their capabilities to
insurgents, and assure themselves figh? of?
of
domestication of the rest of society.”the
( 39
)

Okonkwo refers to this manipulation
of family ties
as "clan based nepotism.”
(40)
Furthermore,

he asserts:

"History demonstrates through its
accounts of
national developments, that unjust,
repressive
regimes challenge a man's inherent desire
for
and equity.
Consequently such regimes as
the General's (Barre) invariably encounter
opposition from dedicated and determined
nationalists.” (41)
To my knowledge, the State Department has
not

recognized that either of the two insurgent groups
has a
strong following. The two groups do not cooperate
with
each other. They are different factions composed
of

different clans from
different parts of the
country
Somali and „s authorities
generally disavowed that
the
SSDF had much backing
among Somalis, rather
that its
support came from Ethiopia,
other sources say the
SSDF
is strongly supported
by Somali people in
the

South.
In the North there
seemed to be significant
support
for the SNM among
Somalis, predominantly
among the Issag
end issas.
Popular support facilitated
such major
undertakings as the succesful
attacks on Handera prison
end the routing of a
Somali army camp near
Burao during
1984.
There seemed to be general
opposition as well to
Barre's recruitment and
maintenance of Ogadeni people
in
the Northwest.

us military and economic
manipulation of their
country is a condition both
of these groups are against.
The SNM resents the
exploitation of the refugee
program
to their exclusion and
advocates ending the dependency
they say has been created.

African Confidential"

(AC)

views the SNM and SSDF

as proxy forces that Mengistu
can utilize to fight

against Somalia's proxy army, the
WSLF.

AC regards the

DF as weak and of little military significance.
SNM, IS seen as much stronger,
evidenced by their

military achievements against Barre's
army.
Mengistu
gives tacit support to both groups
because they
(particularly the SNM) are strong bargaining
chips

The

166

167

towards an Ogaden settlement.
some colleagues and
writers say Barre is afraid
of
growing SNM strength that
will lead to a separatist
movement in the Northwest.
"African Confidential"
writes
^he
EttlSpianfm?ght°fllof?he^;®“^°P^®'?
SNM to
extend control over local
the Ogaden and Eastern
at the expense of thf Haud ^^such^^^^°^
OgadeAi beSuL"of%hrx^
the Issaq
dominance in the SNM
Rn+- i-h
to a
widespread Issag s^ira^^^r
Somalia. A senarate afar ^ movement in northern
northern
Somalia and ®®®tern
eS?ern Ethiopia
E?h?nnla°”^°^K'^
is
what
Barre
fears
most." (42)
in a paper for the Wilson
Center, ex-CIA analyst

Henze (1982) describes how
the militarization of
Somali's
economy (similar to the us
economy) has come at the
expense of investing in Somalia's
general public
services.
He states:
“ilitary expenditure was so
it was consuming more
than 150 percent of the export
accounted for nearly 70% of all revenues and
imports.'"
43

taxino\r?i^ economy that
?an

(

)

Hunger, writes Abdi Samatar
(1986)

manifestation of
significant degree the result of
a
policies and practices...
The staS structure and state
authorities are a
immediate impediment to economic growth, direcoomic development, and the assault on
poverty.” 44
^

(

In 1983,

I

)

was told by an AID official that the

entire infrastructure of the refugee
business operated at
an annual cost of $300 million. Just
before leaving
Somalia in 1984, l asked an NRC official what
would

happen to the refugees if
the food stopped coming.
He
shrugged as if the answer
were obvious, and not worth
discussing, "They all have
places to go."

More Food
But the food kept coining
as did more refugees in
1985.
As people (mostly Oromo)
fled to Somalia, other
ethnic groups (mostly from
Tigray and Eritrea) were
leaving Ethiopia for the Sudan.
They were fleeing
"villagization", the forced relocation
program of the
Mengistu government. This movement
of people was brought
to the attention of Europeans
and United Statesians.

During the Spring of that year,
"Live Aid" began to
rock and roll for the starving
in Ethiopia; for the
refugees that were leaving their
homes because they had
no food.

The quotes from musicians such as
Stills,

Ritchey, Geldorf, et.al. indicated no
knowledge of the
fighting, burning of crops, and forced
relocation; no

awareness of the dynamics of power and how
millions of
dollars of food aid would be a violent
weapon in the
hands of Mengistu Haile Mariam.
Live Aid???
etc.)

(45)

Aid sent to Ethiopia (food, trucks

is controlled by the Ethiopian government
and they

are not going to feed the people they have been

intentionally starving, unless there is an ulterior
motive,

like media coverage and relocation.
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Seven, armed, anti-government
groups are documented
as fighting within Ethiopia.
The WSLF and EPLF make
nine.
The strongest forces are
among the Tigray and the
Eritreans in the north. It
was Mengistu's plan to take
people from the north and
relocate them elsewhere. The
objective was clear. By
depopulating the war zone, he

would remove infrastructural
support for the liberation
armies.
By no means a new idea, the
US had defoliated
and depopulated in VietNam
and is presently performing
the same operation in Guatemala
and El Salvador.
A high ranking AID official
in the Ethiopian food
program is assured that Mengistu's
intentions are good.
She told me:

people there. Of course no
one wants to leave their home,
but under the
"--thing had
?o’^brdone?""(4
6?

A high ranking AID official in the
Somali refugee
program doubts that crops were burned
or that the

relocation was necessarily violent:
"It is not that easy to
came to Somalia because
Marxist-Leninist state,
•pull factor,
the fact
waiting for them across
'

burn crops. These people
they don't want to live in a
That and what I call the
that food and water were
the border." (47)

There is good evidence, however, that supports
the
contention that Mengistu has attempted to create a
free

fire zone (scorched earth)

in the north; that there has

been forced relocation of Tigrean and Oromo to
facilitate
this, quite often at harvest time when crops were
left in

the fields.
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mentioned the scorched
earth policy in Chapter
TWO. The comparison is
striking with Operation
Pheonix in
El Salvador.
The US free fire zone in
El Salvador has
resulted in 65,000 dead and
over 20% of the population
displaced from their homes
during the last
I

7

years.

No

Live Aid concert for these
people.

The greatest devastation
in the Horn is in Eritrea
and Tigray, but in any area
where there is resistance to
Mengistu,
the consequence of hunger
is a reality.
The
hunger is not from drought,
over-population, and poor
farm management as is often
advertised.
it is from

aerial bombing, burning of crops,
forced relocation, and
an attempt by the Ethiopian
government to otherwise

systematically destroy the infrastructure
of any
opposition to Mengistu.
The only voluntary agency (to my
knowledge) to speak
out against this policy has been
the Belgian
group,

Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF or Doctors
Without Borders)
They were expelled from Ethiopia in
late
1985 for

publicly reporting that:
"100,000 had already been killed in the
program which aims to shift 1 1/2 millionrelocation
people in
uxX*
(48)

Rony Brauman, president of MSF stated:
"The food donated by European countries and by
the
USA IS instrumental in helping the regime's counterinsurgency strategy to concentrate the rural
population in relocation villages where they can be
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Hancock

(

1985

)

severed." (49)

writes:

aid ItTtill ?h 4
convenient
lelTlrltLllT^^
security problem posed
by the
- Tigre and
serious
Wollo - should aic:o
4.^® the provinces
scheduled to provide
supplies of human
fodder for the resettlem^n?
First
starved half
deaJh
communities all over southern
scattered
contumacious northeL^?^ ^
position to oppose the
goveriLi?.

L

State Department, AID,
and Food For Peace
officials
Who I interviewed in
Washington DC were almost
unanimous
in their pride of having
saved five or six million
people
from starvation.
Five people interviewed
chose not to
comment on the political
implications of food aid. six
said they saw no connection
between Ethiopia's

villagization/resettlement policy and
food assistance.
The bottom line for all
but two State officials was
that
the food went to the people
it was intended for.
one economic advisor felt
that the Ethiopians should
not have been given any food;

agfiriSr
ater, ’'anS
g
and

then again later on.
now, we won't have to do that."
(51)

them
if thev
^

®

The other official's bottom
line was that food aid was
fighting communism.

Jason Clay of Cultural Survival
strongly argues;
humanitarian assistance
attempted to systematically
causes of the present famine. While
ir assistance,
I
their
they claim, feeds the hungry, they
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Whether their
exacerbate the

as1i.L°ncf

conditions that led to tho°'^
West is willing to
fLd sta?^ino"rt^®”'^"®'
asking how they came to Ho
without
-i-u
condition or
evaluate whetter Welte^n
ssistance programs
alleviate those cnnHi-ni
monumental task in thi=
a
Ethiopia is eltabUsMnf
system that will nr-oHur^^ a social and economic
generations ?o coni?»“(S2f
•

Clays analysis
the region.

overthrown.

USSR as his
Dergue from

dictator in

is consistent with
US planning for

The US does not want
to see Mengistu
Rather, the US wants to
merely replace the
primary benefactor, a process
of weaning the
their Soviet patrons.
Mengistu is a military
the genre of other proxy
rulers the US

maintains in exploited countries,
and the State
Department feels they can work
with him. According to
Jean Szymanski, Desk Officer
for Ethiopia at the state
Department:
*^°

Ethion'i'a'^

them?"

tstr

our relationship with
continually making that known to

Turner and Clay both assert that
it is this policy
that makes the US:
"...tacit accomplice in the Dergue's
ruthless
the north, which are mainly
p nsible for the famine's persistence."
(54)

Gebremichael writes:
The Soviet Union's military aid and
the
relief aid to Ethiopia ... have helped West's
carry out its war policy in Eritrea and Ethiopia to
more social and political unrest in the to create
country
^ and
region as a whole." (55)
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Chris Carter, Africa
Program Coordinator
for
Grassroots International
concurs:

contrasting t!
also causing
addItISSII^S«SaSfer"
Offers

logistical backuo
pin
^ tn Ethiopia
campaigns." 55
(

1^Si"Sr"
s

military

)

us food policy to
Ethiopia is consistent with
US
cooperation with Mengistu.
There are well-established
relief agencies organized
by and working among
the
Eritreans, Tigray, and
Oromo, but US support
of their
work conflicts with US
"strategic interests" in the
region.
The HCR and most NGOs
follow the same policy.
From 1984 to 86 the us sent
more food to Ethiopia
than to any other country
in Africa.
Several writers and
Ethiopians, Somalis, and Eritreans
with whom I have
spoken suggest that Mengistu
would have been overthrown
by now if it were not for
the food aid.
The Somali and
Ethiopian Embassies in Washington
have declined to
comment, state Department and
AID officials who I have
interviewed disagree (if they comment
on the subject)
that the food has had that much
significance on the
longevity or strength of the Mengistu
regime.

Most of the 3,500 tons of food
per month that the
Relief Society for Tigray (REST) moves
at night from the
Sudan into Tigray comes unofficially
from the US.
During
the summer of 1986 a shipment of 75
Mercedes trucks
increased the cross-border capacity by an
estimated
60%.

"African Confidential" writes

s;sg«“^^^^^^“Leninist
League of Ticrr ?»\7 irif luential
a.with thp t^pt p^
-t-K
wouldj now seem out of the
question.”
(

t

/

1

*.

(57^

The similarities between
Mengistu and Barre in
manipulating food assistance are
striking.
many
respects, Mengistu replayed
in 1985 a scenario reminiscent of Somalia in 1979.
The USDA is always a willing
food donor because they face
storage costs of us wheat
surpluses in the US of $25 billion.
(58)
They know it is
cheaper to send food to other
countries. And the State
Department has long agreed with
ex-Agriculture Secretary
Earl Butz that, "We can use food
as a weapon."
59

m

(

)

Summary
US foreign policy has repeatedly
illustrated an

inability to understand and accept the
social and
political legitimacy behind liberation
struggles
worldwide.

US militarization in the Horn is no
exception

to this naivete.

Chapter Three provides

a

brief an recent historical

perspective of Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.

In order

to discuss and work towards durable solutions
for

refugees in Somali camps it is necessary to understand
the regional and national policies that created the

refugees in the first place, and keep them (the ones that

exist)
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in the camps.

The notion of "durable
solutions" is a key theme
to
the community development
program that is discussed
in
the following chapter.
The regional political
dynamics
explained in Chapter Four may
be easily superimposed
on
those involved in the refugee
business to better
understand the realities of
the work.
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CHAPTER SIX

COMMUNITY development FOR
SELF-RELIANCE
"Iskaa— Wax— u Qabso rspi -f— Vioi
closely related to
socialist principles of
collective ownership
t

of

resourcpc^

prodLtion

and dSribCtion®"^
>^evolution
believe that the'strengtrof\hI
government
depends
on the strength
of^
^
people who actively particinatp in
^

espeSi“%”^-^r:nd^
^
nformation and National Guidance,
SDR (i)
"We have ways of making
our
Suleiman Gulaid NRC 1984 people work for us
(2)

II

The UNHCR charter states
that the organization
provides assistance and protection
to refugees.
Working
within this assistance component
is an HCR Program
Officer for Education through whom
funds are channeled
for school construction and
the acquisition of materials
such as tables, chairs, books,
and pencils.
This is
formal education in a primary
school setting.

Available in the area of nonformal
education (NFE)
are millions of dollars for a
community development
program.
Community development programs theoretically
facilitate their participants in their quest
for self-

reliance.

Although self-reliance and community

development are regarded by many as educational
process,
HCR/Somalia and the Somali government view these
concepts
as having nothing at all to do with
education, especially
in an empowering sense.

(3)

As a developmental goal for refugees, the language
179

of self-reliance and
community development seems
to have
originated with the NRC,
although some in HCR say
it was
decided upon by HCR/Geneva,
presented to the NRC and then
given to the refugees.

Popular among benefactors
in International
Development are catch words
like self-help, income
generation, self-reliance,
participation, and food for
work, all developmental
approaches by definition in the
interest of refugees. However,
if these concepts are not
well-understood and accepted, they
can be used by people
in power to Increase their
authority and control over a
selected population, in this case,
refugees.

Why Community Development
The development slogan for Somalia
since the
military coup in 1969 has been
self-reliance.
The
Ministry of Information has much
publicity concerning
self-reliance "projects" through agriculture,
literacy,
employment, and education, such that when
the community
development package arrived, the rhetoric
was consistent
with what already existed in the Somali
Ministry of Local
Government and Rural Development;

Fundamental to rural development efforts envisaged
coming decade is the increased participation
of the rural population, including women and
youth,
through rural organizations and institutions at the
various levels.
Increased rural participation will
be fostered in the decision making process to
influence the nature, process, sequence, and implementation of natural rural development programs and
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rural development projects
at various levels."
( 4
The Somali Ministry of
Information and National
Guidance
writes that self-reliance:
)

in active particinat i nn

confidence!"

revolution believes
-achieved through mutual

***^fj?
•

Community development became
the means to an end
called self-reliance which
would be evident in the durable solutions to refugee
circumstances.
No one in Somalia ever provided me with
a non-amorphous definition
of
solutions.
To some it meant sending the
refugees
all back to Where they came
from.
To others it meant
finding a place for them to live
within Somalia. To
others there would be no durable
solutions until the USSR
and US ceased their military
intervention in the region.

Understanding Community Development
There was confusion and disagreement
over the
concept of self-reliance, as well.
Helmut Langschwert
Head of the Sub Office (SO) HCR/Hargeisa
believed that
refugees did not have the intelligence to
be self,

reliant.

To many people in the State Department
and AID,

self-reliance for Somalia or for refugees means
having
cash on hand to buy US products.
(6)

Refugees understood self-reliance in

a

functional

sense and attempted self-reliant initiatives when
not

subjected to the authority of the SDR or the HCR.

To
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self-reliance was a
project designed by
an
agency .non Hunope,
.ustnaUa, .sia, on .ontn
;n„enica an.
presented one day in a
nefugee camp.
(

7)

hen discussing the
community development
prognam
at IS impontant
to emphasize that
self-neliance is a
process, not a project.
The newands of
self-neliance ane
intrinsic, not quantitative
or something tangible
which
can be measured,
it is not the full
stomach that implies
self-reliance, rather the
power
P wer of a community to
control
an adequate food supply
PPi-y ror
for all
all to
fn keep
in
the stomach full.
Self-neliance is a condition,
an attitude.
The hieranchial stnucture
and autocnatic natune
of
the HCR and the SOP
stifle this pnocess.
Pon nefugees to
take initiative in any
sont of sel .-determinant
way is to
take a nisk. They may
be threatened, beaten,
annested,
drafted, lose thein nations,
on in a few cases disappean.
(7a)
The same may be said fon
those who work with
refugees, although in the
case of expatriates, they
ane
usually either intimidated,
transferred, lose their jobs,
or asked to leave the country.

Maslow built his pyramid with
physiological and
safety needs at its base. He
didn't

use the term self-

reliance, but if he had, it would
have been towards the
top of the structure.

Community development is impontant
to HCR and the
SDR because in 1983 they received
38 million dollars for

it,

but only spent 23
million.
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To quote Langschwert:

yea?^Cl984)^wra;e going to
spenrall o^-i^*
not going to give any
of it bLk this ?Le!" (”®
His idea (with Which
I refused to
cooperate) was for me
to write as many community
development projects as
possible, the larger the
better, to show that the
money
was being spent.
it would look very
good on his record,
he told me, and local
people would like him. From
this
position perhaps a definition
of community development
as
perceived by the HCR can be
extracted:
enha°SL°^"n^t^^,:°,^^n^,-ney an^^

so doing,

and control over the
reci;iInS"^f

There is a slight contradiction
between this
definition and Gajanayake's cited
earlier.
In fairness
to HCR, the preceding
definition is presumption on my
part. When Langschwert asked
about community development
I explained it to him
in terms similar to Gajanayake-s.
His response was, -You can't
give people control who know
nothing." He once greeted three
MCC community
development workers with a challenging
"i don't believe
in this community development
of yours.”
(

9

)

To understand the community development
program in
Somalia one must understand power
relationships within
the country.
it is important to address how attitudes
are subordinate to and often shaped
by the system.
in
HCR, these attitudes are aristocratic
with a persistent
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theme of top down
planning. The basic
theory of this
system is hierarchial
or control by position.
Decisions
are made by -superiors.,
and are generally not
guestioned
hy people Who
implement them and people
who are recipient
of the consequences.

Neither is information
readily shared. A degree
of
power is assumed by those
who are privilege to
information, as well as by
those who exercise
control
over important resources:

(10)

omeone to make a decision
and do it."

For this reason perhaps,
there was not one staff
meeting
during my year's contract
at the Hargeisa office.
A basic premise of the
community development program
for self-reliance and
durable solutions was that
no
permanent structures were to
be built in the camps,
yet
one by one, the nine
Northwest camps received
permanent
cinder block schools and
community development centers.
The plans for building the
latter went from my office to
the camps without my knowledge.
When I went to monitor
their construction in the nine
camps, I discovered that
none of the camp commanders
and certainly none of the
refugees knew the purpose of the
buildings,
one
colleague from a voluntary agency
suggested that as long
as construction materials were
coming into the camp it
meant financial gain and power for
the camp commanders
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and there was no need
therefore to question why
they were
being built.

Communities
In order for community
development to function, one

must first have a community.

As previously discussed,
an

essential molecule of the community
development formula
is that the community be
a unit, that the

focus not be on

select individuals or groups
to the neglect of others.
In Somalia this is not the
case.
Camp residents
have diverse needs and wants
based on their ethnicity,
national origin, gender, and class
position.
As

explained in Chapter Three, many
people identified as
refugees in the camps are not refugees.
Many

are local

people, as well as the families
of Somali herders who are
there as a consequence of manipulation.

The legitimate refugees from Ethiopia
are primarily
concerned with security issues: protection
from the
Somali army and fair rationing from section
leaders.

USAID and the NRC estimate that 80% of the
Somali camp
residents are herders. The men tend the herds
following
traditional grazing patterns while the women and
children
set up homes in the camps.

The Ethiopians are

predominantly farmers and students.
A good example of this diversity of needs was
a

scheduled

youth meeting in Dari Ma'an camp on 26 August

1983.

.hat .orning the
So.ali
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a™,

had entered the ca.p
nd had removed at
gun point 350 young
men whom they
declared were all an„.
deserters tahing the™ away
in a
CARE truck.
Later that morning when
I arrived, the
young
men (who otherwise
would have
ave oeen
been at the
th^ organizational
meeting) were missing.

we had co»e to talh
about income generation
projects
for the unemployed,
but everyone in
attendence was
-Ployed as either a health
worker, teacher, or
administratrvely with the government.
Local Somalis from Boroma
attended and wanted guitars
and other instruments
for a
band.
Refugees, on the other
hand, wanted protection
from the army, although
this was not spoken openly
in
front of the camp commander
who, armed with a rifle,
had
assisted the army in the
morning's recruitment.

My report was based on
information from Chris and
Clare Rolfe, AFSC Representatives
living

in the camp, as
well as interviews with
refugees and camp authorities.
When HCR received my report
of the illegal seizure, they
took no action rather legitimized
the army's behavior.
As it was explained to me by
Deputy Representative
Onesima Silveira, "After all, it's
their country. They
have a right to enter the camps."
(H)

Aside from forced conscription, the
greatest
discrimination against refugees in the
Northwest was the
ethnocentrism against Oromo people,
particularly those in
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section 22 in saba'ad
oa.p „bo repeatedly
were denied
their food rations on
distribution day for six
weeks
When 1 was told of
this diversion, i
reported it to HCK
hut HCK policy was
that it was an internal
affair and
Should be bandied by
ca„p administration.
(Sounds like
policy with the Burundi
genocide. Chapter Two.)
Food distribution was
every ten days. The
diversion
continued, Oromo people
complained, and HCR ignored
them.
In early September,
Regional Refugee Commissioner
Botan
wrote a letter to the
camp ordering the camp
commander to
appoint a new section leader
for the Oromos in Section
22.
This was not done.
On 7 October, Langschwert
went
to the camp "to solve
the problem," but there
was no
Oromo interpreter present,
which ultimately didn-t
matter
because no Oromos or social
workers were allowed
'

to

participate.

Langschwert told me that my
presence was
not required either and
afterwards said that camp
authorities would handle the
problem.
Later in the day I
went to section 22. Refugees
told me that the next time
they were denied food they
would march to the HCR
office,

which they did two days later.
On

October 1983, 79 women and children
and six
aged men, protested at HCR/Hargeisa.
Questioned
9

separately, their stories were consistent,
particularly
in relating that six lactating
mothers had been separated
from their babies for confronting
camp officials who in
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their words, »were
stealing refugee food...
The wo.en
were arrested and
threatened with rape.
That day i was
in charge of the
office because Langschwert
and Program
Officer Tayeb El Tayeb
were out of town. On
authority
from commissioner
Botan and with a truck
from blu/cake we
transported the refugees
back to the camp.
Eogistics
Officer Bashir went with
us and participated
in an open
forum for Section 22 in
which residents decided
to split
into two sub-sections.
People who wanted to stay
with
the present section
leader did so. Those who
were being
discriminated against elected
a new section leader.

A

problem festering for six
weeks was settled in less
than
an hour.
Returning to the camp
commander.
s office,

we

were greeted by about 60
representatives from other
sections of the camp. They
reported intimidation and
threats from camp authorities,
describing the withholding
Of food as terrorism. They
called the camp commander a
criminal, explaining that
refugees were forced to pay a
bribe for what was supposed
to be free food.
The only camp with a sense of
community is Darbi
Xore, the northern most camp
in the country.
It is a

community of Issas people, all local
residents who were
assembled for their strategic,
military position
on the

Ethiopian border.

The camp has a village aura to
it with

herds of sheep and goats.

Camp Commander Jeeh is the

local mayor making sure his community
gets their piece of
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the refugee pie.

According to conversations
with Food
Monitors and other
colleagues, the local
military base
receives its alloted share
from every refugee
food
distr ibut ion

^participation
in December 1983

„as asked to attend a
meeting at
the Regional Ministry
for Agriculture in
Hargeisa to
discuss an upcoming training
program for refugee farm
managers.
Those in attendance were
trying to decide on
the needs of farm managers
so they could be taught
accordingly.
Dan Gilrein, a community
development worker
with MCC, and I each
suggested that the question
be put
to the farm managers so
that they could tell us what
their needs were and by so
doing help design their own
training.
front of three farm managers
present at the
meeting, RAU Regional Director,
Galbedi responded:
"If the farm managers could
design their own
raining, then they didn't need
a training." (12)
,

i

m

In the same vein was the
meeting at HCR/Hargeisa

when Langschwert requested as
many proposals as possible
as soon as possible to
allocate community development
money.
when I suggested that the proposals
be done with
refugee participation since they
knew better than we what
they needed, he responded that it
would take too
long to

do that, and besides,

"Refugees are all beggars and

they'll take anything we give them."

hen there were
legitimate attempts at
participation
for small-scale
projects, they were often
undercut by the
HCR.
In January 1984 a
refugee representative
from
Saba. ad camp came to
my office to explain
a literacy
P g m they were beginning
in four sections of
the camp
(Saba -ad had 24 sections),
camp residents in these
sections had organized and
collected money for a local
teacher to instruct their
children.
They were now
submitting a request for
notebooks and pencils.
I considered this
request reasonable, but
when
presented to the community
development committee, the
self-reliant component was
removed entirely by agreeing
to pay the local teacher
an increased salary out
of HCR
community development money.
This idea was put forth by
Langschwert and agreed to by
Commissioner Botan and NRC
Planning Director Suleiman
Gulai(i.

Arguments against this policy
came from Bob Koepp
the Regional Representative
for the World Food Program
(WFP) and me on the grounds
that to pay the teacher's
salary was to undercut local
initiative and create

dependency on the HCR bankroll,

m

this instance,

"democratic" procedures were conveniently
used with
resulting vote of 3-2.

a

None of the community development
proposals of which
I was aware had any refugee
input.
One of the "official"
reasons for my removal from the Hargeisa
office was my
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refusal to sit in a
noo„ and write
proposals for people
(Langsohwerfs beggars, who
knew nothing at all
about the
projects. The water
tank and poultry farm
in Damka and
Blavo's road are cases
in point.
At this same meeting
mentioned above, I argued
that
If the water tank
were indeed a self-help,
community
development project (as
it was so labled,
then that
,
meant that the camp
residents had identified
the water
tank as a need and were
pursuing it as a viable
project.
This was not the case,
but Gulaid from the
NRC made it
clear at this meeting,
as he did in others
that:

Again democracy prevailed
in a 3-2 vote.
The most illustrative
example of attitudes towards
refugee participation in
community development was
revealed with HCR/Somalia
Representative Blavo's road.
Langschwert returned to Hargeisa
in January from a
meeting with Representative
Blavo in Mogadisho and told
me that he was going to
build a road for Blavo along
the
border because:

wixi oe very pleased with me."
(14)
Shortly after this conversation,
"Blavo's Road" was
presented to the community development
committee as a
self-help project.

Koepp (WFP) asked Langschwert
what the refugees'
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in
p
n this
cnis self-help
project was.

was that they would
build the road.
matter-of-f actly

The reply

t

Langschwert spoke

one ?or^im''?o®lSl’'®onr?
other for him tris4

shovels.
mat makes sense." (15) ^he
Ihfr^ai!

I

suggested that the refugees
would not cotunit
themselves to donating
free labor to a project
that was
not in their interest.

Langschwert 's response to
this was to pay them.
Koepp and I again both
clarified that labor on a
selfhelp project is voluntary
because the people who
plan the
project see it as in their
interest to work
on it.

At this point, RRC Botan
told Koepp that he didn't
know anything about Somalis.
At least this is what
Gulaid's translation was.
My Somali is not fluent,
but I
don't think Botan said
exactly that. Gulaid was
more to
the point in his own words,
"We have ways of making
our
people work."
Koepp was furious over these
remarks and was adamant
in saying, "Forcing people
to work is not community
development," and read a short
definition of self-reliant
development, a combination of Nyerere
and Ghandi.
Gulaid held a lot of power at this
meeting through
his fluency in both languages.
I didn't completely
understand the translation he gave
Botan, but after
Gulaid finished it, both men rose
and left the meeting, a
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democratic signal for
adjournment.
Autocratic top-down delegation
of authority is a
pervasive theme with HCR and
the Somali government
and is
typical Of Planning and
decision making.
if ft occurs
that a subordinate or
refugee is asked an opinion,
they
are often reluctant to
give it for fear of ridicule
or
ostracism and/or punishment
as a troublemaker.

Self-Help Projects
As briefly mentioned above,
self-help projects were
promoted as one strategy to
"achieve" self-reliance.
Self-help, as earlier defined
is directly linked to
participation with its concern for
human worth and
dignity, as well as economic
and political self-

determination; that people have
control over decisions
affecting their lives and have the
basic right of
realizing their potential as human
beings.

A typical "self-help" project was
realized through
the Food For Work (FFW) program.
Food For Work is a
concept where people do community self-help
projects and
receive food (sugar) as an incentive in
lieu of cash

payments for their work.

Food For Work didn't work if

one considers it as part of a self-reliance
process,

because none of the projects were generated by
refugees
who worked on them.
Food For Work did work according to
Cohan (HCR Head of Sub Office) because. "It allowed
us to
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do projects that
otherwise would never
have been done
U6, Koepp
concurred,
don-t lihe using food
all
but it can
<^n work
4work.
ai- least
jAt
it worked till we
ran out of sugar."
••

n

•

(17)

Both statements are
true, but in their
truthfulness
they are contrary to
the process of
self-reliance because
all Of the FFW projects
were planned and administered
By
the NRC.
Three examples of FFW
projects speak for
themselves
Latrines:

There was a critical
sanitation problem
in the camps due to
refuse from garbage and
excrement.
Public latrines were
identified by the FFW committee
composed of United Nations
and Somali government

employees as an important
project.
the latrines in exchange

Camp residents dug

for sugar, after which the

latrines were either not used
or misused.
Pastoralists
found the latrines culturally
unacceptable as it was
contrary for them to squat where
someone else had
squatted before them.
So

1)

the latrines were not used or

2

)

camp

residents would use the entire
floor surface of the
latrine leaving it covered with
excrement, 3) no one took
the responsibility for cleaning
this excrement, and 4)
often the latrines were not dug
deeply enough as their
purpose was not understood in the
first place.
Camp residents who wanted latrines,
dug their own at
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their own expense.
SEges:

As the refugee program
turned into a
business, the impact of
people on the environment
was
severe.
Deforestation was a problem
and rightly
identified as such by the
FFW committee, but it
was not
as important an issue
to camp residents who
thought they
were only doing temporary
duty in Somalia.
Local people
Planted the trees and received
sugar for their work.
However, there was no
sugar allocated to take
care of the
trees.
Administrators assumed that
the trees would be
taken care of.

To Social worker Omer
Abdulahi, the refugees were
only interested in sugar
for their tea, not in the
trees:
Food For Work projects are
Refugees do not see the needimposed projects
for food s?orL
everything.
if the
run“out'
building stops. The way they 4 ugar
think is
that ™v*t
i">P°rtant than a tree.
I'u
n?ant
?
^
have
to
Lkfcarl orit!°

L

small, less than a meter tall
trees are a long range
investment.
To residents who see their stay
as
temporary, a long term investment
in a tree did not
receive priority.

There were frequent instances where
construction of
a "self-help" school, community
center, or feeding center
would come to a halt because of a lack
of sugar.
in Ary
Addys camp, the RHU food for work garden
never got
in the

ground.

Said one CHW, "No sugar, no garden."
(19)

As

ashir of IITT would often
quip, "Refugees are treated
ants.
Put a little sugar in
front of them

and you
can make them work for
you." (20)
Th e Airstrip
The classic example of
the "selfhelp" process as administered
by HCR was the airstrip
in
Darbi Xore. According to
camp commander Jeeh,
Langschwert had asked him to
build an airstrip because
Langschwert was getting his own
plane.
Jeeh was proud of
the airstrip as his was the
only camp that had
:

one.

He

also saw it as a real self-help
project because no sugar
used.
When I asked him what the refugee
motivation
was to build an airstrip for
Helmut, he said he had told
his people it was important,
and smiling, mentioned that
Langschwert had promised him a ride
in his airplane.
Langschwert promised a number of
people rides in an
airplane that never got off the ground.

Income Generation
In August of 1983,

I

was informed that the Hargeisa

office had 60,000 Somali Shillings
(/=) available for
income generation projects that had to
be spent by the
end of September.

I

was told by Langschwert to find

refugees who needed money for small businesses
and give
It to them.

In so many words, this is what the directive

said from Mogadisho.
the money

.

The goal appeared to be "to spend

There were no objectives or considerations
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or small business assistance
such as training in
management, marketing, bookkeeping,
etc.
There was no
monitoring procedure or
evaluation component.

Neither was there much of an
educative process to
determine the recipients.
If one shoemaker was honest
and said there was no market,
he was liable to be
considered lazy and not be
considered
for the money,

if

the next shoemaker said there
was a market, he would
as an applicant.
The social workers and

I

suggested to Langsohwert

that the grants be converted
to a revolving loan fund
with no interest to pay back.
As the money from one
business was repaid, it would be
available for another
business in the community. He
agreed even though he
considered the small loans a waste
of time:
really hardworking, they wouldn't
start
without^!?
without It and make whatever it is they
make." (21)
There was little cooperation from the
camp

commanders in interviewing applicants, as
they all had
their favorite small business entrepreneurs.
in some

camps like Agabar and Las Dhure camp
commanders

encouraged residents to create bogus businesses
with
money requests in millions of Somali Shillings.
We decided on nine small businesses which
received

between 6,000-7,000 /= each.

The businesses included

bakers, blacksmiths, barbers, a chicken cooperative,
and
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one sandlemaker
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,

Batas was fierce.

albeii-

(21a)

a.
he competition
from the plastic
The social workers
and I

attempted to assist the
loanees with some basic
record
ceaping which included
cost of materials,
transportation
selling price, etc. to
help organize to devise
a
repayment schedule. This
training program was
abruptly
stopped When HCR/Mogadisho
reiterated that the money
be
given to the camp residents
with no follow up
activities.
Langschwert was never
supportive of small scale
income generation activities,
particularly
in

agriculture.

He felt that the refugee
cooperative farm
in Tug wajale should
be heavily mechanized
or ceased to
exist.
He suggested that the way
to go would be to start
light industry in the camps:
^
here.
^her^f^filrar^^b
i°r factory work.
TheJ are
hut they could do
unIL?fL
cheaply.

about this." (22^"^^

Someone should think

When Langschwert wasn’t
dreaming in the corporate
world Of exploitation his ideas
of appropriate community
development projects for the
frontier outpost of Hargeisa
included:
because television is
popular "here''®^?n^rhr
nere.
in the next six months, we have
to train
''''
refugees to put up tv antennas."
"We have to get a color photo
studio.
it is onlv a
"
the Japanese mfrk^i"^
tToTai°VrU
Somalis like to have their picture
taken!
2)

3)

"There is no place to get cheese.

We can bring in an

f^om the Swiss Aln*^
Holsteins, and train
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4.

a"^f^LeTtna^° =h:^L!°"t^ 3

,

told Langschwart that
Somalis generally did
not
eat Cheese and there
were practical reasons
as to why
they did not. without
breaking his train of
thought, he
reasoned;
I

see"’?hem^el? It^^nd'^thev
and their families
becauL Jhe foLigne?s
We could manufacture
4)
get carbon dioxide from mineral water here. We could
Europe or Saudi Arabia
have a lot there."
They must
.

"There is no place to get
spectacles here, We need
lenses and frames and
to
train
someone to be an
optometrist " (24)
5)

.

HCR.s obsession with
bigness resulted in discriminatory remarks by the
organization against the small
scale projects of Action
Aid, IDE, AFSC, and MCC.
A
popular project in the Northwest
camps was Action Aid's
mud stove program, i
participated in the evaluation
of
these stoves with VITA
Director, Hank Cauley. Many
women
commented favorably about their
efficiency, reporting
that on the average, they
now went for wood every ten
days instead of four. Yet
Langschwert referred to the
stoves as "monuments to development
that nobody used."
One volag worker believed HCR
disliked these
organizations because they did not
bring in large sums of
money for capital intensive
projects that looked good in
HCR's monthly reports. Another
colleague commented that
HCR viewed volag control over small
scale projects as an
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affront to their power.

Refugee Health Unit (RHU)
When I arrived in
Hargeisa, there was .uch
disagreement over the extent
of malnutrition in
the camps.
The
RHU was arguing there
was a malnutrition rate
among
children of 13% and that
more supplementary food
assistance was necessary,
particularly dried whole milk
(DWM)

Brigette Kohan, Head of the
HCR Sub office was
adamant that there was no
such malnutrition and that
the
real reason for requesting
DWM was for its value in
the
marketplace.
Spreading the camouflage of
hunger was also
compatible with fact finding
senators like John Danforth
who would make an appearance
six months later with
a

camera for snapshots of
malnutrition and hunger for
Capitol hill.
The social workers and

I

were asked to check the

camps for evidence of malnutrition.

with the exception

of a very few cases of
Kwashiorkor (RHU identified maybe
3 cases to me) not
only was there little sign of

malnutrition, there were no RHU records
indicating
malnutrition in any of the camps. Record
ledgers that
saw were incomplete, inconsistent,
contrived, and some
didn't exist. After the survey report
was submitted,
there was no further suggestion of
malnutrition.

I

The report increased the suspicion between
Kohan and

Mohamed Ali, Head of rhu
in the Northwest.
As I came to
Moha^ed AU better, I
doubted that he had tried
to
deceive the Interagency
Council with false
information
There was ample evidence
in the report that
suggested
that local community
health workers (CHWs, were
following
someone else's direction.
At the November 1983
Regional rhu meeting, Ali
Stressed:

wrmSirhLra%o"^d'|^^eiKanL°" collecting data,
with poor records indicates
poor work®^ ‘(25°°'^
He also indicated that
only half the camps had
measuring
boards and many CHWs did
not know how to use then
correctly.
The importance of relating
this incident is that it
is a good illustration
of the competitive and
unharmonius
working relationships among
agencies.
Earlier in the
year the NRC had complained
that the RHU had diverted a
significant quantity of drugs and
cement.
The HCR
obediently followed the NRC lead
by accusing the RHU of
general mismanagement.

While the NRC was always pushing
for more drugs and
rations, the RHU was thinking of
nutrition in

preventative terms:
"The nutrition problem is one of
education, not
rations.
Parents must be told to feed their
children the same food as they eat... There
positive relationship between the presence is a
of a
mother at the supplementary feedings and
her child's
health. .. Skim milk is in the food basket
and is
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accompanied by sugar and
oil to add to it."
(26)
RHU was frequently
critical of NRC and HCR
inaction
or What they referred
to as lack of policy
concerning the
gees.

on one occasion Mohamed
Dahir (CHW Supervisor)
said to the NRC:

refugees, then\ou^should^let^th^^^^
these
you snould let them go
home." (27)
one RHU Official told
me that there were no
good
relationships between camp
commanders and medical
officers
"The camp commanders want
more medicine so they can
use it for their own
purposes.
They can easily take
the food, but we are in
charge of the medicine.
" (28)
One CHW commented:
^

Sicir^of J?cers^is®bar"
people need medicine.
food.

?he^

<=°™>”anders and

The med?Sl

omcefLyf^

if the supplementary food
Lr the
and lactating is diverted bv the

aaed
ged, pregnant,
Storekeeper and the Medical Officer,
Ihty slilT
complain because they didn't get
their share." 29
(

)

Two camp commanders spoke with
similar disdain for the
RHU, particularly over the
issue of cement:
600 sacks of cement from Xamar
in a house
in Hargeisa under control of
RHU.
it is
it?"''^t 3 o}^^

latrines, but they won't let us use

Refugee Agriculture Unit (RAU)

Similar to my RHU briefing,
not be trusted.
RHU,

I

I

was told the RAU could

As with my initial "assignment" with the

was asked to do

a

similar survey of RAU farms in
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the Northwest.

Playing detective was not
the „ost
ingratiating way of introducing
myself to a community,
particularly when the evidence
suggested that tools, Ind
other materials were at
destinations other than what
was
indicated on their travel
vouchers.
in the competitive
world of refugee business,
the

RAU reported 23 hectares
under cultivation in Ary
Addys
camp When there were only
1 1 / 2 ; between 2 0-3
0 hectares
in Saba -ad camp when
there was less than one.
Northwest
Regional RAU Director Galbedi
often referred to refugee
farmers as lazy, particularly
those in Saba -ad. Abdirahman, a farm manager from
another camp wrote a letter
to
Galbedi requesting his alloted
money for the refugee farm
project. He told me Galbedi
threatened to fire him
and

reduced his position to
Assistant Farm Manager.
I was upset at the
distortion and manipulation, but
what was more distressing was
the system that fueled and
encouraged the competitiveness,
defensiveness, and
misrepresentation among the agencies.
Refugees in the
Northwest were tolerated by local
Somalis to the extent
that local residents could gain from
the refugee
business.
In terms of settlement, Somalis
did not want
to share their land with them.

Agriculture was to be the fulcrum for refugee
settlement in Somalia. RAU's projects were

(with the

exception of the Tug Wajale farm) small scale
and labor
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intensive

Settlement was to follow a
small-scale
agricultural scheme of one
hectare per family
The only
organization that favored
large scale, privately
run, and
heavily mechanized farms
was the
.

HCR.

(31)

i^ettlement

In 1983, HCR/Somalia
received 13 million dollars
for

refugee settlement,

on

October 1983 the Settlement

1

Committee met at the Agriculture
Ministry in the
Northwest.
Regional Agriculture Director
Hassan held
letter from the Assistant
Minister for Agriculture
indicating that the government
had "set aside

a

land for

settlement."

More specifically, Hassan
said:

j;S£r;
^

Moqadisho^"
thi reolon

°

niiT-oha^

unoccupLd?"

°
(

32

National Committee from
® committee to survey
Innds available to
surveyed must be

Dan Gilrein of MCC asked the
appropriate question,
"Should there be refugees on the
committee?" Hassan
replied:
"The Committee must be well-informed
and have
knowledge of soil, therefore a refugee
with no
knowledge of agriculture would only mislead
the
committee.
We need a technical committee to
allocate the areas." (33)
If

I

were a refugee,

looking at the land

writes

I

I

would want

a

refugee farmer

was going to be given.

Ceres
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officials and^agriSlturalist™^"^

understand

tL
»

<3.,

It was Clear that this
land survey exercise
was to
be an in-house affair
with no intention of
settling

refugees as a primary
objective. w>en Gilrein
suggested
that the Northwest
Agricultural Development Project
(NWADP)

be included on the
committee, along with their
surveys, Hassan gave the
idea little consideration
saying
the surveys were incomplete.
To my knowledge, NWADP was
never contacted.

The next committee meeting
was
agenda included two items:

3

October.

The

setting up a training program
for farm managers geared
for refugee settlement.
It was at this meeting that
I
asked if it would be appropriate
for the farm managers to
help with the training design.
Galbedi replied
1)

smiling,

"If they can design their own
training, then they don't
need the training," spoken in
front of three farm
managers.
Throughout the discussion, the farm
managers

were referred to in the third person.
deciding whose vehicles would be used
on what days and
Who would supply the petrol.
2)

Musadaq Mohamed Mohamoud, Manager of the
Northwest
Refugee Water Supply Unit (NWRWSU) was
concerned about
the roles of the committee members.

He identified his

role as
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urveying for water.

Hassan added that "the
NRC
and HCR are the political
side of the co^ittee
and the
Ministry of Agriculture
will find the land."
( 35 ,
i did
not ask Hassan what
"political side of the
coBunittee"
naant.
it was understood
that NRC and HCR would
validate
the survey and all
recommendations of the committee.

Half way through the
meeting, Musadaq said he
didn't
understand the oojeotives
obiectivec? o-f
-j.
+-k«
of the committee, which
was
logical because no objectives
had been discussed.
Galbedi returned the
conversation to the vehicles
and
Objectives were not heard of
again.

Hassan began the

8

October meeting by describing

five possible areas to
settle 250,000 refugees.
Everyone
in the room knew that
250,000 was a grossly fraudulent
figure.
I posed that maybe not
all of the refugees
wanted to settle; that maybe
we should do a quick survey
of the camps to see what the
number was. As soon as I
said this, I realized what a
foolish remark it was
To
do a survey in the camps was
to set up a repeat

performance of the census fiasco of
1982.
Hassan replied, "If we know the area,
then we can do
anything we like." (36)
El Tayeb of HCR commented "If we
ask refugees before

we have the land, maybe they won't
want it."

This is a possibility,

i

(

37 )

thought to myself.

it was

also true that refugees may not want the
land after you
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have it if it is poor or
inaccessible land.
AS Hassan described the
Damal

area, he commented

that there was lots of room
for settlement because
no one
was there.
the Waxen and Bichi Valleys,
he said there
were only Nomads grazing.

m

One need not be an agronomist
to realize that the
reason there were no people
in Damal was that there was
no water. Regardless of
how many available hectares
there were in Waxen and Bichi,
good grazing land does not
necessarily mean good farmland.
Ali Jama was impatient
with these descriptions:
^
^ater.
It is 300 meters
The sni? ?
300^ of rain per year. We know
will not change it... Tug Wajale this. Going there
has no water. We
valleys have soil and water, but the
climat^^^*
feasible.
The handicaps there
til
arid no roads.
it is very hot four
moni-ho a year."
months

dLp

^

*

(38)

This was the last settlement meeting

I

attended.

Seven months later at an Interagency
meeting in Mogadisho
no apparent progress had been made.
Hank Cauley of VITA
was concerned that no guidelines had been
drawn up for
refugee input.

Bashir, Director of IITT, questioned the

whole settlement policy and spoke for several
of us:
"Have refugees been informed of your plans?...
In
terms of self-sufficiency, income generation, and
community development, this program is not in the
interest of the refugees.
Income generation is not
income generation for the refugee.
it is all
related to sugar.
I think there is some abuse in
this concept.
Shall we deal with something more
human? Self-reliance, as it is engineered here
makes people poorer." (39)
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An income generation
meeting was scheduled for
Thursday and the lAC meeting
was adjourned.

oucxai (-nange and the
UNHCR

Rooted in Ghandian and
Buddhist philosophies,
community development is
regarded as a "respect for
all
life" and "the dignity of
the human being."
(40)
Antithetical to this is the
use of coercion, socioeconomic manipulation,
physical force, and violence
as
mechanisms to implement community
development.

Community development is used
by the SDR to extend
their domination of the refugee
business.

m

endeavor, they receive HCR
support.

this

As a catalyst for

social change, the HCR is in
a glaciatic time frame.
status quo of an elite power
structure is firmly

The

entrenched.

Very simply, in Somalia community
development serves
those in control, those with wealth
and power,
not the

disenfranchised.

Taking initiative to organize locally

in "empowering terms" can put
you in jail,

m

the words

Of a refugee farmer from Damka:

take the time to organize and plant
rieids If the camp commander has the
right to take
our land from us once the crops begin
to grow?"
41
(

HCR/Somalia views CD on

a

)

quantitative, macro scale

of building construction and the dollar
amount spent on

large numbers of people.

CD is not seen as a development

strategy because HCR
and the SDR do not
agree with the
premise of local control
over resources. This
is one
primary reason why the
small scale initiatives
of apsc
MCC, and Action Aid
were regularly discredited
by the Hcn
with the exception of the
Social Services Office
headed
in turn by Wilhelm
Damm and Mieke Weeda.
All programming
is highly centralized
with decisions made by
upper level
UN and SDR Officials.
There is virtually total
disregard
for local involvement
and participation.
This is not a difficult
phenomenon to understand.
Being able to participate
in a decision making
process
and beyond this, to be able
to actually be responsible
for making the decisions
that affect you and your
community is a very powerful
notion.
Having power means
control and control within the
Somali refugee business
means significant economic and
political wealth.
It is
understandable that the elite who
control would be
threatened by the thought of sharing
their wealth and
power with others.
The question that many of us in
Somalia were
regularly dealing with was why
HCR/Somalia supported such
a self-serving and oppressive
system.
People such as
Blavo and Langschwert have come under
heavy criticism
from voluntary agencies and refugees,
the US State

Department, as well as other UN organizations
for not
taking a firm stand on refugee rights in
the areas of
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protection and assistance.

But as one colleague
put it,
it wasn-t a matter of
individuals, rather the system:

their job."

(

42 )

criticized for not doing

To extract from a dialogue
in Belet Weyne between K.
Krishnan of care and Jane Cole
of UNICEF, Krishnan
exclaimed that "hcr has no
backbone.', cole was not an
apologist for HCR policy, but
did defend the UN system
with the rationale that the
UN is in Somalia at the
invitation of the Somali government
and that the UN
Charter clearly stipulates that
no UN organization is to
make national policy; that the
UN is in the host country
to assist that country in a
way that its national

government feels is most appropriate.

(43)

Only in this

way, it is argued, can the UN
remain apolitical and

therefore neutral.
The gross contradiction is that the
UN is very
political. As Freire insists, all education
is

political.

Therefore all the educative processes of

community development and self-reliance are
political.
As far as the HCR is concerned, this is
a weak argument

because the HCR does not see itself as an
educational
organization. Neither does it view community development
as an educational process.

According to Smyser, neither

is the HCR a development oriented organization.
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To not question the
Somali government's refusal
to
protect refugees from physical,
psychological or sexual
abuse; to refuse issue of
identification cards as is

required under international
law; to blame its refugee
employees when detained and
beaten by the Somali army; to
not question military
impressment of refugees; to not
question inconsistencies and
gross irregularities in the
distribution of food and other
resources; to acquiesce to
Somali government whims is to
support the Somali government and in so doing facilitate
oppression and perpetuate
dependency among the refugees. And
this is extremely
political.

One could conclude from all this
that there
IS no theory for social change
within the HCR because
there is no mechanism for social
action.

One Who Learns, Teaches
I

...Serrer proverb

never heard the Serrers use this proverb

reciprocally, that "one who teaches, learns,"
but the
persuasion behind both of these proverbs is
that learning
and teaching are two way propositions.
This two-way

communication is exciting when it happens.

It is a self-

orienting, giving, and experiential educational
process.

When two-way communication is thwarted or when it
just doesn't exist, it can be oppressive, destructive,
and life endangering.

Physical, sexual, and

psychological harrassment speak for the education
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orientation of the Somali
government. The fact that
hcr
does not actively interrupt
this oppression speaks for
their orientation as well.
The three social workers
at HCR were responsible
for
any attempt at education
among the refugees.
But when
the KSS is following you,
the army is beating you up,
and
your boss at HCR refers to
you as a spy, it is not
a

particularly easy setting in
which to work, much less
work safely.
In research of mine from
1985, there was a feeling

among volag participants that:
"With HCR programs, there were
no learners no
^^^^ matter, no education
was
taking^place^»^° 445

Although these sentiments aptly
describe HCR/Somalia in
an institutional sense, it is
important to recognize that
there were a few employees in the
organization who were
genuinely concerned about the welfare
of the people with
whom they worked. Unfortunately,
these people had
neither power nor influence in terms
of policy
formulation or implementation.
In Wilhelm Damm's final work report he
wrote that

the NRC was administered with the mentality
of people

supervising a concentration camp.

Mieke Weeda, his

successor as Head of the Social Services Unit
shared her
frustration at an HCR/NRC meeting in her office:
"Geneva's patience has run out with Somalia's lack
of accountability with everything. .Somali nationals
.

don't want the refuaees
often soon fired
hired they are
Manv’^mif
are over-trained!
refugees
.^hLr?e?r“
^^efugees are treated
prisoners by the NSS
like
and out, bu? afLf
refugees
in
On a policy level awhile ?t S"
anymore,
it seems
to administration.
On a practioPiT
feel the problem are
people who
those^whn'
^
^
them." (45)
to day with
.

i

Summary

Co^nity

development is

a

greatly misunderstood

concept in Somalia.

There is much discrepancy
concerning
the matter, a discrepancy
fueled by self-interest,
exploitation, and the political
realities of the country.
The following chapter
addresses a community development
workers' training program
and will discuss the
community
development program further.
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CHAPTER

7

training for community
development
control who know nothing
Helmut Langschwert, HCR/Hargeisa
(i)

"

community development as
previously discussed is:
the abilities and

eA^^qieforthe®

democratic processes and voluntary

efforts."

(

2

)

In the 1980s, CD has become
a fashionable term.
Donors like it because it is
laced with democratic

rhetoric that is ethically easy
to fund.
Deciding on a
policy of community development,
HCR must be careful not
to impose this educational
alternative on systems and
people within these systems who do
not understand it
and/or do not want it. An even
greater prerequisite is
that HCR be committed to and
understand the principles of
CD so they can effectively assist
in the implementation
of CD programs.

This chapter discusses the planning,
implementation,
and evaluation of three-week training
program for

community development trainees in the
Northwest.
At the
time of this project (Jan-Feb 1984), I
was a Field
Program Assistant for HCR/Somalia in Hargeisa.
My

responsibilities involved protection and assistance
issues in the nine Northwest camps.
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Background
To better understand
the v-unoexr
context of
o-p the
community
development trainino
ning, it is
c necessary
to briefly describe
a social work training
that preceded it.
i

At HCR's invitiation.
Dr. A.H. Shawky,
professor of
social work at El Minya
University in Egypt, traveled
to
Somalia in June of 1982.
The purpose of his visit
was to
discuss the possibility of
implementing a social work
training program for refugees.
He met with

representatives from HCR, the
NRC, the Ministry of
Education, and the Ministry
of Labor and Social
Affairs.
He was introduced to
representatives
from Africare, the

instructional Institute for
Teacher Training (iitT)
and
some refugees from Mogadisho.
He was permitted to visit
one refugee camp.
Shawky

primary contact was Wilhelm Damm
who was
the social Projects Officer
for HCR/Mogadisho
Damm and
Shawky outlined a proposed plan
which included the
following areas of concern.
's

.

The Probl em
The problem as identified by Damm
and Shawky was
that there were over one million
refugees in Somalia, all
from the Ogaden and all there for
political reasons:

They all suffer from alienation, fear,
anxiety
anomie, uncertainty, and leisure.
They suffer in
addition to complete dependency on the world
community to solve their problems." 3
(

It is convenient to stereotype people.

)

It happens

with refugees and it is
misleading.
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The refugees are not

all from the Ogaden.

Neither do they all suffer
from the
above mentioned maladies,
albeit a number of them
do.
are great distinctions
in power and access to
services among camp residents.
To say there are over a
million refugees in Somalia
is to greatly exaggerate
the
As already discussed,
g
evidence suggests much
less than half of this
number in the country.
Damm knew this, but to
question the number would
have been to put his job in
jeopardy,
it is an example
of colluding with oppression
through silence.
It was a
constraint that he and I and
everyone worked
under.

The one part of this problem
statement with which I
agree is the word dependency.
Damm, Shawky, and I
discussed on more than one occassion
what we considered
to be an intentional dependency
perpetuated by both the
Somali Government and the HCR.

Proposed Sol nt inn
The HCR and NRC both agreed to
appointing counselors
who would assist refugees with the
following needs:
a) Handle their own personal
problems effectively;
fellow refugees to lead a happy,
holesome life while waiting for repatriation
or
otherwise;
c) Plan realistically for their
personal and collective
future
d) Exert all possible efforts
to re-adjust to their new
circumstances; and
e) Co-operate with other professional
workers to help
special groups such as women, children, the aged
and the handicapped. (4)
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Training Obiectivpg;
It was planned that
the social workers/counselors

would possibly be employed
by the NRC, HCR, NGOs
Ministry of Education,
and Ministry of labor
and Social
Affairs, but ultimately
they were assigned to
only NRC
and HCR. They were
expected to help refugees
as
"stimulators, advisors, enablers,
backers, promoters,

encouragers, teachers, resource
persons, etc
(IBID)
These were the proposed
training objectives in the
planning paper. However,
there were objectives more
important than these, which
were not recognized as such,
in the training proposal.
These included:
.

b)

to become self-educators;

to teach

>

n^wliSgrf-m-L“?t^a-?-^

geneSllL^t?::i

---

rtL^roSnf

°in?rLtIon?"tf)'’°"

translate their knowledge

In Shawky's June 83 evaluation
report, he wrote:

objective of the training was to
dev^oc®'"®^^
5f°dp of para-social workers who would
be
able tc
to h
help refugees to cope realistically
positively, and independently with their
difficult
problems; and help special cases in
need for
attention to be able to deal prductively
and
courageously with life." (6)

There was no indication in the evaluation
report as to
whether this objective had been met.
There was, however,
a

suggestion:

Training objectives should be modified and
spelled
out in a way that meets the actual needs
of refugees

in Somalia. Accordinqlv
W.th refugees in SoullL thp r-r.i<=
sh:uId'L°rede?inec,!°’^
A Classroom discussion
of '.coping realistically
with
problems" and "dealing
courageously with life" could
have
little if any functional
application in the camps.
Openly
and honestly discussing
these issues is to
self-disclose
and become vulnerable,
even among friends. A wrong
assumption to make was that
these 15 trainees had a
common goal and purpose.
Some were refugees - some
were
not.
They were from different
countries, different
,

regions, and different ethnic
groups.
Auspicpf^

The training was to be
organized under the joint
auspices of the HCR, NRC, and
Africare, but to my
knowledge the latter agency had
little or no input.
Trainee?;

Refugee candidates were to be
nominated by NRC, HCR,
The Ministry of Education, The
Ministry of Labor and
Social Affairs, and NGOs involved
with
refugees.

A

committee of representatives from HCR,
NRC, and Africare
were to interview and select the
trainees. This criteria
was used:
...basic perscpnal traits such as warmth,
maturity
ability to relate to people and work
ith them, ability to help persons in
trouble, and
willingness to make sacrifices when
needed. .whenever possible, secondery
school
graduates."
.

The evaluation report included further
criteria that the
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candidates should satisfy;
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

represent different ethnic
groupsrepresent both sexes;

f)
( 8

e se ected from
younger citizens

1^4

)

^® 9 ions and ca^ps;
--OX certificate,,

(20-35 years old).

Trainers
There was considerable
concern as to who would
train
the social workers.
According to the NRC, no
Somalis
were trained in social
work, as this was a totally
new
concept in the country.
Neither were there expatriates
Who were trained in social
work, only people who
taught
related subjects.
In the evaluation report
it is noted
that the majority of the
trainees thought that most of
these instructors "came
unprepared to class." 9
(

)

In class, Shawky wanted an
atmosphere of

participation, as he put great
importance in class
discussions.
He wanted:
leitu^P^^^nH^^'

tlachi4
pe^le" (^0^

unplanned, repetition between
contradiction between the
methodology of working with

Subi ect.s

Shawky 's set curriculum included the
following
subj ects
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)

Social-psycho problems of refugees;
Introduction to human behavior;
Introduction to working with people;
Introduction to counseling and guidance;
Introduction to informal education, methods,
and
tools;
Local and international resources for
refugees;
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g)
h)

How to lead a discussion
How to chair a meeting; group;
- How to address
a group;
“ How to listen;
“ How to record;
- Recreational
skills; and

To accomplish this material
in a few weeks was an
ambitious endeavor. Shawky
proposed the following work
schedule
I.

II.
III.

fieirixperiencH'^''^'"'
IV.

work^®"^
V.

“^l^ssroom discussions of

months of supervised field

Final two weeks of classroom
discussions or
of rieid
field
experience. (12)

Shawky and Damm had hoped for

a

training center in a

refugee camp, but with none available,
they settled for
school in Mogadisho. The final
evaluation report
Stipulated:

a

Future training should be done out of
nearer to refugee camps. The training Mogadisho
of the first
batch proved that the location of the
training
center influences the selection process of
the
candidates." (13)

Evaluation of Trainees
Evaluation was to be an on-going process.

A final

exam measuring memorization was not considered
important.

More emphasis was placed on the expression of

knowledge, skills, and attitudes such as:
a)

ability to build positive and meaningful relationships
with staff and colleagues;

b)

d\
e
f)

g)
h)
i)

i)

ability to discuss in clasc:
^
the point of view of
others-
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himself, and see

follow;

Liiity to concent^atr^®

learning;

ability to
‘--‘veiy,
creativeness;
enthusiasm for work;
participation in extracurricular acri^/ir*
activities:
regularity and punctuality
U4^

The on-going evaluation,
of course, was during
the
trainees field work. Shawky's
initial concerns about
having no trained social
workers in Somalia were allayed
by the enthusiasm and
responsibility of the expatriate
supervisors during the field
experiences. Shawky
considered them;

"...quite useful in field supervision
even
^
properly trained as lo^dl Zrklts
meeting with field supervisors
proved
orovid to be extremely useful."
(15)
The expatriate supervisors
considered the social
workers necessary for refugee
work.
They felt that the
trainees could carry productive
responsibilities with
refugees if properly trained. They
also stressed that
western standards and points of view
should not be
imposed.
Eleven of the 15 trainees completed
the training and received certificates.
Three of them were posted
at the Hargeisa SO where I was
assigned in July
1983.

The four of us worked closely together
on refugee
protection and assistance issues. The team
that we built
had mutual respect and trust. This support
was essential
as their job descriptions often put them
in tense and
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potentially dangerous
situations.
They had been mandated

to deal with social
issues
that included food
distribution, access to
water
construction materials,
health services, forced
conscription of refugees
into the Somali army,
and daily
counseling of new and
old refugees.
The tasks they were
asked to perform and
the services to render
were
substantial. They were
the "go-betweens" and
were often
caught in the middle.
They would be authorized
by HCR to
do a task and then
scapegoated when the
consequence was
hegative. The most blatant
of many examples of
this was
on 2 Nov 1983.
social worker Ismail
Hussein was given
authorization to go to Agabar
camp with driver Mohammed
Hassan. On their return
to Hargeisa, they were
stopped
by the Somali army,
beaten as spies, and put
in the
military stockade. The
incident report I submitted
to
HCR indicated that Hussein
and Hassan had been authorized
by both HCR and the army
to be on that road.
They had
proper identification and were
not violating any HCR or
SDR law or standard of conduct.
'

Langschwert took no action on this
matter.
a
letter to Deputy Representative
Onesima Silveira,
HCR/Mogadisho, he blamed the victims
as being in
violation of HCR guidelines. The
fact that they were
beaten would serve as their
punishment

m

and in so doing,

"teach them a lesson." (16)

The potential for this type

Of incident was a daily
pressure and not an agenda
that
could be discussed openly
in a training program.

Wilhelm Damm was the only
Mogadisho employee (at
that time) in either HCR
or NRC who recognized
these
difficulties, expressed a
concern for the social
workers
well being, and told them
he appreciated their
work.

a memo to HCR/Geneva
upon the completion of
the social

m

work training, he wrote
that:

had b:in

plsSl'Ss^dii

tr^ineef

=°nsiLrable dlfliiul^ies
wori""""
involved with social work was
very
reluctlAt’trc'^°°
devoteS'to tSir work
and"^--“®L^'^®
and
are worthy of patience and
understanding." U 7

)

Planning the Training

Getting Acaua ntpH
i

On 24 October, Damm and Shawky
arrived in Hargeisa
to discuss the training of
social workers in the
Northwest.
They were accompanied most of the
time by
M. Bulgas of the Somali
National Security Service (NSS)
A meeting was arranged for them
at the HCR office with
Hussein Samatar, RHU Training Consultant
and me.

Shawky gave

a

brief description of his training

objectives which were basically the same as
those from
his previous training program.
He emphasized

the role of
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social workers as community
motivators/educators. Hussein
was uneasy with the idea
of a training program
for
community educators because:
"That is what Community
Health Workers (CHW) do.
They are specifically
trained to do community
education ” ( is
.

He was threatened by Shawky's
training because he
envisioned the loss of his CHWs
to the higher salaried
Community Development Workers
(CDW) or social workers
or
whatever title they would have.
There was a definite
attitude that the two programs
would be competing rather
than cooperating. He was asked
by Shawky if the CHWs
could be trained to be more of
a CDW persuasion.
He
responded that there was a possibility
because CHWs were
already in the community, but due
to the RHU policy
of

secrecy, they would not give you
honest information
because refugees would be afraid
of losing rations.
Hussein's words may be interpreted
by suggesting that a
CDW would not have the loyalty of a
CHW to the RHU
feeding and medical programs. Loyalty
implies secrecy to
not reveal actual numbers of people
who are being fed,
treated, and vaccinated.
Further, Hussein was defensive
about an outsider telling the RHU how their
CHWs should
do community work.

Shawky left this meeting with the impression that;
"
local RHU officals in Hargeisa welcomed
cooperation with HCR for training CHWs in social
work methods." ( 19
)
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however, agreed completely
with Damm that -Rm;
offering a polite refusal
to cooperate." 20
(
)
This first meeting
initiated a fear in both
RHU and
IITT that the community
development trainees (CDT,
would
be recruited from
their own CHWs and teachers.
This was
a very legitimate
concern because HCR was
advertising a
salary of 1000 /= (shillings,
a month whereas
CHWs and
IITT teachers were
earning 400 and 500/= a
month.
Not
only was there a financial
increment for them, but
also
the aspect of further
training in a professional
area
that could lead to future
employment,
it had been
mentioned by HCR's three
social workers that paying
1000/= a month to CDWs would
probably make for jealous
and uncooperative teachers
in the camps, but neither
HCR
nor RRC gave this serious
consideration.
I

This suspicion of the CDW
training program never
abated because the conflict
was never resolved, shawky
returned home to Egypt with a
misunderstanding between
him and RHU which was never
sorted out. At an RHU
monthly meeting this concern was
aired by some of those
present. Mohamed Dahir and Hussein
made it clear that
they did not want their CHWs
participating in the
program.
Dahir expressed the concern that:
not represent the camp population,
leaders and should be the

SheSI
heiks are
are^iL'^r
the traditional

Se^H
I

replied that to have a selection of
trainees
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representative of the camp
population would result in
90
of them being women
to which 1 had no
objection,
i
didn't get into the
metaphysics of CD, but did
explain
that the focus of the
training was for the trainees
to
assist the refugees in
identifying their needs and
to
facilitate their decision
making.
CD was a

process, i
explained, that would allow
refugees more control over
their lives.
I welcomed their
recommendations and
suggestions

During the interim from October
to January misunder
standings and suspicions
lingered with assumptions by
nearly everyone because no
one (including myself) knew
for sure what was going to
happen.
It was further
complicated by intentional attempts
by HCR and NRC to
undermine the program.
On

Nov 1983, Shawky asked me to
assist with the
training.
it was not clear whether the
training was for
social workers or CD workers. As
I was questioning him
on specifics, trying to focus on
what my role was,
9

he

became angry with me, accused me of
trying to take his
program away from him, and added that he
was not going to
return in 1984 to do the training unless
he was
completely in charge. Damm smoothed things
over, but in

the smoothing process,

I

was unclear as to the purpose,

objectives, and content of the training,

conflict resolved.

Neither was the

At that point, my role
in the training was
vague
other than to arrange
for teachers, but it
wasn-t clear
What the subject matter
was to include, nor how
much time
to be allotted to each
topic area.
i requested that
he
send me a copy of his
curriculum so that I could
find
teachers for the courses.
His reply was that if i
couldn't find teachers, he
would teach the material.
The following morning we
met with HCR Representative
Blavo.
It was agreed that Shawky
was in charge
of

curriculum and that

I

was to assist him.

Langschwert was

responsible for the completion
of the ELU/CARE food store
in Damka (Dam Refugee Camp)
to be used as a dormitory,
and the construction of the
CD Center in which we were
to
have classrooms and office
space.
Langschwert thought that Damm,
Shawky, and I were
operating behind his back to keep
him out of the training.
He indicated his displeasure
that afternoon when he
interrupted a meeting among Damm,
Social Workers
Douale,

Hussein, and Ibrahim, and me.

He disrupted the meeting

by shouting at us that we didn-t
need meetings and
sharing of information; that all we
needed was for one
person to go ahead and do it. He did
add, however that
he was in favor of the training for
two reasons:

An excuse to finish construction of the
food store in
Damka
1)

2)

Give him something to write about in his monthly
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reports.

230

was exasperated with
Langschwert s
belligerency and asked him
simply and directly why
he
refused to cooperate.
His response was to leave
the
room.
I confided in Damm
that once back in the
Northwest
he would attempt to
sabotage the program.
Upon returning
to Hargeisa, Langschwert
requested that I design a training program.
i refused on the
grounds that Blavo had
made it perfectly clear
that the training curriculum
was
to be Shawky's design and
should not be interfered
Daitim

•

with.

t^d"™!
(22)

When

’

Mogadisho that 1 can do it
he
“°5adisho thinks I can do’ it."

asked him who in particular
felt this way, he
indicated UNHCR Representative
Blavo, "Blavo doesn't
think I can do it.”
I

suggested that if it was of such
personal
importance to him, that he put
together his own proposal
and submit it to Blavo.
it was my belief that if
I

Langschwert had a curriculum, he would
send it to Shawky
with the intention of insulting him,
and as a result have
him refuse to do the training. My
refusal to design this
program was a continual source of conflict
between us.
It had the unfortunate consequence
of making his negative
attitude towards CD more negative and
increasingly
strained our ability to work together.

The last time it

came up was 27 December 1983, 19 days before
the training
started.

Langschwert had just returned from Mogadisho
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where, he told me:

pJogra^'tStend

^

^^reed. He thought it

was a good idet"

responded that I had already
given him an outline of
topics.
I

"NO," he replied, "„e have
to put a training schedule together to be able
to use in case he doesn't
come."
"Why wouldn't he come," i
asked.

His reply was, "Maybe he'll
change his mind."
I mentioned this
conversation to Blavo a month
later.
He was angry that Langschwert
would say such a
thing, "I never said that,"
Blavo told me privately, "it
is a lie." ( 24
)

After the 27 December conversation,

immediately

l

sent a note to Damm explaining
Langschwert s obsession
with the curriculum.
I don't know what Damm
said to
Blavo, but the latter sent a radio
message to Langschwert
ordering him to be responsible only
for the construction
of the two buildings and nothing else.
•

Damm, Shawky, and

I

had discussed in Mogadishu that

for the training to be most effective,
it must have the
support and cooperation of the Hargeisa community,

including local government agencies, NGOs, RRC,
and UN
organizations, but after this radio message from Blavo,

Langschwert ordered me to stop all public relations or

community education regarding the training.

This was a clumsy posture
for the HCR to assume
because it left several
organizations uncertain about
the
training, as well as not
allowing me to do what
groundwork was necessary to
arrange teachers.
Langschwert then
told me that he would
take care of the teachers
which he
never did.
Due to these uncertainties
and contradictions
there were several areas of
conflict.

The Trainefi!^
On 10 November at a meeting
in Mogadisho with
Shirdon (Deputy Commissioner
for NRC)
Abdirahman (NRC
,

Counseling Unit), Damm, and me,
it was agreed that there
be 30 students in the training.
Twenty-three of these
were to come from the Northwest
camps and seven were to
be from the CD unit at the
regional levels (the proposed
supervisors of whom I knew nothing)
he criteria for students had
previously been designated
by Shawky.
it was suggested that the
trainees:

among refugees, preferably those living
in
speak, write, and read English;

^Lmps^
b)

"with^rSugeel;
d)
e)

be at the secondery school level;
and
be motivated ( 25
)

Social workers Douale, Hussein, and Ibrahim
went to
the nine camps with application forms,
leaving
10-15

applications with the camp commanders to distribute
among
possible candidates. Where possible, meetings
with youth
groups were organized to discuss the training,
but the

responsxbility for distributing
and collecting the
forms
remained with the camp
commanders. Urban refugees
were
invited to apply through
RRC and HCR in Hargeisa.

Langschwerfs lack of cooperation
was illustrated
with his dictum to Ibrahim
to go to Darbi Xore,
Dare
Ma-an, Tug Wajale, and
Arabsiyo camps in one day
with no
overnight. Langschwert
knew it was 8-9 hours to
Darbi
xore and one can assume 8-9
hours back to

Hargeisa, not
including side trips to
three other camps. He told
Ibrahim there was no need
to discuss the forms,
rather
just leave them with the
camp commanders. He added
that
there was no need for social
workers to spend the night
in a camp, "stirring up
trouble" and that Ibrahim
could
leave at 4:00 A.M.

explained to Langschwert that
this was
unreasonable,
it would mean that Ibrahim
would be back
in Hargeisa sometime around
midnight at the earliest
except that there were checkpoints
which wouldn't allow
him to travel after 5:00 p.m. out
of Borama.
i also
expressed curiosity at this abrupt
"change of policy"
which had previously criticized
Hussein for being
I

on a

different road {with authorization) at
5:00 p.m. and now
was allowing Ibrahim an unrequested
extension of travel
time to circumvent a night or two in a
camp.
Langschwert
Changed his mind and Ibrahim spent one
night each in
Darbi Xore and Dare Ma'an,
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A week later,
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accompanied Douale, Hussein,
and

Ibrahim to some of the
camps, interviewing
the applicants
to have a personal
knowledge of them, primarily
to test
their English language
ability,
some of the camp
commanders had done nothing
with the forms. There
were
no applicants from
Dare Ma'an. The Las Dhure
commander
Haii Modu tried to persuade
refugees not to apply. The«
was only one each from
Darbe Xore, Tug Wajale,
and
Arabsiyo hand picked by the
camp commanders.
An overriding motivating
factor for young men to
apply was the refugee
conscription law, which was to
go
into effect in January
1984. It stipulated that any
unemployed man between the ages
of 15-40 regardless of
refugee status was subject to
military service in the
Somali army. This was part
of the Somali Government's

policy of refugee assimilation,
Geneva Convention notwithstanding.
In some of my interviews, men
in this age
group appeared desperate with
fear of the Somali army.
During the application period we
were in frequent
contact (3-4 times a week) with RRC
Deputy Commissioner
Hiis and Commissioner Botan.
Hiis had application forms
and we periodically checked in with
him to see if he had
any names. He told us he had 15-17
interested refugees,
but never produced them.
The deadline for applicants was 17 December,
but

Langschwert wanted to select on the 15th to
"get it over
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with.

Present with Langsohwert
were Ibrahim, Hussein,
and I.
It was suggested that
either Botan or Hiis be
present, but Langsohwert
indicated that Mohamed and
Hussein represented RRC
and that we shouldn't
"worry
about Botan", that he
would "deal with Botan
later." (26)
Of the 54 applicants,
24 were chosen, taken
(I
think) by Langsohwert
to Botan for approval
and agreed
to.
Langsohwert told us that he
had told Botan that the
list was being sent to
Mogadisho and that there were
no
complaints. Two days later,
Botan told Hussein that
Langsohwert had had no right
to send any names.
Deputy
commissioner Hiis had accused
the social workers of doing
things behind his back which
was completely untrue
'

as

Hiis had always been informed
of the prooedings.
Hiis shouted at Hussein that
they only wanted to
work with HCR, not rrc to
which Botan responded, "They
don't get paid, why should
they want to work for RRC?"
The issue of the applicants was
left unsettled.
Hiis wanted to check our list,
plus he restated he had
15-17 of his own applicants.
We returned on 20 December
and Hiis wanted to check our list
again.
Botan asked him
why he had to keep reohecking it
to which Hiis replied,
"I have my own way of doing
things."
On 21 December Hiis said there were
complaints from
Agabar and Las Dhure camps about the
application process
and therefore he was going to hold
the applications until
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24 DeceMber.

The two cahp colanders
in question were
both in Hargeisa that
day.
vmen we asked ther,
about
this, neither one knew
what Hiis was talking
about.
Hiis
later changed his story
on 26 Dece,„ber £ro»
Agabar and
Las Dhure to Damka
and Saba -ad camps.
He told Langschwert
that the social workers
had gone
in to these camps
without informing the camp
commanders
and then passed out forms
to their friends, an
accusation
Which was totally
unsubstantiated,
yet with this
information, Langschwert
berated the social workers
for
causing trouble by by-passing
the camp commanders,

therefore supporting Hiisaccusation; another example
of
the social workers being
discredited and scapegoated.
This was the day after
Christmas. Langschwert
reminded me that I had refused
to write the training
program, and if the program
failed, it would be my
fault.
He also told me to rewrite
my performance report
to Geneva,
it was too negative, he said,
-too much
conflict." He told me that he
would have to criticize me
and besides, "Why have a fight?
It'll look bad on your
record and you'll never get another
job with the U.N."
i

didn't change the report and Langschwert
didn't send it.
Meanwhile, Hiis delayed the list for
two weeks on
the grounds that it was a biased
selection favoring
Oromos.
Ibrahim confronted him with the fact that
he
only wanted Ogadeni names. An RRC office
worker
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confirmed this in early January,
telling Ibrahim that
Hiis was intentionally
discriminating against Oromos.
only eight of the 24
trainees were Oromo.
Hiis had previously made a
similar accusation
against the recruitment of
twelve refugee women for
vocational training in Hargeisa,
claiming that they were
all oromo, when only one
woman was of this ethnicity.
Two days before the training
started. Camp Commander
Jeeh submitted the name of
a person he wanted in the
training. There was no
application and we knew nothing
other than he was Jeeh's friend.
The selection committee
was opposed to his inclusion
except for Langschwert who
wanted him even though two weeks
earlier he had
exclaimed, "No more names.

Democracy not withstanding,

Everyone else is too late."
(4-1 against)

he was put on

the list, but never appeared for
the training.

The American Friends Service Committee
(AFSC) had
requested that an employee of theirs who
was involved
with CD be allowed to attend the training.
He was
permitted to do so, but left for personal
reasons during
the first week.
At the end of the first week of training,
Sa'ada

Mohamed Afar, the only woman to apply, was admitted.
There had been

a

mix-up between her name and another

refugee who had been admitted by mistake.
to stay.

He was allowed

On day six of the training, Hiis sent six
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trainees to participate in
the program. There were
no
applications, but they were
allowed to stay which was
done entirely for political
reasons.
One of the six {who
was an IITT teacher) wasn't
interested and left on his
first day saying that he
had "no idea what was going
on,"
that he had been told to
come by Hiis. Two others
of the
six were also IITT teachers
who had to leave when lITT
came to retreive them. One
student was a CHW and the RHU
wanted him back. The CHW
indicated he had quit his
job

and was allowed to stay.

This worsened relations with

IITT and RHU as a specific
criteria had been not to allow
entry to any of their people
either presently or
previously employed.

Hiis student number five spoke
no English and did
not understand what was being said
in class.
Hiis
student number six was an NSS informant,
as was one of
the IITT teachers who had been dismissed.
The obvious
NSS prescence was a deterrent to
open discussion, as well
the motivation of the late arrivals.
C.

The Instructors

During the

9

November 83 meeting among Damm, Shawky,

and me, Shawky said he needed someone to do
staff

development.

To me staff development meant training

staff members to increase their level of information
and

awareness about training philosophy, content, or to
increase training skills such as group facilitation or

problem solving.
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suggested it would be nice
to have a
few days before the
training coimnenoed to do
this work.
When Shawky arrived on
14 January, he asked
me ifi
had done staff development
to which 1 replied that
there
was no staff and explained
why.
it took a couple of
days
for me to realize that
Shawky and I had two
different
meanings for staff development.
To me it was training
staff.
For him it was just finding
them.
i

On the first complete day
of training, 16 January,
Shawky told me I would be
responsible for the study
groups and informal education.
Seeking clarity, i asked
him to explain what he meant
by informal education.
His
description led me to comment
that at U/Mass Center for
International Education we call
that non formal education.
informal education is incidental
and unstructured
and didn't seem to be what we
wanted here. Reed concurs:
"Informal learning is not education
it is
unorganized, often unintended, and
often less
conciously aimed at identified
objectives."
( 27
He didn't appreciate the
clarification so I dropped it.
He continued that we must find
teachers for the
areas of Refugee Problems, Human Behavior,
Working with
People, and Community Development skills.
This was a
difficult task as their was still no schedule
for the
,

)

training nor a concise description of what
exact areas of
Human Behavior or CD (for example) should be
addressed.

I

shared with Shawky that there were several talented

people in Hargeisa, but
they needed direction
as did 1
regarding content. i gave
him some examples of
what I
considered to be appropriate
and was capable of doing,
stressing that 1 didn't
want to duplicate material
he had
planned for his classes,
when I asked Shawky what
his
curriculum entailed, he
became very defensive and
once
again expressed to me that
I not try to take
over his
program; that he had a Ph.D.
from Columbia and knew
what
he was doing.
i assured him that
I only wanted to know
What he was going to teach
so that I could plan my
classes accordingly. He
informed me that what he was
to
do in his class sessions
was his business and that
he

likewise would not interfere
with my sessions, to wit, "i
have nothing to do with your
classes and you have nothing
to do with mine." (28)
Throughout the training there was
no concept of a team
approach.
To follow through on staff
development as defined by
Shawky, all interested people
were invited to discuss
their roles in the training. This
meeting occurred on 22
January, day seven of a 20 day
program,
shawky drew up a
schedule for the remaining 13 days.
Of the 58 available
class periods, he slotted eight for
himself, nine for me,
two organizational meetings, two
parties, and three student evaluations done by the staff, plus
one session with

Representative Blavo during his visit.

The remaining 33

sessions were filled with 22 people from the
community.
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Implementation
e 22

January meeting, Shawky
addressed three
main issues relevant to the
training program.
1)

Condition of Refuaee.q
Shawky described refugees
as:
"overdependent. .are totally
insecure enH
and behave
accordingly
unrer-t-;, m
in their
future., n
.

-i

2)

^at

is Communit y Pevel

Shawky emphasized that:
is the key to community
development
^

important as material
ch^nae ... Building
R
Change
a road is not necessariiv
process of woLing
problem, of planning
whit irto°h^
^
done, teaches something about ^
democracy and builds the road at
the same time.-

Bo le of the Co mmun ity Development

Wn-rVo>-

development workers are stimulators,
planners, coordinators, teachers .. ?hPv
They assist communities towards
self-help or
action where refugees organize to say
what
y need. .community development is a method...
i OCGS
_

.

£-^

S

•

Rather than addressing these areas, the
main issue
for discussion was to whom the CD
trainees would

report;

who would supervise them.

It had been Shawky 's intention

to have the supervision come from
qualified expatriates

with community development experience who
would work with
Somalis from the CD Units.
It was his concern that
CD

was a new phenomenon and needed strong guidance
and

training, especially in the area of supervision, by
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Skilled people.

AFSC, MCC, Action Aid,
and HCR all had
enthusiastic and talented staff
who wanted to become
involved and assist with
the supervision.

Langschwert

s idea

was to keep expatriates
from
having any Involvement
with the trainees' supervision.
-

Privately, with Abdulahi
Jama Samatar, Head of the
CD
Team in the Northwest, it
was agreed that that
arrangement would be followed.
shawky was very upset
with this decision as he saw
the CD Team as having-

philosophy behind the

.orr?-in?Ag

L%“-pe\--

He was right on both counts.
It allowed the HCR and nrc
to manipulate the program
to fit their personal interests

while they simultaneously sabotaged
the principles of CD.

Training Approach

Shawky 's training approach as described
in his end of
training evaluation report was:
"...full time training in a camp like situation;
intensive all day work; informal, but welldisciplined atmosphere; paper writing; small
discussion groups; problem solving approach;
use of
field case records; full participation;
supervised
recreation; very close and warm attention to
trainees; exchange of experiences among teaching
staff members." 30
(

)

As stated earlier, Shawky wanted:
No serious, unplanned repitition between lectures
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ssis-s ss;
Vet the lack of a team
approach facilitated a lack
of continuity from session
to session.
Shawky was
generally not in the classroom
if he was not teaching
and
as a consequence was
not exposed to contrary
philosophies
of CD and to sessions
which had nothing at all to
do with
CD.
This physical separation
from what was being

discussed, or better said
lectured, distracted from the
program's clarity and effectiveness,
as well, of course
from the content. As I
remember, Shawky sat in on only
seven sessions in which he was
not the leader, three of
which were mine.
For example, Langschwert told
the trainees that
refugees had to be c^vinced to
do what was good for
them. "You have to convince
them because it is in their
interest." (32)
Suleiman Gulaid from NRC stated that
refugees could not express themselves
and therefore you
had to plan for them, " Sitting in
Mogadisho, l can tell
you what every refugee needs.
l don't have to go to the
camp." This attitude was confusing
and destructive.
The Northwest Region Agriculture Development
Project
and The Muslim World League had well-planned
sessions

that were clear, interesting, and informative,
but for
the time and place, not particularly
appropriate to the
needs of the training.
in lieu of this, we could have

included more work on CD
skills, especially since
so
little time was allotted to
this area.

Another problem was the
absenteeism of Gulaid and
Jana.
Gulaid was present for only
two of a scheduled six
hours during the first
week.
Jama Samatar was present
for only two of his five
sessions and was frequently
criticized by shawky for having
little visible interest
in the students.
The breakdown for the entire
training follows:
Total number of instructional
sessions
= 67

.

The figures illustrate that over
55% of class time was
led by 24 different people, none
of whom had any idea
what the whole of the training
looked like and how they
integrated with other trainers. Many
presenters had an
inadequate understanding of CD and a few
didn't believe
in It.
They were primarily agency directors and

representatives explaining their work in the
Northwest.
Some merely introduced their organizations.
Others
taught skills, i.e. administration, gardening,
statistics, etc.

The critical question raised by this data is

continuity from class to class.

it has already been

mentioned that Shawky knew not what

I

was teaching and
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that
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was only aware of his
content by sitting in on
his
lessons,
similarly, the instructors
from the community
only participated during
their particular session
and had
no first hand knowledge
of what the others were
doing
except for Lutful Kabir
of CARE and B.P. sharma
from the
Technical School, who planned
their work together.
i was
frustrated in trying to
integrate and share the
I

presentations because

wanted nor did

I

never knew exactly what
Shawky

want to duplicate his
material.
The other end of this is
that some important CD
skills were not being addressed
at all.
A significant
component of CD work is organizing
and facilitating group
discussions, yet the trainees
received virtually no
training in this area. Originally
it was my intention to
emphasize this in the NFE classes,
but as the training
progressed, it was my understanding
that Shawky was going
to do this in his “Working
with Groups" sessions. Not to
point a figure at anyone, it was
a typical example of
poor communications between him
and me.
I

January 22nd was the day when all
prospective
teachers gathered and the only time
such a meeting
occurred.
it would have been a more effective
meeting
had It been arranged before the start
of the
training.

Some people, like Jane Cole, Regional
Director for
UNICEF, didn't know the training had begun
and wondered
why no one had contacted her. Other
organizations were
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similarly confused.
There was a tendency among
some people in the
Northwest to criticize Shawky
for the confusion.
On the
one hand, this is justified
as he had not shared any
concrete planning concerning
curriculum previous to his
arrival.
However, HCR/Hargeisa could
have reduced this
confusion considerably by
projecting a more positive
attitude in a public
relations/information sharing way.

Notable Incidents
The incentive for Jama and
Gulaid and NRC in general
to participate in this
training was financial, as well as
political.
The refugee business, operates
on the

principle of maximized accumulation.

During the training

this was done through intimidation
and manipulation.
At the first organizational meeting
on day one. Jama
was absent.
The students had many concerns that
they
presented instead to Douale who worked
closely with me on
the training.
He passed them on to Jama who told
Douale
he was to have nothing to do with
the trainees.
This
attitude was consistent with his lack of
regard for the
trainees and the program. When present at
the training,
he promoted neither discussion nor
problem solving.
At the end of the first week of training,
Shawky was
upset with Jama's abscence from the training.
He was

also irritated that Jama hadn't paid the
trainees their
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walk around allowance.

Again, Douale was asked
to find
him in Hargeisa and get
the noney.
This tine, Douale and
I were both acoussed
by Jama of making trouble
for him.
The following day, the
students were upset over the
lack Of food and asked me
how many Shillings had
been
allocated in the budget. I
told them to ask Jama since
ha was in charge of this.
Three days later they asked
me
again because Jama had not
been available for comment.

Eighty Shillings a day for
28 days for 40 people had
been
budgeted. The students complained
to me that of this
3200/- a day, the cooks were
receiving only 1000/= a day
for food.
I shared this information
with Shawky who
proceded to call me a trouble
maker.
Douale, Hussein,

and

suggested to the students that they
bring up this
issue with Jama at the next
organizational
I

meeting.
The
1000/= a day were never mentioned
at the meeting, but it
was agreed to form a food committee
of three student

representatives who would provide input
into the
planning, but no action was ever taken.

A student food committee was part of the
1983 parasocial workers training and it had been
our (HCR Program

Officer El Tayeb, the social workers, and

I)

intention to

incorporate it into this training, but Langschwert
was
strongly against the idea of students having this
control, as he told El Tayeb and me, "They should
have no
control, otherwise we should just give them the money."
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So Instead it went home
with Jama Samatar.

Perhaps the most revealing
incident of the training
began in a class session I
was leading on self-reliance.
The discussion centered
on whether political
democracy or
economic democracy was the
most critical first step
in
initiating a democratic society.
A few days
later,

received

I

warning letter from Langschwert
accusing me of
causing trouble and interfering
with the
a

training.

Training Budget
The final training budget of
162,000/=
authorized nor did l ever see a copy
of it.

authorized budget

I

was never
The

have included is for 159,890/=.

The

line Item amounts came largely
from the suggestion of
NRC/Mogadisho Director of Training, Jusuf
Dunqal.
The
accounts sheet of training expenditures
from this budget
arrived in Mogadisho two months after
the training
finished. It was accommpanied by neither
vouchers nor
receipts.
i discussed the irregularities
of the budget
with Mieke Weeda, Head of HCR Social Services.
On 29 April 84 she sent a letter to Dunqal
informing

him there were no vouchers or receipts accompanying
the

expenditures statement.

"You will note," she wrote,

"the

discrepancies between the amount and lines in the
approved budget and the final accounts."

No one was ever

held accountable nor any action taken regarding these

discrepancies
Below is a copy of the
original budget,
In the
column to the right is my
estimate of what was spent

legitimate training needs.

on

in August 1985 I sent a

letter to HCR/Mogadisho
requesting a copy of the final
evaluation report with the
statement of expenditures, but
received no reply. These figures
illustrate that only
1/4 of the training budget was
spent on the program.
Co mmunitY Development Training Pro
g ram Budget

DSA for 30 Trainees @ 20/= a day
x 28
Food 80/= @ day x 40 x 28-

Jan-Feb 84

Budget

Spent

16,800

9,700
20,000

89 600
,

Local Hirp

Librarian/Secretary § 70/= @ day x 28
Secretary @ 70/= @ day x 28
I4 Group Leaders
Consultants each 350/day x 5
1 Training Director incentive
Cook 60/= /day x 28
Cook Ast. 50/= /day x 28
Language instruction 48 hrs.
/ 80/= Incentive Fund
0 Air Fare from Mogadisho
Towels 30 each 120/=
Recreational games
Miscellaneous and unanticipated
expenses

0

1,960
,800

4

1,750
2 000
1,680
1,400
3 840
,

,

0

000
1,200
2

,

0
0

,

-14

000
— 600
— 600
— 1,500

0
0

,

3

,

3

,

1,840
0

15 000

3

159,890

42

.

Budget Increase

3

840
600

,

,

000
180

110
162 000
2

,

,

Evaluation

There were two evaluation periods; one circa day 10
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and one at the end of the
training.
The interviewers
were usually shawky, Douale,
Hussein, and I.
it was
during these sessions that
Shawky 's caring for the
students usually surfaced as
well as his frequent use of
the words dependency to
describe what existed and

democracy to describe what was
needed.
There was no such
thing as failing a student,
neither the Hiis students who
had no interest in CD, the NSS
informant, nor the three
students who had no capacity with
English and therefore
had no linguistic understanding
of classroom
activities.

The instructors were evaluated
anonymously by the
students.
The students expressed considerable
across the
board appreciation for the training
and instructors.
They were also, however, explicit in
their distrust and
dislike for Samatar, Gulaid, Blavo, and
Langschwert.

Conclusion
At the end of the last trainee evaluation
interview,
Shawky turned to me and said, "My friend, we
have

performed
was.

I

was not sure what the miracle

Speaking subjectively, Shawky was very insecure in

his role.
me.

miracle," but

a

I

I

think he felt threatened by HCR, NRC, and

think he also felt great concern for the safety of

the social workers and the trainees.

He had a strong

conviction to democratic principles and CD neither of
which were alive and well in Somalia, and this I'm sure

had him concerned with his own
job security.
Mieke Weeda asked me in Mogadisho
if this program
was worth continuing. My reply
was that in its present
state, it only served to support
the elite status quo of
NRC and HCR; that it now
legitimized a corrupt CD program
which would exploit refugee aid
to the personal

aggrandizement of the few who held power.
At an emotional level it meant a

lot to the trainees

to have the educational experience,
but as soon as Shawky
was gone and I was moved from the
Northwest, the program

was coopted by HCR and NRC, two
autocracies with no
interest in participatory processes.
A miracle?

Certainly not of the Red Sea parting or

the 69 Mets variety.

Actually, when 3/4 of your budget

is siphoned and you have no political
base to prevent

that from happening, miracles are easy to come
by.

Summary
This chapter has discussed the planning, design,

implementation, and evaluation of a training program for

community development workers in Northwest Somalia.

Similar to Chapter Five, Chapter Six illustrate the

contradictions and difficulties of doing

a

training.

It is important to recognize that the power relationships

present at the local level in this training program are

consistent with the political dynamics at the national

and regional levels.
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ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
"We thought you were someone
dangerous, like a
journalist."
Major Daoud, April 1984
1
(

)

"We Have a Big Mess Here"

When asked about the refugee
program, Robert J.
Luneburg, Head of the US Food
Program in Somalia in 1981,
had no doubts that it was
dramatically wrong:
record about that. It's a
these people
oreak
breafuo'th^?r
up their traditional relationshipson a dole and
of familv
and clan without ruining the
^
society.
it's
^ disaster.
And
goes on, the more disastrous it is." the longer it
dis4st»i^'

(2)

UNHCR/Somalia Representative Hagenbuchle
called the
program a "disservice to the people
it was meant to aid."
"When you have a relief operation
carrying
on like
must, to an extent, admit the
rhocf
possibility,
even the probability, that a
substantial number of people have been
attracted
because you have a focal point.
it may create a
momentum which encourages people to come."
3
;

_

(

)

In December 1983, Assistant HCR
Representative

Robert Smyser told volags in Hargeisa, "We
have
mess here

.

"

(

4

a

big

)

For Edward Rist, World Food Program Representative,
the refugee situation in Somalia was "a disaster."
"You know, a few days ago I did a big TV thing interview.
Why didn't I tell the truth? Well, l
would have lost my job for one thing.
But that's
not the point.
The point is that if I'd told the
truth, the whole thing might have come crashing
down, and then what would happen?" (5)
254

The truth.
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.

An acquaintance of mine
was once put under house
arrest in Hargeisa.
Major Daoud of the Somali
army later
apologized to her, "We are
sorry, but we thought
you were
someone dangerous, like
a journalist."
My first day in Somalia
I received a briefing
from
HCR Deputy Representative,
Onesima Silveira.
I asked him
to clarify some of the
ethnocentric issues and their
relationship to my work. He
declined to offer any
explanation.
"We do not talk about
tribes," he said.
"Everything you need to know
you will find out in
Hargeisa." End of briefing.

My next meeting with Silveira
was initiated by a
report I had written concerning
Somali military
recruitment of about 350 young men
in Dari Ma'an refugee
camp (Chapter Five)
silveira told me

to leave the
Somali army alone, that this was
their country and that
we could not tell them how to
run it.
when I asked if
recruiting of refugees was not against
international law.
He replied that the people taken
were all deserters.
Silveira added that when I learned how
the UNHCR
operated, a person of my ability could
have a very
successful career with the organization.
"There are a
lot of benefits with the UN," he said,
"A person can have
a nice career with them."
.

Although not stated,

I

understood that silence was
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Official policy.

CARE food monitor
reports were often
edited to be in suitable
language when they left
the
country.
January 1934, an official
from HCR/Geneva
was visiting the
HCR/Hargeisa office and ashed
be about
food distribution.
1 shared some
concerns that a food
monitor had discussed with
me that weeh and suggested
to
the HCR Official that
he talk with the monitor.
Before
returning to Geneva, he told
me that the monitor had
not
acknowledged some of the
critical issues I had
mentioned:
"It's not as bleak as you
make it sound," he said.
I was stuck.
I had committed the
error of
discussing controversial
elements of a colleague's
program with an outsider.

m

"Was he keeping something
from me?" he inquired.
"I won't contest what the
monitor told you," I replied,
but It would be good if you
could experience a food
distribution.

Cramer writes:
compel this silence? the
machine runs, after a while, on its
own
mo™
5
momentum.
.Few will blow the whistle on
their
own
programs. Would we ever see a relief
grou^
money.
We may have
erred?^^^*
.

in any business, success is
life-saving intervention, wellpublicized, that draws more donations and,
hence
more contracts, more programs, more
jobs." 6
(

)

Neal Kenny of SCF/Somalia compared his
agency to a
business, stressing the importance of
good publicity and

257

good exposure:

after the same^refugee^doilar°as^ev^^^^^^

going

SsSL“~
room to

move!°“nf

For Mark Masters, Team
Leader for Interchurch
Response, business was going
well:

^

“
to be
h
booming
business.
I
mean,
^
for
me
23
it^rrhPh
It
s the business to be in
now. You travel vou ael

here

for ?he Kxt six
our e^Senses are'taLn ca^e^Sl

Although

I

“p

am always disgusted with media
and

personal misinformation and deception,
it was easy to
comprehend in Somalia as I came to
understand the
different fears and interests with
which people were
^P®^^ting, including the refugees.

Expatriates with the best of intentions
found
security in silence. One health worker
told me she

refused to answer a visitor's questions
when she asked
about corruption.
She was afraid it would become public
and less food would be sent to starving
people.
I

often thought of Freire's "culture of silence",

putting the HCR, State Department, and volags into
this
context.

Most foreigners in the refugee business in

Somalia had careers and organizations to protect.

This
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preoccupation with personal
protection and nurturance
of
privilege precluded empowering
themselves to confront a
power structure that was
generally resented as unfair
and
corrupt, for fear of
reprisal.
Refugees used similar
logic when deciding how
to get involved with
a project,

avoid controversy, or when
to simply remain anonymous.’
Yet it is these government
and NGOs that impose the
hetoric of self-reliance
and empowerment on camp
populations without recognizing
that they themselves are
neither empowered nor self-reliant
to begin
with.

The punishments for speaking
out are real.
HCR
Representative Art DeFehr was asked
by the SDR to leave
When he requested more
accountabilty of financial and
material resources.

HCR removed me from the Northwest
border for
identifying irregularities with
HCR policy and promoting
in their place alternative
approaches that may have been
less wasteful, less harmful, and
more self-determinant
for camp populations.
During my contract with the HCR,
Geneva requested two reports from me
concerning my work.
Neither left Somalia, as they were covered
up by HCR
administration. My boss, Helmut Langschwert,
later told
that he did it to 'protect' mei
had read your report, they wouldn't have
liked It and you would never have gotten a
career
with the UN." (9)

The feeling of several agency people was
that the
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refugee program was so
overwhelming that individuals
made
no difference; that the
system was so entrenched and
lumbering, that one had to
move with it at its own
velocity, merely reacting
to its moods.

Hagenbuchle's Deputy saw the
program as a long
'

chain:

intervene, then you have to do

S

And Saris whK
S^doinr^wr^r^^ probably the
worst thing we could
Michael Maren, Food Monitor for
AID, was one of the
few and perhaps the most
articulate in describing a
condition of self-rightousness,
self-interest, and
naivete within the relief effort.
Michael saw
the food

diversion as a symptom of a much
greater problem in
Somali society:
"You know, a volag or UNHCR or some
expat team will
^
they Sant So d^
And that plan takes on a life of its
own.
it

Sr-SiiS

""

^

For Maren, we were engineering a gross
change in
Somali society, "and doing it, even with
good intentions,
blindly and ignorantly." He considered the
media's

cooperation with the volags as largely culpable
for the
misrepresented images in the States and Europe. With
refeience to Kenny's (SCF) emphasis on the importance
of
packaging the agency's product, Maren felt this was lying
by omission resulting in:

"...things that will turn this mass jumble of
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-ttlers, one
United Statesians live in
an anesthetized society.
To deal with social
realities, many dull their
senses
with alcohol and pills.
Many use the fantasies of
television soap operas and
situation comedies while
nurturing their fears with the
violent images

of "Miami

Vice" and Rambo.

others use their bank accounts
to buy
self-esteem or rid themselves,
upon seeing the picture of
a starving child, of
middle class guilt.

The giving, says Maren, becomes
self-perpetuating:
a voluntary agency needs
is money
In**order^t
n order to get money they have
to do somethino to
give something. They have to
come up wi^f
proposals.
They have to get grants.

They're under pressure to come up
Success IS growth - doing more so with oroiects
you're gettinq
more, so you're giving more,
having morl
result, which means more visibility
which means more money, which means
more jobs to'
proposals to offer, more desks, more
telex, or even an airplane and
direct phone links to New York,
creating needs. You create needs so you
can
-With the food you create a camp, which
water.
It needs medical clinics
because these people have never lived in
this
proximity and contagion. They need fuel for
first time because they can't find firewood the
for so
many people.
•

You make need for sanitation, for transportation,
for education in mass. And because the land
cannot
support thousands of people in one place, they need
food in perpetuity. Which means roads and trucks
and fuel and storehouses and logistics men - all
needs the volags are jumping to fulfill.

And everthing that's added creates more need.
in a
poor country like Somalia, more means more foreign
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help.

And that means more
Something is backward here dependence
"
(13)

not less.

Durable Solutions
Bob Koepp, Head of the WFP
office in Hargeisa, used
to throw his hands in the
air and say in both a joking
and serious way, "Just send
them back where they came
from."
It is well documented that
the main influx of
camp populations were in
1979, a response to advertised
food in Somalia, not from the
war in 1977-78. The camps
in 1987 are a result of this
relief effort. Take away
the food and the camps may very
well disappear.
It is a little ironic, but it
was my Somali

colleagues who would admit, off the
record, that everyone
in the camps had a place to go;
that everyone had family;
that the clan would provide.
it was Somalis who told me
of their herds in the Ogaden and
occasionally returning
there for meat and milk.
Somalis told me that as long as
the food comes, the country will take it,
and smiling the
"I know you know" grin, that Barre will
manipulate the
West for every gram of wheat flour he can.
I

can not document that everyone has a place to go,

could well be the case.

There were several Oromos

who mentioned to me that they would leave the country
if
the Somali government would let them.

estimated maybe

a

Some expatriates

few hundred or a few thousand Oromos

would need assistance in some form.

The point is, they

would emphasize, it is not
one million, a high
ranWng
AID official in Mogadisho
estimates "maybe 100,000
refugees in the camps."
Nine out of thirteen State,
AID,
and FFP employees
interviewed see food as the
incentive
for refugees to come to
and stay in Somalia,
six of
these people replied that
the Ogadenis are in Somalia
as
support for Barre. The other
interviewees declined to
respond to this question or
said they didn-t

'

know.

(14)

AS Of April 1987, Somalia
(according to AID and FFP)
has 14 months of grain
reserves for everyone in the
country, much of this from
their own agricultural
production. Now would be a very
appropriate time to
begin cutting back the food.
A reduction in food aid has
been suggested by some decision
makers in Washington.

The 1985 allotment was 38,000
metric tons, in 1986 it was
35,000 metric tons.
1987, 33,000 metric tons are
being sent. Twenty-three thousand
metric tons are
planned for 1988.

m

While discussing these figures with
AID people in
April 1987, a cable arrived from the
SDR indicating
a

food shortage in their country.

Two refugee affairs

officials complained that Barre was trying
to manipulate
more food from the US:
"He (Barre) does this.
Whenever we talk about
cutting back food, he comes up with a crisis food
shortage situation. He knows that this ploy works
with some people here." (15)
In conjunction with the food reduction to
Somalia,
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the US must stop giving food
assistance to Colonel
Mengistu.
If the US is seriously
concerned with social
lustice and feeding the hungry,
it will work with the
organizations of the liberation
groups defending

themselves against Mengistu.

However,

for this to
happen, US policy in the
region must change from

imperialism to one that supports
the legitimacy of
autonomous and self-determinant
movements.

Similarly,

the role of the UN and volags
must be re-examined to
clarify if they support oppressive
governments or people
Struggling against these governments.

The Developers

The Washington Interviews were
conducted at the
State Department Building and at the
Arlington offices
for AID and FFP.
I was surprised by the amount
of time
was given.
People with whom I had appointments introduced me to and gave me the names and numbers
of other

contacts.

My observation was that people wanted to
talk

about their work.

Usually within the first 5-10 minutes

of the interviews, the following comments
were made:

"None of this is for attribution."

"Forget where you got this."
"I don't want my name anywhere in your book."

"If my name comes up in your work, I'll deny we had
this conversation."

"Keep me out of your bibliography."

I
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want to remain anonymous."

All Of the people with
whom

I

talked in Washington have

been given anonymity.

Three people did not raise
the
issue Of anonymity, but they
are getting it in fairness
to everyone.
The interviews became less
guarded when
anonymity was promised, although
I always felt the
interviewees were holding back.

There are many secrets in
Washington; information
that is disguised and concealed.
Who are the secrets
protecting? Does this covered
up information protect you
and me? Does it protect
refugees in the Horn? Or does
it protect the secret keepers?
On the Community Development
questionnaire, 81% of
the respondents indicated that
it is common for agencies
to cover up the truth through
their silence,

unwillingness to confront authorities,
or intentional
misrepresentation of facts. (16)
One State Department employee answered
this statement:
It's common for everyone to do that if
it is
perceived to be in their best interests."

What does "best interests" mean?

Does it mean some

people are silent because they recognize the
benefits
they receive from being in a dominant position
of

society, or because they are scared, or because they

actively collude with the oppression because they are
seduced and debased by the dehumanizing social and

economic values of the system for which they work?
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Ninety one percent of the
respondents agreed that
there is active competition
and suspicion among the
agencies. ( 17
)

one respondent who agreed
with this statement wrote
that
this suspicion must be
viewed in another context:
about mistrust here where

similar response.”
This is a good point.

°®P^'^ais,

T

etc., I'd give a

Why should the political

dynamics of working with refugees
in Somalia be different
from the business of health
care in the US? What are the
ethical considerations for working
with refugees
in

Somalia and are they any different;
should they be
different from the concerns we have
when working in the
states? Maren has stated that
refugee work is a
business, self-serving, incompetent,
and corrupt, where
"We're all after the same refugee
dollar," all after
power and control
In terms of community development,
only one of the

questionnaire respondents thought refugees had
the power
to identify problems and control their
programs.
(18)

was viewed to be mostly in the interest of
the SDR.

CD

(19)

One respondent wrote:
"If community development schemes exist, they are
operating in a climate of NRC corruption, UNHCR
incompetence, and volag competition."

Among the Washington interviewees no one thought
that refugee projects were primarily in the interest of
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refugees.

The main benefactor
they thought, was the
Somali government. (20) No
Washington respondent thought
that a community development
program existed. One
State Department advisor
stated that the primary
objective of programs in
Somalia was to create a
market
economy which would be in
the interest of the US.
During the Iran-Contra
Hearings, Secretary of state
Charles Schultz emphasized
that us foreign policy
existed
for the benefit of the
United states and no one
else.

He

stressed that foreign aid was
intended for those
countries who cooperated with
the United States.
He went
so far as to say that we
should call foreign aid US aid
because its primary intent was
to aid and strengthen the
United States rather than develop
other countries.
This self-serving attitude is
common among the
population working within the US
foreign aid structure.
Consider the Peace Corps television
promo that shows the
volunteer in Louga, Senegal stating,
"I've made
a lot of

friends here, but more important, I've
made a lot of
friends for America."

Secretary Schultz agrees that aid is much
more a
matter of promoting strategies to meet US
political and
economic objectives. Aid can safeguard these
interests
by rewarding friends and penalising "enemies".

Representative Broomfield from the Hearings Committee
concurred with Schultz, "Let's look at foreign policy
as
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'that's good for America."

us aid is a way of opening
up markets be it with
high technology or food
assistance. Hayter and Watson
suggest:
"Once a country has imported
a steel mill

for imports fr^^"?^:
s^rsoSrcl!"
,

If the aid had not been
avai^abll

nr-

-raiir

LanSo^^f""

irtL°firsl

cases,
oases' have
have"be®’'^^^®
been provided from local sources."
(21)
US aid IS also a mechanism to
inhibit ("rollback")
social, political, and economic
reform movements in

exploited countries, while controlling
and reinforcing
governments that are considered
cooperative.
January

m

Eliot Abrams was in Central America
telling
governments in the region to support the
Contras or else
US aid to these countries would
be cut off.
88,

(22)

When Charles Wick was appointed as
Reagan's director
of USIA, he commented that it was an
excellent position
from which to fight communism. Under Wick,
the intent of
USIA programming has been to reward elites
from

cooperating countries.

in January 1987,

"The Guardian"

recognized Charles Wick as "Anti-communist of the
year"
in the Reagan administration.

US aid in Somalia supports the Barre government

while simultaneously creating dependency on wheat flour
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and arms, although Barre
is upset with the type
of
weaponry he has been receiving
from the US so has gone
to
China and Romania for other
weapons. (23)
six
of 13

Washington interviewees agreed
that US refugee assistance
to Somalia is creating
dependency.
Five of 13 disagreed,

two Of Whom said the
assistance is creating markets.
Two’
people didn't know. (24)

Nine of these 13 said that food
was the incentive
for refugees to go to Somalia.
Three said
Marxism/Leninism and one person said the
drought.
25
Responding to the guestion:
(

)

Are the Ogadenis in Somalia for
the express
purpose of supporting the Barre
government?
Six out of six Washington respondents
answered "yes."

Volags Are Nice People But,
One NRC official in Somalia commented:

Volags are nice people and they mean well,
but they
do not know more than we do about our
people.
Somalis know what is best for Somalia, not
foreigners

.

Shawcross writes of Thailand:
The Prime Minister added that food for the new
arrivals should be bought in Thailand.
It would be
by Thais. He did not want any foreign
relief officials in the field.
"Send the supplies
to us.
We will do it." Then in a remark which
summed up what officials in third-world countries
often feel about international humanitarian
agencies, he said, "Refugee officials are wonderful
but unrealistic and only look at one aspect." This
was a clash of priorities which was to occur again
and again throughout the Cambodian drama, as through
many others." (26)
_
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So what doss thic;
i-iiis say to the ^
agencies and

individuals working within the
parameters of US foreign
policy, as well as the social,
economic, and political
realities of a recipient country?
How effective can an
agency or an individual be
in this system?
rian Walker, Director General
of Oxfam in 1979,
stated that all agencies should
accept the conditions set
by host countries:
"I think all agencies that
are guests in any countrv
must accept what is laid down by
^
the government

of

This was operational policy for
UNHCR/Somalia and led to
much criticism by voluntary agencies
that rebuked the HCR
for having no backbone, because
all the volags were under
the HCR umbrella.

The Politics of Aid

After the Cuban revolution, Fanon wrote that
the US
would have to actively work to establish a
counterrevolutionary force in the Caribbean and Central
America
if they wanted to prevent other Cubas from
happening.
"Progressives" in the Kennedy administration saw Peace
Corps and the Alliance for Progress as an alternative,

a

strategy under the guise of benevolence to contain the

contagion of liberation movements in the region.

(

28 )

My experiences with agricultural extension and rural

development work with Peace Corps in Colombia and Senegal
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were

weak attempts at taking the
edge off poverty by
participating in bogus rural
assistance programs that
gave neither political nor
economic power to people. On
the contrary, these programs
often resulted in debt and
loss of land for the poor.
When democratic reform movements
have occurred in
Latin America, the US has been
quick to respond with
military force. The US invasion
of the Dominican
Republic in 1965 with 20,000 troops
(up from 1900

soldiers when the US attacked in
1911) was an obvious US
preference for fascism as opposed to a
democratic
government that would have been more
difficult to
control. (29)

Dominican Republic President Juan Bosch
was not a
military threat. Neither was Fidel Castro
nor Arbenz in
1954.

The threat, of course, is an economic and

political model that can be followed by other
countries
if these models are allowed to succeed.
These models

threaten the "strategic interests" of the United
States

because they threaten imperial control as defended by
wing dictatorships in exploited countries.

Understanding this premise, it is easier to
understand why foreign aid is used to pay off our proxies
and why it is withheld to punish alternative economic
models.

Castro in Cuba, Manley in Jamaica, Goulart in

Brazil, Cheddi Jagan in Guyana, Popular Unity in Chile,
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he New Jewel Movement
in Grenada, and the
Sandinistas in
Nicaragua are a few examples
of the US cancelling
foreign
aid in an attempt to
destabilze a country.
When we were in New Zealand
in November 1984, the
Lange government declared
that their ports and sea
lanes
would not permit ships carrying
nuclear weapons. The
immediate response of the Reagan
administration was that
Lange's government was
influenced by communist elements.
The us discussed sanctions
against New Zealand

agricultural products, and ultimately
excluded New
Zealand from military manuvers
and the sharing of
intelligence as provided for under
the Anzus Treaty.
The following month, in Fiji,
my impression was
Fijians wanted the Ratu government
to declare a nuclear
free Fiji.
Prime Minister Ratu was in Washington

at that

time telling Reagan that his
nuclear warships would
always be welcome in Fijian harbors.

Fijians told me their island was economically
dependent on the US; that Ratu knew if
he didn't obey
Reagan, the US would delay food shipments
(primarily

wheat flour)

,

and cancel the bilateral agreement to buy

Fijian sugar, which the US did anyway.
In 1987, Fijians elected a new prime minister,
Dr.

Timoci Bavadra who advocated a nuclear free Fiji.

He was

promptly overthrown by the CIA with John Singlaub in
attendance.

(30)

The Reagan government had no comment
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other than to say it was a
racial incident in which the
Blacks overthrew the Indians.

A 1988 reality is that most
United Statesians avoid
dealing with the global
destructiveness wrought by this
country,
our educational system lulls
us into the
complacent thinking that it is
other peoples, other
races, and other cultures
that are destroying each other
and themselves from within.
United Statesians are

conditioned to be oblivious or to
misunderstand this
destruction in other countries, as
well as the selfdestruction in our own society.
Orwell understated the degree to
which the thought
police could control US society.
From "Dragnet" to "Dick
Tracy" i learned to be suspicious
of difference.
My
earliest images of Black, Asian, and
Native people framed
them in terms inferior to whites.
Foreigners were
inferior to people (white ones) born in
the United
States.
Notions of superiority deeply rooted in a

citizenry are essential to orchestrate a
foreign policy
mooted in the ideology of empire.
It allows,

for example, the notion that the United

States is above international law and can therefore

delegate legality in its own terms.

(31)

it legitimizes

rape, torture, and murder by proxy armies and death

squads in the name of a "free" world.

It also

facilitates self-rightous and condescending attitudes and
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bohavioirs towaird the poor".

Development workers should be
educators for social
responsibility. The historical
context of US oppression
in terms of race, class, and
gender must be understood.
The oppression is systemic,
rather than the work of
individuals, but it is individuals
who keep the system
going with naive band aid approaches
to social change.
US international aid programs are
similar to social

assistance programs in the US in that
they are necessary
for the corporate warfare/welfare
state to take the edge
off poverty.

It is an attempt to clean up the
plantation

just enough so the slaves won't revolt.

may become less desperate.

Some of the poor

Some slip through the cracks

to become active consumers in the economy,
which is

necessary to maintain the vision and myth of
upward
mobilization, but power relationships do not change.

Liberals advocating social change become

implementers of these programs and are simultaneously
coopted.

For the wealthy, social assistance is small

change and is necessary for the rich to maintain their

power and privilege in

a

system offering no significant

economic and political alternatives for the poor.

Self-Reliance
The key word in the Somali refugee business is self-

reliance.

The US is not a self-reliant nation.

Why
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should they promote a policy
that refugees in Somalia be
self-reliant?

Seventy-four percent of the
respondents do not view
self-reliance as a feasible
development objective in the
refugee camps, 71 % strongly
disagreeing. One volag
wrote, "Refugees and self-reliance
are two terms that
contradict each other."

Another volag worker wrote;
projects will make any difference
the refugees' oSn
didn't apply themselvis.
I'm
not
not^sure
sure if that was out of fear or
if they
^
^ ^just
wanted everything
given.

The government (Somali) was against
most of these
small projects. They wanted big
money
projects. .The only way to make refugees
reliant IS to get them out of the camps." self.

An AID respondent wrote that a real
"burden" is put
on the term self-reliance:
"I think if you separate the buzz
word from the real
word you get two different answers. Refugee
encampments on foreign (if i way) soil do not
allow
for freedom of choice or self-reliance,
per se.
Money is sent in to support people who await
a
^ political - solution.
That goes for
all buzz word" programs; "Community development",
"self-reliance", "self-sufficiency", etc.
On another plane, however, I think they offer
a
justifiable form of relief activity - once you've
defined the parameters. These projects target
economic assistance in ways which potentially
broaden the dispersion of such assistance. Simply,
these projects realize that people in captivity will
get assistance, and some of it is better tied to
needs other than food and shelter.
It will lead to
busy work, skewed implementation objectives, power
conflicts and no small sum of diversion, but it is
not worse in this regard than other assistance to
artificially constructed populations."
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do not deny that an element
of human concern is
involved with foreign aid.
There is David Crosby (1968)
I

"We can save the world, it's
dying," idealism combined
with activism. There is the
self-rightous "Somethings are
worth saving" Peace Corps add
displaying
a globe thrown

away in a waste basket.
have so much, the least

There is middle class guilt, "I
I

my life for these people."

can do is give up two years of
(

32

)

There are others who are well-aware
they are doing
nicely on the gravy train, "There is
a lot of money to be
made in the development pie and I want
my slice."
(

33

)

The Point

The point of this dissertation is to
share my

experiences.

The point is to raise questions to help

development workers "pack to go" or maybe unpack.
point is
UN,

n^

a volag,

The

to tell people they shouldn't work for the
or the US Government.

For me the deciding issue is power.

As a change

agent, as an educator for social responsibility,

I

have

more power here in the US than in any other country.
sphere of influence is the US.
articles,

I

I

My

write letters and

teach, do trainings and presentations, lead

workshops, vote

,

organize, and am in the streets (or in

the case of General Dynamics in the Groton River with the

Peace Navy) to protest illegal actions and injustice for
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Which this country is responsible.
do not have these forms of
expression in Somalia
or El Salvador.
My power to change US policy
in the Horn
or in Central America is here
in the States.
I will continue to work
in other countries, but with
organizations that are in solidarity
with governments
I

I

can support.

will return to Nicaragua or work
with the
FMLN, but not with US foreign
aid that supports the
contras or Duarte.
I

USAID and USIA do not support liberation
movements
such as the ANC, Sahrawi, and the
EPLF.
They do support
"controlled villages", homelands, and the
generals
in

Central America.

The US government chooses to work with

South Africa and Ethiopia.

It is their choice.

I

choose

differently.
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Appendix A
COLATED DATA FROM WASHINGTON
INTERVIEWS
The following questions were
primary areas of
discussion. There are different
numbers of responses for
different questions because not
all interviews addressed
the same issues.
Is self-reliance a feasible
objective in Somali
refugee camps?
1.

0-0%

Yes

No

11 - 85%

Don't Know

2

- 15%

Is refugee assistance creating
dependency?

2.

6-46%

Yes

No

5 - 38%

Don't Know

2

-

15%

Was food aid sent to Ethiopia in
1985 to wean
Mengistu from the USSR to the US?
3.

Yes

- 0%,

0

No

7

- 70%,

Maybe

1

-

Didn't work 2-20%

10%,

What is the incentive for Ethiopians to
leave their
country for Somalia?
4.

Refugee food
Drought
5.

9

- 69%,

Marxism/Leninism

3

- 23 %

1-8%

Is it politically expedient for Barre to
have a large

number of Ogadeni refugees in Somalia for support?
Yes
6.

6

- 100%

Is food aid to Somalia a disincentive to local

farmers because it competes with their production?
Yes

3

- 60%

No

1

- 20%

Don't Know

7.

In whose interest are refugee projects?

SDR

2

- 40%,

HCR

1

- 20%,

US

1

- 20%,

1

- 20%

Business

1

- 20%
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Appendix B

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE
LETTER
«ith some of you

concerning

inclosrr^eriirnriiII^®"''°‘^
opinir^i

""

completing the

II III ?iiirit°iiii’^L^i:ii

iriiir

DIRECTIONS
Please express your opinion concerning
the
^estionnaire s responses. If you strongly
disagree with
the statement, please write a 0
in the space provided
statement; pleLe writ4 a
r
j.
IluI’IIIi
Your
choices are these:
'

Strongly Disagree,
False Statement

Mostly
Disagree

Mostly
Agree

Strongly Agree,
True Statement

I encourage you to comment at
length and/or provide any
documented information that helps to substantiate
or
refute an argument.
If possible, I would enjoy getting
together with you to discuss these issues.

Enclosed is a self-addressed, stamped envelope.
I
realize you are probably immersed in your own work.
As
such, I very much appreciate your taking the
time to be
part of this research.
Sincerely,

Tom Neilson
Health Education
Health Services
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Ma 01003

a
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DATA FROM THE COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE
statement, the data is coded
in the following

Of projecfmlnagement?'

Disagree 22 -

96%

Agree

1

- 4%

Community development projects are
mostly identified
and designed by;

b.

1.

UNHCR

2

SDR

.

3 - 14%
10 - 55%
-Disagree 2 - 11 %
-Disagree 17 - 89%

Agree
Agree
Agree
Agree

19 - 86 %
8

- 45 %

17 - 89%
2 - 11 %

4.

refugees

c.

Community development projects are
managed by;
UNHCR
Disagree 9 - 50 %
Agree
9 - 50%
SDR
Disagree 9 - 47 %
Agree 10 - 53%
volags
Disagree 3 - 14 %
Agree 18 - 86%
refugees
Disagree 16 - 89%
Agree
2 - 11 %

1
2

.

3

.

4

.

.

Community development projects are mostly
in the
interest of;
1
UNHCR
5 - 26%
Agree 14 - 74%
2
SDR
Agree 20 - 91%
3.
4 - 21%
Agree 15 - 79%
4. refugeesDisagree 9 - 47%
Agree 10 - 53%
d.
.

2-9%

.

—

e. The community development program
is an integral part
of refugee settlement in Somalia.

Disagree

17 - 77%

Agree

5

- 23%

f. The goals and objectives of the
CD program are
understood, agreed to, and supported with the active
cooperation of all agencies.

Disagree

16 - 76%

Agree

5

- 24%

g. There is active competition and suspicion among the
agencies.

Disagree

2

-

If guestion g is true
are:

9%

h»

1*

'

Agree 20 - 91%

the competition and suspicion

among the volags.
Disagree

7

- 41%

Agree 10 - 59 %

.

2.

between the volags and the UNHCR,
Disagree

3

.

4-21%

Agree 15 - 79 %

between the volags and the Somali
government.
Disagree l - 5 %
Agree 19 - 95
%

4.

between the UNHCR and the Somali
government,
Disagree 2 - 10 %
Agree 18 - 90%

5.

within the UNHCR,
Disagree

6

- 50%

7

Agree

7

- 50 %

Agree 15

- 94 %

within the Somali government.
Disagree

-

1

6%

i. It is common for agencies
to cover up
through their silence, unwillingness to the truth
confront
authorities, or intentional misrepresentation

of facts.

Disagree

- 19 %

4

Agree 17

81%

is a feasible development objective
x
in
j

the refugee camps.

Disagree 17

- 74%

Agree

6

- 26%
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Appendix c
ABBREVIATIONS
AC

-

Africa Confidential
Service Committee
CARE - Cooperation for
American
Relief Everywhere
CDT^
CDI - Center for Defense
Information
CDT
Community Development Trainee
CDW
Community Development Worker
CHW ~ Community Health Worker
ELU - Emergency Logistics
Unit
EPLF
People's Liberation Front
ERA
^^itrean Relief Association
FHI
Food for the Hungry
FLC ~ Family Life Center International
FNLA
HCR : UN High Commission for Liberation of Angola
Refugees
lAC ~ Interagency Council
MLA
Liberation Army (South African
sponsor^d?^^
MPLA - Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola
^
MCC - Mennonite Central Committee
MSF - Medecins Sans Frontieres
NFD - Northern Frontier District
NGO - Non-Government Organization
NRC
National Refugee Commission
NSC - National Security Council
NWRAP
Northwest Regional Agricultural
NWRWSU - Northwest Regional Water Supply Project
Unit
OLF
Oromo Liberation Front
PVO - Private Volunteer Organization
RAU - Refugee Agriculture Unit
REST - Tigray Relief Society
RHU - Refugee Health Unit
RRC - Regional Refugee Commission
- Regional Refugee
RRC
Commissioner
SCF
Save the Children Federation
- Somali
SDR
Democratic Republic
SNM
Somali National Movement
SO
Sub Office (UNHCR)
SSDF - Somali Salvation Liberation Front
SSO
Social Services Office (UNHCR)
TPLF
Tigray People's Liberation Front
UNHCR - United Nations High Commission for Refufgees
UNITA - Unity for the Total Liberation of Angola (US
sponsored)
VITA - Volunteers in Technical Assistance
VOLAG - Voluntary Agency
WSLF - Western Somalia Liberation Front
-
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Appendix D
Somali Map
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